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Chapter 1: Introduction
The U.S.-China rapprochement of 1972 is regarded as one of the most important events
of the Cold War. In a self-congratulatory tone, Richard Nixon claims that it was “the most
dramatic geopolitical event since World War II.” Historians like Chen Jian and David Wilson
consider it, along with the Sino-Soviet border clashes, as “two of the most important events in
the international history of the Cold War.” 1 Thus far, scholars of the Sino-American
rapprochement have examined the Cold War international setting, domestic politics, and the
policy-making of the two governments. With most of the works focusing on the political aspect,
we know more and more about diplomacy and triangulation. However, we still know very little
about how people in the two countries came to learn about the change in relations and how each
nation prepared its people for the dramatic rapprochement.
Historiographical Survey
During the first decade after Nixon’s visit to China, American scholars who studied the
Sino-American rapprochement generally employed the “realistic approach” that emphasized the
balance of power among Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. These scholars explained the SinoAmerican thaw in light of the change in the international environment such as the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the eruption of Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 in
particular. They argued that Beijing’s fear of becoming the “next Czechoslovakia” compelled it
to seek reconciliation with Washington as a way to counterbalance the Soviet threat.2 Due to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980), 134; Chen Jian, Introduction to “All
under Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn toward Sino-American
Rapprochement, 1968-69,” ed. Chen Jian and David Wilson, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP),
Working Paper No.11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998), 155.
2
Harold C. Hinton, Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage, 1976), 28; A. Doak Barnett, China Policy: Old Problems and New Challenge (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1977), 2-3; Allen S. Whiting, China and the United States, What Next? (New York: Foreign
Policy Association, 1976); John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1983), 457.
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their lack of first-hand sources, especially those from China, these scholars used inferential
reasoning in explaining policy-making in both governments. Their speculations about policymaking in China were based on the American perspective.
In the 1980s, under the influence of Warren Cohen, a reformist movement occurred in the
study of China in the United States. Younger scholars began to criticize Sinologists of the first
generation, such as Barnett and Fairbank, for being Western-centric and proposed the “Sinocentric approach.” Cohen’s America’s Response to China was a direct counter-approach to
Fairbank’s “impact-response” theory, which argued that the modern history of China was a
response to Western impact.3 As a typical example of the Sino-centric approach, John Garver
evaluates the Sino-American rapprochement in terms of the “subtle political considerations” of
Chinese leaders. Pointing out that China was different from Eastern Europe, he especially attacks
the “next Czechoslovakia” thesis. He questions the importance of military deterrence and claims
that Mao and Zhou “looked to China itself to provide its main strategic deterrent,” calling it
“flattering” for Americans to imagine that Beijing “looked to Soviet apprehensions of American
disapproval to prevent a Soviet attack against China.”4
In the 1990s, many Chinese official documents were declassified, such as the manuscripts
of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, their writings on foreign policies, and their detailed
chronological records.5 These newly available materials have shed new light on the decision!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations
(New York: Wiley, 1971). For more about the impact-response theory and its critics, see Paul A. Cohen,
Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984).
4
John W. Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971 (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1982), 1, 149-55.
5
Document Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, ed., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao
[Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China]. vol. 13 (Beijing: Zhongyang
wenxian chubanshe, 1998); Li Ping and Ma Zhisun, eds., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1976 [a Chronological Record of
Zhou Enlai, 1898-1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China and Document Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, eds., Mao Zedong
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making in Beijing. Chinese scholars, with Party historians included, elaborated on how sagacious
Mao and Zhou were in their reading of international affairs, how adroitly they handled the
signals from the Nixon administration, and how they responded with subtlety. They gave the
impression that the Americans were more anxious than the Chinese in seeking rapprochement.6
After the formal normalization of Sino-American relations in 1979, several Chinese
students entered American universities for doctoral studies. Because of their bilingual capability,
they were able to read both American and Chinese declassified documents as well as the
memoirs of important participants in Sino-American rapprochement. Zhai Qiang examines
China’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Xia Yafeng reveals the importance of Sino-American
ambassadorial talks in communicating their genuine intentions to avoid dramatic confrontations.
In his study of Mao’s impact on China’s Cold War experience, Chen Jian argues that geopolitical
reasons were not sufficient to explain the complicated reasons for Mao’s decision to reconcile
with Washington. Emphasizing Mao’s ideology of “continuous revolution,” Chen argues that
Mao initiated a major breakthrough in China’s foreign relations to serve his domestic needs of
“boosting his declining reputation while enhancing the Chinese support for Mao’s communist
state.” Chen does not explain how Mao reconciled his “continuous revolution” ideology with the
decision to accommodate with the “most dangerous enemy of world revolution.” 7 These scholars
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
waijiao wenxuan [Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe and
shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and Document
Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, eds., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai
on Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990).
6
Gong Li, Kuayue honggou: 1969-1979 nian zhongmei guanxi de yanbian [Bridging the Chasm: The
Evolution of Sino-American Relations, 1969-1979] (Zhengzhou, China: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1992); Qian
Jiang, Pingpong waijiao muhou [Behind Ping-Pong Diplomacy] (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1997); and Yang
Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold
War History vol.1, no.1 (August 2000); Gong Li, “Chinese Decision Making and the Thawing of U.S.-China
Relations,” and Zhang Baijia, “The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States,
1954-1970,” in Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, eds. Robert Ross and Jiang
Changbin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
7
Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2000); Xia Yafeng, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington:
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have only briefly mentioned how Beijing prepared for Nixon’s visit in the official circle, but they
fail to consider how the Chinese government educated the general public through the media.
Among the more recent works on Sino-American rapprochement, Michael Lumbers has
done an extraordinary study on the bridge-building efforts of the Johnson administration. He
argues that a large part of the foundation for Nixon to start the China initiatives had been laid
during the administration of Lyndon Johnson, whose inactivity during the Cultural Revolution
even had merits because it did not push Sino-American relations to a worse situation. Margaret
MacMillan’s Nixon and Mao recounts the interactions between leaders of the two countries and
does a particularly nice job on the public-relations aspect of the Nixon trip. But her narrative is
limited to 1971-1972 with scant attention to the evolution of Sino-American relations in the
1960s. Taking advantage of the Nixon tapes, Chris Tudda reveals more insights about decisionmaking in the White House. He finds that Nixon and Kissinger, instead of employing “linkage
diplomacy,” “compartmentalized” Vietnam and China policies and delinked them from each
other. However, his argument that the Nixon administration did not intentionally play the China
card against the Soviet Union until after Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in 1971 is open to
debate.8 Nixon and Kissinger would probably not agree with him.
The change in U.S. domestic politics is another important theme in the study of SinoAmerican rapprochement. Rosemary Foot, for example, focuses on the establishment of
“domestic consensus” of the 1960s based on a broad understanding that China could not be
ignored and would be better dealt with directly because it was no longer as menacing as had been
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Indiana University Press, 2006); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2001), 239, 270-1.
8
Michael Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China During the Johnson
Years (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2008), 202, and Lumbers, “‘Staying out of This Chinese
Muddle’: The Johnson Administration’s Response to the Cultural Revolution.” Diplomatic History vol. 31, no. 2
(April 2007): 259-94; Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: the Week that Changed the World (New York:
Random House, 2007), 150-2; Chris Tudda, A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2012), 206-7.
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thought to be the case in the 1950s. She deals with the persistent efforts of several officials in
pushing for a reconsideration of the China policy, such as James Thomson Jr., Roger Hilsman,
Robert Komer, Edward Rice, Chester Bowles, and Edwin Reischauer, who were mostly seniorlevel bureaucrats specialized in China, along with legislators such as the Kennedys and Mike
Mansfield (D-MN).9
Evelyn Goh, Foot’s student at Oxford, uses “discursive analysis” to look at the
rapprochement through the evolving but at the same time competing images of China in the
official as well as academic discourses, which shifted China from a “red menace” to “troubled
modernizer and resurgent power” to a “tacit ally.” Similar to Foot, she argues that “the 1960s
revisionist discourse constituted an important legacy for the Nixon administration’s eventual
rapprochement with China and they helped to forge a significant internal official consensus on,
and to prepare public opinion for, the need to improve relations with China.”10 One problem with
Goh is that she pays little attention to the media, which constituted very important carriers of
those discourses.
The domestic consensus concerns not only domestic politics, but also public opinion.
Based on the analysis of public polls, Leonard A. Kusnitz does not accept the concept of a
“Nixon Turnaround.” In his opinion, the “mind blowing” statement by the Washington Post in
response to Nixon’s announcement of his China trip simply “shows a neglect of the very real
prior moves the president had made toward China and the way opinion reacted to these

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon
Press, 1995), 18. See also Foot, “Redefinitions: The Domestic Context of America’s China Policy in the 1960s,” in
Ross and Jiang, eds., Re-examining the Cold War, 264-75. For Congress and Sino-American relations, see Xu
Guangqiu, Congress and the U.S.-China Relationship, 1949-1979 (Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 2007).
10
Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to
“Tacit Ally” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11-13, 262.
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actions.”11 Steven Mosher also argues that American academics provided Nixon with a “readymade image of the New China, stamped with the scholarly seal of approval, which he in turn
could sell to the American people.”12
Examinations of domestic politics and public opinion have enabled scholars to see the
Sino-American thaw as a result of gradual change and to trace its foundation to a much earlier
period. Nonetheless, as important influencers of public opinion, the media in both countries have
not been systematically studied. Chang Tsan-Kuo, a student of communication, does look at the
relationship between the press and America’s China policy by using statistics and polls, which
demonstrates how the image of China and Sino-American relations evolved between 1949 and
1984. However, I do not agree with his argument that the press was only a “surrogate” for policy
makers rather than independent voices for alternative views.13 I believe that the U.S. media did
make an independent contribution to the reconciliation between the two countries. His work
lacks a historical context, and more importantly, a perspective from the Chinese media.
Between what happens in the political world and people’s formation of their views there
is a link to which few scholars pay attention. That is, how people learned about the developments
of Sino-American relations through the media, or how the media transmitted the political
information to the public. Harold Lasswell describes media transmission as a process involving
“who says what to whom through which medium with what effects.” 14 The media effects
concern not only the incident and the audiences, but also what happened in the transmission
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949-1979 (Westport,
CT: Greenwood, 1984), 132-7.
12
Steven W. Mosher, China Misperceived: American Illusion and Chinese Reality (New York: BasicBooks,
1990), 139.
13
Chang Tsan-Kuo, The Press and China Policy: The Illusion of Sino-American Relations, 1950-1984
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1993), 247.
14
Harold D. Lasswell, “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society,” in The Process and
Effects of Mass Communication, ed. Wilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois
Press, 1971), 84.
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process. Therefore, what people know about an incident does not necessarily mirror what
actually happened. I am interested in how the media in both countries covered Sino-American
relations at different time periods. While most other scholars use the media as tools or purveyors
of government policies in studying the Sino-American rapprochement, I take the media
themselves as my objects of study. My focus is not so much on “why” Sino-American
rapprochement could happen, but on “how” it came about in the media.
Significance & Research Questions
The media are important for studying U.S.-China reconciliation for several reasons. As
the chief means by which the public gathers information about current issues, the media had a
large impact on the public. Here “the public” refers to those who demonstrate an interest in a
particular issue or in politics in general.15 Instead of reporting the information “objectively,”
media transmit information to the public through a subjective process of selectivity, placement,
images, and opinions. They can prioritize issues that the editors or publishers think are more
important and suppress stories or opinions that they do not like. In their coverage, they may use
symbols or images that have particular effects. Even for the same political event, different media
may pick different emphases and come up with dramatically different interpretations. Therefore,
the media’s representation of events relating to the two countries influenced their audiences’
perception of Sino-American relations.
Media affected public officials “indirectly,” through their impact on opinion registered in
polls, and indirectly, through official media monitor’s “impressionistic evaluations” of a story or
a newscast.16 Their influence on public opinion is best reflected in their ability to set the agenda.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Melvin Small, Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1994), 7. See also John C. Pierce, Kathleen M. Beatty, and Paul R. Hagner, The Dynamics
of American Public Opinion: Patterns and Processes (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1982), 97, 13.
16
Small, Covering Dissent, 10.
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Bernard Cohen, one of the earliest scholars who study the relationship between the press and
U.S. foreign policy, claims that the press is not only a “purveyor of information and opinion,”
but also has agenda-setting functions. As he argues, the press may not be successful in telling
people “what to think,” but it is generally successful in telling the audience “what to think
about.”17
Cohen made the claim at a time when newspapers were the dominant channel through
which people learned about current issues. Since the 1960s, television has replaced newspapers
as the dominant medium. The development of television consolidated the media’s power to set
agendas for political issues. In terms of foreign policy, media could place an issue or region on
the U.S. foreign policy agenda that was not already there or move an issue or country presently
on the agenda to a higher level of policy consideration. As Jimmy Carter once said, sometimes a
particular event “may not warrant preeminent consideration, but because of the high publicity
assigned to it, the government officials, including the President, are almost forced to deal with it
in preference to other items that might warrant more attention.”18 In another example, as the
Johnson administration faced increasing criticisms for its rigid China policy, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk grudgingly complained about how the media kept focusing on the question of
China’s admission to the UN while not giving, in his words, “adequate reproaches” to its policies
in Southeast Asia.19
Media could also function as cultural institutions that reflect and influence the political
culture of a certain period. As David L. Altheide argues, “history speaks through the media in
use. And conversely, the media in use during a historical epoch help shape that epoch.”
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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259.

18

Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 5, 13,

Patrick O’Heffernan, Mass Media and American Foreign Policy: Inside Perspectives on Global
Journalism and the Foreign Policy Process (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1991), 45-46.
19
Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain, 67.
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According to him, besides the traditional approach of finding evidence of “political/ideological
infusion into the media process,” we can also look at the media as “cultural items” that
contributed to the “values, beliefs, meanings, and symbols that define our social world.”20 The
linguistic as well as visual symbols and the discourse in the media created a unique culture that
reflected and influenced Sino-American relations. When relations between Beijing and
Washington were frozen, the U.S. media insisted on using “Red China” or “Communist China”
in referring to the regime on the mainland. With the thaw in relations, they dropped “Red” and
“Communist” and even started using the People’s Republic of China. In the Chinese media on
the other hand, the rhetoric that the American “imperialists” were the “most dangerous enemy to
people all over the world” also gradually gave way to “heroic” or “friendly” Americans.
My study is important because it deals with a monumental geopolitical event during a
crucial period when the two countries were going through great transformations in their domestic
politics and foreign policies. By using a multinational perspective that involves not only China
and the United States, but also the Soviet Union and Vietnam, it enriches the study of SinoAmerican rapprochement through the lenses of the media, an understudied but vital institution
that reflected and influenced the two publics’ perception of the relations. It not only readdresses
the issue of the government-media relationship in the United States, but also maps out the
development of Beijing’s approach to the United States and reveals how it communicated its
foreign policy to its own people.
This dissertation seeks answers to the following questions: How did the media in both
countries cover the events that showed change in relations? What role(s) did the media in both
countries play in the Sino-American rapprochement? In other words, I want to see how the media
in both countries dealt with the prospect of a thaw in relations. Did the U.S. media pick up the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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clues in the various events? Could a reader of the Chinese press see the revolutionary change in
relations coming, especially in the late sixties as the Soviet Union replaced the United States as
public enemy number one?
Differences between the U.S. and Chinese Media
This is a study of “what” was in the media to evaluate their possible influence on public
opinion. Before I explain the research method, it is important to note the differences between the
American media and the Chinese media. First, the U.S. government does not have much direct
control over the media, except that radio and TV stations are federally licensed. Under the
protection of the First Amendment, the media have a relatively freer hand in news reporting and
editing. Also, the influence between the American media and foreign policy makers is mutual,
which means whereas the government may try to affect the media through public announcements
and selective leaking, the media’s prioritized coverage of certain news and their editorial
positions might force the government to respond and address those issues.21
In China, on the other hand, to serve its “totalitarian ideology,” the Communist Party
controls the media through its Propaganda Department and uses them to make known its policy
direction and to manipulate public opinion.22 This influence is one-way from the government to
the media. Directors of the Xinhua News Agency and chief editors of the People’s Daily enjoyed
high status within the Party and were heavily involved in its policy-making. A typical example is
Wu Lenxi, who headed both Xinhua and the People’s Daily from 1957 to 1966 and regularly
attended the meetings of the Politburo even though he was not a member.23 Moreover, Mao kept
a tight control of the propaganda machines by appointing people he trusted to lead them. Besides
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Small, Covering Dissent, 17, 13.
Yu Xinlu, “The Role of Chinese Media During the Cultural Revolution (1965-1969).” (Ph.D. Diss.: Ohio
University, 2001), 28-31.
23
Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan: 1956-1966 zhongsu guanxi huiyilu [Ten Years of Polemics: A Memoir of
Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), 236.
22
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Wu, Hu Qiaomu, who headed Xinhua in 1949, and Chen Boda, who controlled the People’s
Daily and Red Flag during the Cultural Revolution, had all been loyal to Mao because of their
previous service as his personal secretaries.24
Mao’s control of the Propaganda Department and the media in Beijing faltered after he
stepped back to the “second line” in late 1960 due to the disastrous Great Leap Forward (GLF)
and left State Chairman Liu Shaoqi, Premier Zhou Enlai, and Party Secretary Deng Xiaoping in
charge of the policies of the CCP.25 The situation was especially true in 1965, when Mao failed
to have the People’s Daily and other major Chinese newspapers reprint an article in the
Shanghai-based Wenhui Bao (Wenhui Daily) that attacked Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, a
historical play authored by Wu Han, the deputy mayor of Beijing. It was the article that sparked
the Cultural Revolution.26
Despite the divisions within the Party in the early 1960s, there were no great differences
on foreign policy, particularly on U.S. policy, among Chinese leaders. The divisions were mostly
confined in domestic policy, such as how to evaluate the GLF and how to fix the problems it
caused.27 Moreover, when the Cultural Revolution started in May 1966, one of the first things
Mao did was to seize control of the People’s Daily and replace Wu Lengxi with Chen Boda.28

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 127; Daniel Leese, Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural
Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31.
25
Won Ho Chang, Mass Media in China: the History and the Future (Ames, IA: Iowa State University
Press, 1989), 40-41.
26
Though the People’s Daily reprinted the article later, it placed it in a column “academic debate” and later
published several editorials repudiating Yao’s article. See People’s Daily (Beijing: Xinhua News Agency, 19651966) (hereafter as PD), November 30, 1965, 5; December 15, 1965, 5; December 25, 1965, 5; January 19, 1966, 5.
27
Harry Harding, “The Chinese State in Crisis,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 15: The People’s
Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution 1966-1982, eds. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K.
Fairbank (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 113.
28
Ma Jisen, Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
2004), 15.
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Therefore, we can assume that, during most of the time under study, the Chinese media spoke for
the Party, the government, and the country.29
Another difference is that information in the American media is more explicit because
this country’s political and journalist culture requires open and straightforward articulation. In
China, by contrast, the government might deliver political or diplomatic messages with extreme
subtlety. For example, when Zhou Enlai arranged for Edgar Snow to stand next to Mao on the
Tiananmen balcony on the October Day national celebration in 1970 and had their photo
published later, U.S. officials as well as journalists did not realize that it was a message from
Beijing that it wanted to do business with Washington. Moreover, in an authoritarian state like
China, the government often makes propagandistic statements in the media that did not reflect its
actual policy. Mao and Zhou Enlai admitted that they usually “fire empty cannons.”30 Therefore,
it is more difficult to understand the implications between the lines reading the Chinese media. I
would be reading the tea leaves so to speak.
Print Media Versus Electronic Media
It is worthwhile to note that different forms of media have their own strengths in news
reporting. During the time under study, U.S. newspapers and magazines reach far fewer
audiences than the nightly newscasts, had much more space to elaborate a story, relied more on
words and language than pictures, and offered far more opinions through editorials and
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columns.31 As a visual medium, television is better at presenting events that are “accessible to
camera and action.” Like radio, it is an “instant” source that reduces the audiences’ chance to
“check and edit information” before it goes on the air and increases the risk of error or
misinterpretation.32
Although television networks are potentially more powerful than newspapers in
influencing the ordinary people, students of journalism generally agreed on the importance of
elite newspapers in setting the agenda. Most newspaper editors and television producers relied
heavily on the Times and the Post, the wire services, a few morning columnists, and more
generally, the covers of Time and Newsweek to decide what was newsworthy. That is why Russ
Braley argues that television seldom “discovers” or “initiates” news; it “magnifies” news that
others have discovered. Later on, even though television networks became independent gatherers
of news, they were limited by time constraints that left them with only about 90 seconds for each
story in a 22-minute “news hole” on their 30-minute nightly programs.33 They did not have
enough space to elaborate on the background, significance and response relevant to a certain
story. For this reason, some correspondents called nightly news a “headline service” that
provided an outline of the day’s events. From these “headlines,” one could pick and choose and
follow his interests for more information in the newspapers. According to Philip L. Geyelin, the
editorial page editor of the Washington Post from 1968 to 1979, while television news
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“bombards” viewers with a “shifting series of illusions and deceptive appearances,” newspapers
tidy things up, examine them so that the stories could make sense.34
Moreover, the most influential members of the public including policy makers relied
more on the prestige newspapers for serious news than on television, which presented short
stories in “sensational packages that lacked context.” Therefore, the importance of television in
influencing public opinion might be exaggerated. What makes the relationship more complicated
is the fact that most officials think that television is more important than print media in affecting
the public.35
Due to the “inherent mechanical need” of television to have images, their reporters had
been accused of being especially “susceptible to being used” by news sources. Because most
stories of foreign affairs concerned the White House, and it was more difficult to get decision
makers to talk on camera, stories of this kind were mostly “talking heads” and “standuppers”-the White House correspondent, with the White House in the background, talking his story into
the camera or even the anchor reading the stories in the studio.36 This was even truer when it
came to stories about China due to the lack of images.
Comments on Sources: Media under Study
As Melvin Small points out in Covering Dissent, there are numerous difficulties in
analyzing the media’s coverage of a historical process: the determination of the media to be
examined, the identification of important events, and the sampling method.37 I select some of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34

Robert M. Batscha, Foreign Affairs News and the Broadcast Journalist (New York: Praeger, 1975), 50;
Philip Geyelin, “The Editorial Page,” in The Editorial Page, ed. Laura Longley Babb (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1977), 18.
35
Small, Covering Dissent, 16-17.
36
Batscha, Foreign Affairs News and the Broadcast Journalist, 32, 142.
37
Small, Covering Dissent, 3.

!

15!
most influential media in both countries and examine how they covered the important events that
affected Sino-American relations.
For sources of U.S. media, I look at newspapers, magazines, and television news
programs. Among newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post were the most
influential in this period because other major newspapers, magazines, and television networks,
often accepted their definition of “what was ‘news.’” The New York Times is especially
important because of the prominence it had gained since the 1940s when it invested heavily in
foreign affairs reporting, a neglected field of journalism at the time. Since then, the Times had
the largest, if not the best, staff of foreign correspondents. The importance of the Times can also
be shown that several scholars use it as the major source to represent the American media when
they study the foreign policy reporting.38 In addition, Time and Newsweek, among magazines,
and the evening newscasts of the three national networks, CBS, ABC, and NBC, were also
important sources for Americans. Students of American journalism would agree with Johnson
and Nixon who believed that these seven media institutions were the most important in the
United States.39
Among sources of the Chinese media, I mainly use Renmin Ribao, or the People’s Daily,
and Cankao Xiaoxi, or the Reference News, because they represented the two levels of the
Chinese communication system, one in the form of mass media, the other the internal channel.40
Hong Qi (the Red Flag magazine), the “ideological journal” of the CCP,41 appear in my narrative
occasionally when it published joint editorials with the People’s Daily. My original plan was to
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examine the People’s Liberation Army Daily (the PLA Daily) as well. However, after checking a
number of key events, such as Beijing’s 1968 statement offering the renewal of the Warsaw
Talks and Mao’s photo with Snow in 1970, I find that its articles were identical to those in the
People’s Daily. So I decided not to single it out for analysis.
I do not use Chinese electronic media for several reasons. First, TV programs were not
transmitted on a regular basis and the number of sets available to the Chinese public was quite
limited in the 1960s. The second reason is that archives of telecasts and radio programs in China
are not easy to access. The third and most important reason is that the centralized nature of the
Chinese media--their common ownership by the state-owned Xinhua News Agency--decides that
voices of all media forms in China should be generally identical. Important news and
commentaries in TV and radio appeared in the People’s Daily as well.
As the official publication of Central Committee of the CCP, the People’s Daily was the
most important newspaper in China and scholars often use it for studying the Chinese media.
Each edition had a wide readership when it was circulated in many work units or put in bulletin
boards in public areas. Under the direct control of the Central Propaganda Department, it was
tasked with disseminating the Party line and policies to the people. People’s Daily published
commentaries in the following forms: editorials, which were the most commonly used; short
general commentaries and articles by the paper’s own commentators, which were very brief and
usually more locally oriented; articles by the paper’s editorial department, reserved for more
abstract subjects; articles by political observers dealing with foreign issues; and articles by
various dignitaries representing the voice of the CCP. Despite the variety in their names, they
generally reflected the position of the CCP or the Chinese government. Editorials in this
newspaper were of great importance and its level of authority ranked just under directives, Party
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resolutions, and Mao’s words. News stories were secondary to editorials in the newspaper. In a
highly politicized culture, it was a common practice among local party branches of the CCP or
various small work units consisting of adults to hold regular meetings to study the editorials of
the People’s Daily.42
The Reference News was an internal newspaper few scholars have used in studying SinoAmerican relations. Founded in 1931, it was originally a classified internal publication read only
by top CCP leaders and military commanders with a circulation of around fifty in the 1930s and
two thousand after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. In 1957,
Mao decided to turn it into an internal newspaper with its readership expanded to Communist
cadres above the county-level and a limited number of non-communist intellectuals who worked
with the CCP. By running news stories that were not fit to publish in the open media, Mao
wanted the newspaper to function as a tool to inform the Chinese cadres about world affairs and
world opinions about China, both positive and negative. In his words, “by letting the cadres
know about how our enemies criticize us, Reference News would function as a vaccination that
promoted their immune system and judgment.” Its circulation was 200,000 in 1957 and 400,000
in 1964. When China was moving toward the United States, Reference News became even more
important in preparing the Chinese cadres for the possible new relationship. On July 5, 1970, the
Central Committee of the CCP issued a notice, which dramatically increased its circulation to
around five million.43
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As David Bonavia of the New York Times wrote in July 1975, Reference News carried
“accurate though often abridged” translations of reports from the main world news agencies to
keep readers informed of trends in foreign public opinion rather than to propagate the news of
the Chinese leadership, although he admits the existence of a “slant.” He put it in sharp contrast
to the Soviet equivalent, a weekly publication that presented only foreign materials favorable to
Moscow’s propaganda line, and that regularly distorted or misinterpreted the contents of the
originals for political purposes.44
Due to its internal nature, the subscriptions of the Reference News had to be approved by
the Party and foreigners were not allowed to access it up to the late 1970s. At one time, the
ability to read this newspaper had been regarded as a privilege or a sign of social status in China.
Its header used to have a notice “neibu kanwu, zhuyi baocun,” which means “internal circulation,
please handle with discretion.” Even its used copies had to be recycled to prevent it from flowing
to the public. After the Reference News became a newspaper, people gave it a nickname known
as xiao cankao (Small Reference) to differentiate it from the daily internal publication called
Reference Materials, or da cankao (Big Reference), which published about a hundred pages with
a morning issue and an afternoon issue. As its nickname da cankao suggests, the Reference
Materials was read only by the “big shots”--officials of the CCP at very high level.45
The two U.S. newspapers during the period under study are available in the online
database of ProQuest. The two magazines can be found on microfilm. Many universities in the
United States have access to the People’s Daily database. The Havard-Yenching library has the
paper copies of the Red Flag magazine and the two Chinese newspapers under study on disks. It
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also has the People’s Daily on microfilm. Now many newspapers, both American and Chinese,
have been digitalized into searchable items via key words and dates. One problem is that the
number of entries turned out by the search engine might be hugely different depending on what
criteria the researcher uses. Another problem with digitalized newspapers articles is that they
have been singled out as separate entries, usually with pictures and cartoons omitted because of
property right issues. Therefore, reading the digitalized article is vastly different from reading the
actual newspaper on the microfilm, which tells more about the context of that article. One of the
ways to compensate for these problems is to use the New York Times index, which gives a
complete picture about what entries and how many there are in each newspaper. Besides
showing the location of each news entry, the number of entries in the index also shows the
amount of attention given and how long it remained in the spotlight.
The political narrative requires the actual policy inputs of both countries. On the
American side, I use the series of Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and the
Department of State Bulletin published by the Department of State, the Congressional Record, in
addition to the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United State. Chinese primary sources
include works of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on diplomacy, the Chronological Record of Zhou
Enlai, and the multi-volumes of the Manuscripts of Mao Zedong, all published by the Central
Party Literature Press of China. Moreover, many of the conversations between Chinese leaders
and foreign leaders concerning the Indochina Wars and Sino-Soviet conflicts had been
declassified and compiled into working papers in the Bulletins of the Cold War International
History Project by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. In addition, I have
read the memoirs of senior officials, diplomats, and prominent journalists in both countries.
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Sampling Method: How to Read the Media
After the selection of the media to examine, I set up the chronological boundary, which
covers the administration of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon’s first term. It starts with
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman’s major policy speech in
1963, which signified a new U.S. posture toward China, and ends with Nixon’s visit in 1972.
Over this ten-year period, I select a number of key events that affected Sino-American relations
and examine how they were covered by the mainstream media in their respective countries. The
identification of these key events can be subjective. However, I try to pick those whose
importance has been agreed upon by most historians. These events are: the Hilsman Speech in
1963; the French Recognition of China, the escalation of the Vietnam War, and China’s nuclear
test in 1964; the Fulbright Hearings and the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966; the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the beginning of the Paris talks, and the Chinese offer to resume the
Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw (known as the Warsaw Talks) in 1968; the
Sino-Soviet border clashes and U.S. overtures to China in 1969; the resumption of the Warsaw
Talks and Edgar Snow’s visit to China in 1970; Ping-Pong Diplomacy and Henry Kissinger’s
secret trip to China in 1971, and finally Nixon’s trip in 1972.
For each event, I briefly describe its development on the basis of secondary accounts and
memoirs. It should be noted that several of the events did not happen on a single day, but
consisted of events that occurred over a long period of time, for example, the Cultural
Revolution, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the Sino-Vietnam split. For these events, I devote more
space to their historical background.
After the narration of the event, I examine how the elite U.S. media covered it in terms of
headlines, placement, opinions, and the general evaluation of the significance. If there were
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photos or political cartoons attached, I describe them and interpret their implications, evaluating
their possible influence on the audience. If one event that I think is important was not covered by
a certain source, it is always worthwhile to explain the reason for the silence. To locate articles
from the ProQuest database, I use the search engine on the basis of the date and key words. From
the larger sample of articles, I mainly focus on front-page stories, editorials, and columns,
eliminating when possible duplicate ideas and arguments. The selection process also involves
placement, relevancy, and the reputation of the columnists.
In his study of the media coverage of the antiwar movement, Melvin Small does not look
at editorials because he argues that for print media, headlines, lead paragraphs, and pictures on
the front pages are more important in influencing the public than editorials or columns that are
usually buried deep. He also believes that editorials of elite newspapers tend to be more
conservative than their more objective news articles. Richard Nixon also holds that editorial
pages of the newspapers “tilt right,” while their reports from the Washington bureau generally
“tilt left.”46
Small’s argument is true indeed, but the importance of news articles, especially frontpage stories, does not necessarily mean that editorials and columns are not important. According
to a report based on a research by Belden Associates, on a Newspaper Association of American
Report detailing a national survey of newspaper readership, on a 1993 study of media and their
markets by Simmons Market Research Bureau, and on a review of academic research into
readership patterns, editorial readership is next only to general news for adult readers at every
level of education and ranks ahead of categories that include sports, business, entertainment,
food, and home. Similar studies in 1994 show that 79 percent of adult readers who read
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newspapers daily read or look at the editorial page. More importantly, these studies show that
editorial page readers tend to be “older, more affluent, and better educated,” which means their
readers are more likely to “hold sway” in public affairs.47 Moreover, even Small agrees that
editorials and opinions in newspapers had more influence on the presidents than news stories
because they were given special importance in the news summaries of the Johnson and Nixon
administrations. They seemed to think that “publicly expressed opinions” were more important
in influencing Americans than front-page news stories.48
Time and Newsweek are available on microfilm. In order to locate relevant articles on an
event, I use Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature in combination with the magazines’ own
indices. As magazines were published once a week, timeliness was obviously not their strength,
which lay in the large amount of pictures, political cartoons, and in-depth analysis. Magazines
could also prioritize a topic by putting it on their covers.
Then I turn to television programs. During most of the time under study, the U.S.
television networks did not have many images from China due to their lack of access to the
country and the extremely rare interactions between Chinese and Americans. Moreover, the
Vanderbilt University Television News Archives’ videotape collection in Nashville extends back
only to 1968. Of the three networks, only CBS maintains an archive for pre-1968 broadcasts. But
they are not open to public use.49 Therefore, I use more sources in the print media, especially the
two elite newspapers, than television footage in studying the period between 1963 and 1967.
Even though U.S. telecasts become part of my narrative from 1968, it was not until Ping-Pong
Diplomacy in April 1971 that they began to play a substantially more prominent role in Sino!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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American relations. In watching television footage, I mainly look at the direction of the camera,
symbols in the picture, activities and expressions of people featured in the video because these
elements could potentially influence the audience’s perception of the event. For “talking heads”
in the studio, I examine the expression, tone, and arguments of the anchors.
Because of the differences between the media in the two countries, I have come upon
different issues in looking at them. In studying the U.S. media, I address the issue of their
relationship with the government to see if they played an independent role in America’s China
policy. When it comes to the Chinese side, evaluation of the media enables me to obtain hints
about Beijing’s attitude because of their close relationship with the Party and the government.
When reading the People’s Daily, I pay attention to the placement, the headlines, and the
format of an article. Usually, editorials appearing jointly with Red Flag and the PLA Daily are
more important than articles in other formats. For a specific article, I examine how it
characterized the United States, sometimes in comparison to the Soviet Union, to find clues
about official attitudes toward them. From the propaganda or the “empty cannon,” I try to find
nuances such as the demonstration of commitment. With regard to the Reference News, I mainly
focus on the placement of the story and especially how it dealt with the signals from the United
States in order to see what kind of information Beijing released to the cadres.
In a more general sense, I look at the differences among the media and try to explain
why. For example, the differences between the New York Times and the Washington Post in their
reporting of China might reflect the opinions of different groups. On the other hand, the different
attitude to the United States in the People’s Daily and the Reference News reflected how Beijing
communicated its foreign policies to people at different positions of the political hierarchy. I am
also interested in how the media in both countries responded to each other because usually the
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reporting of the media in one country would attract the attention of the other. The interpretation
of news reporting from the other side could potentially affect the domestic audience. Moreover, I
look at the relationship between the actual governmental policy and the media representation.
Usually the discrepancy between governmental “words” and “deeds” on certain issues had
implications. It is my job to explain the causes of the differences.
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one covers the period from
Hilsman’s speech in late 1963 to the Fulbright Hearings in spring 1966. By working with the
critics from academic and congressional circles, the U.S. media contributed to the
“depoliticization” of the China issue in the public arena.50 The Chinese media’s attitude toward
the United States, on the other hand, changed from moderately hostile to radically hostile during
this period. They responded to the new developments in the United States with mockery and
vigilance, describing them as “hoax” and “tools of peaceful transformation.”
The second chapter deals with the high point of the Cultural Revolution between 1966
and 1968, during which the Chinese media promoted Beijing’s image as a fighter against both
“American imperialists” and “Soviet revisionists” in order to inspire the struggle against Mao’s
political enemies. While the voices calling for a more flexible China policy in the U.S. media
were overwhelmed by stories of recurrent violence in China, their coverage of its troubles with
Moscow and Hanoi presented a disorganized and greatly weakened China that had become less
of a threat to the United States.
Chapter three examines 1969, when the eruption of Sino-Soviet border clashes brought
Beijing and Washington closer. Whereas Washington assumed a public posture of detachment,
the U.S. media openly elaborated on the benefits of closer ties with Beijing. When Beijing
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showed a genuine concern for a Soviet surprise attack in its media, the Reference News started to
report on U.S. overtures despite the rigid rhetoric in the People’s Daily.
Chapter four looks at the “intricate minuet” between Beijing and Washington from the
renewal of the Warsaw talks in early 1970 to Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971.
During this period, Beijing became a much more active player in promoting Sino-American
rapprochement, especially through the media. The U.S. media’s positive reports of China,
especially during Ping-Pong Diplomacy, helped to change its image into a rational country
possible to deal with.
The last chapter looks at the period between Kissinger’s secret visit to Nixon’s trip to
China in 1972. While Nixon started his media campaign to prepare for the show in Beijing, the
Chinese government used its media to prepare its people for the dramatic change in relations
with its former number-one enemy. The China visit turned into a “TV spectacle” when massive
media coverage contributed to and became part of this success story of public relations.
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Chapter 2: The Depoliticization of the China Issue: 1963-1966
The period between late 1963 and spring 1966 witnessed the gradual “depoliticization” of

the China issue in the United States.1 The speech of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs Roger Hilsman in December 1963 was received favorably as a change in U.S. posture
toward China. In 1964 China established diplomatic relations with France and successfully
exploded its first atomic bomb. These two events dramatically elevated Beijing’s international
position and posed new challenges to the China policy of the Johnson administration, which
faced increasing pressure to include China into the international community.
The U.S. escalation in Vietnam, especially the introduction of ground-combat troops in
1965, caused great concern in the United States about the danger of military confrontations with
China. This concern provided a strong logic for a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward China.
During the highly publicized Fulbright Hearings in spring 1966, the “containment without
isolation” thesis proposed by the academics received overwhelmingly favorable responses in
journalistic as well as official circles. The media’s coverage of the hearings was important in
“legitimizing” the airing of views that would have been considered dangerous in the 1950s.2
By looking at the media coverage of the events from Hilsman’s speech through the
French recognition, the Chinese nuclear test, and U.S. escalation in Vietnam to the Fulbright
Hearings, this chapter examines how influential U.S. media acted as vocal critics of the Johnson
administration’s rigid policy toward China and how they contributed to the “depoliticization” of
the China issue. It also examines how Chinese media responded to the new developments in the
United States.
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U.S.-China relations to 1963
In 1949, the relationship between the United States and the newly established People’s
Republic of China (PRC) was shaped by the larger Cold War context. Before the establishment
of the PRC, Mao Zedong had declared openly that China would “lean to one side” and join the
socialist camp led by the Soviet Union. Not in a hurry to extend recognition to China, the
Truman administration adopted Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s policy to “wait until the dust
settles.”3 The breakout of the Korean War in 1950, the American effort to stop the Chinese
Communists from taking over Taiwan, and the fight between the two countries on the Korean
peninsula shattered the last hope of a better relationship.
The policy of “containment and isolation” set up by the Truman administration became
the foundation of America’s China policy over the next two decades. Under this policy, the
United States refused to recognize the newly established People’s Republic and blocked its
admission to the United Nations. Moreover, it placed an economic embargo on China and
formed military alliances with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and South Vietnam to contain its
“expansion.” Due to the McCarthy witch hunt in the early 1950s and the powerful influence of
the China Lobby, an interest group consisting of “zealous protagonists” of the Nationalist
government on Taiwan,4 any talk about changing this policy became risky politically.
The Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower did not show any interest in
improving relations with China. It pursued a “wedge strategy” designed to split China from the
Soviet Union by placing “diplomatic, economic, and military pressure” on Beijing that Moscow
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would be unable or unwilling to relieve.5 As the primary architect of this policy, Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles believed that it would eventually produce the “desired rupture” between
them.6 This policy also froze U.S.-China relations between 1953 and 1960 in a state of high
tension, which was well reflected in the two Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954 and 1958.
The tension between China and the United States lessened a little under the presidency of
John F. Kennedy. When he was a senator, Kennedy had criticized the rigid China policy of the
Republican administration in a Foreign Affairs article in 1957.7 In one of his television debates
with Richard Nixon during the 1960 campaign, Kennedy advocated forsaking the offshore
islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which lied within the canon range Chinese forces, to avoid
military confrontations with China. This position nearly cost his election and he had to change
his position later.8 When Kennedy entered the White House, China was ending its disastrous
Great Leap Forward. Millions of Chinese lives had perished due to the famine it caused.
Kennedy flirted with the idea of shipping famine-relieving wheat to China, but on the condition
that Beijing requested it first. When the Nationalists planned to invade China in 1962, U.S.
representatives told the Chinese at the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw that Washington would not
support their war effort. Xia Yafeng argues that the pro-Taiwan sentiment in the United States,
Beijing’s militancy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and its attempt to acquire a nuclear
capability, dissuaded Kennedy from ending the policy of containment and isolation.9
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Hilsman’s Speech
Though Sino-American relations did not improve much during the Kennedy
administration, there had been a reformist sentiment among higher-level officials dealing with
the China policy.10 Roger Hilsman claims that even the president himself authorized an attempt
to open the door to a normalization of relations with China not long after the Cuban Missile
Crisis and the signing of the limited nuclear test-ban treaty in 1963.11 Kennedy lost the chance to
do more with his assassination on November 22, 1963.
On December 13, three weeks after Kennedy’s death, Hilsman made a major speech on
China policy in his address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco. In this speech he stated
that the United States would like to “keep the door open” to negotiations with Communist China
if the Chinese leaders forsake their “venomous hatred” of the United States. Acknowledging that
the Communist regime was not likely to be overthrown, Hilsman expressed hope that Chinese
leaders “at the second echelon” would take a realistic approach and that they would realize that
the Great Leap Forward reflected “a stubborn addiction to theories which did not work in
modern world.”12 Six years earlier, also in San Francisco, John Foster Dulles had reiterated the
American policy of “no recognition, no U.N. seat and no trade and cultural interchanges” with
China. He had confidently assumed that Communist rule in China was a “passing and not a
perpetual phase.”13
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The New York Times placed the Hilsman speech on its front page with “KEY POLICY

STATEMENT” in the headline. Calling the speech “a new exposition of policy toward China-the first such major statement from either the Kennedy or Johnson administration,” it pointed out
that it had been “cleared through higher levels of the administration” and the text of the speech
had been distributed by the State Department. In a column “Looking Toward Peking:
Washington Shows New Frankness on Policies Long under Discussion,” Max Frankel, chief of
the Times’ Washington Bureau and its major China watcher, claimed that the most important
thing about the speech was that “it was made at all.” While calling Kennedy’s China advisers
timid because of the offensives of Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) and the China Lobby during the
1950s, he described the Chinese leaders as “prudent and sensible.” Frankel also appealed to
readers by saying that the statement was “aimed at Americans” and that it was a call for their
“realism and moderation” in dealing with Beijing.14
The Washington Post did not give the speech as much prominence as the Times, placing
it on page five. Even though it called China the “most populous and most embittered” nation in
the world, the article favorably reviewed Hilsman’s “dispassionate” speech, putting it in contrast
to Dulles’ statement six years earlier, which it described as having been “couched in tones of
outrage and indignation.” In its editorial, the Post again pointed out that while Dulles’ statement
had “a certain fatalism,” Hilsman’s version saw “a certain prospect for change.” It criticized the
absence of fresh policy on China by asking a question, “After six years, has the United States
nothing more to say than that if China changes, the situation might improve? Not even a trial
balloon?”15
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Newsweek described Hilsman’s speech as the administration’s “tentative, probing move

designed to test the reaction--both at home and in Peking--to a subtle change in its attitude
toward China.” 16 Interestingly, Time was silent on Hilsman’s speech. Instead, it followed
Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s six-week trip to Africa. Referring to Zhou as
“the grandest panjandrum from Peking ever” to visit that continent, Time claimed that China
obviously wanted to establish “the yellow man’s burden” even if it “could not afford to pick it
up.” Here the word “panjandrum” sounds much more evil than “leader,” and “the yellow man’s
burden” compared the Chinese diplomatic activities in African to Western colonial conquest of
this region in the past. When Hilsman resigned from office in early 1964, Time described him as
an “aggressive and abrasive” man hindering the teamwork necessary for coordinating policy. It
even quoted a State Department official who said Hilsman’s resignation was just a “two-day
deal” and they did not mind.17
The hostility of Time to China was closely related to its owner Henry Luce, the son of
missionary parents who had worked in China before 1949. Luce liked to tell friends that the only
ambassadorship he would take was to a “restored democracy in China.” His championing of the
Nationalists was so much that by the time they were driven out of the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek
had appeared on the cover of Time more often than anyone else--even more frequently than
Roosevelt or Churchill or Hitler.18 Luce was a leading member of the China Lobby, in which the
most important nation-wide bipartisan organization was called the Committee of One Million,
founded in 1953 to mobilize sentiment against any “appeasement of Communist China.” Two
weeks after Hilsman’s speech, the Times reported that the committee attacked him for “departing
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from” official U.S. policy by promoting a “two-China” solution. However, it buried the story
deep,19 and the Post ignored the story. Overall, positive responses to Hilsman’s speech far
outweighed criticisms in the U.S. media under examination.
In his memoir, Hilsman describes the birth of his speech as more like a reformist
movement from below rather than one initiated from above. According to him, James C.
Thomson, Jr. the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Lindsey Grant, Officer
in charge of Mainland China Affairs; Allen S. Whiting, Director of the Office of Research for
Far Eastern Affairs; Joseph W. Neubert, also a special assistant in Far Eastern Affairs; and
Abram Manell, Public Affairs Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, were all involved in drafting the
speech. In order to make sure the American people understood its significance, he pointed out,
Allen Whiting had briefed the press, the two wire services, the two local Washington papers and
especially the New York Times, telling them the speech signified a “departure of historical
significance,” especially from Dulles’ China policy statement of 1957. As a former professor and
a graduate of West Point with ten years of service in the Army, Hilsman believed he could
“blunt” the criticism from the far left as well as the far right.20
As Hilsman stated, the speech was cleared by the Defense Department, various branches
of the State Department and the White House staff. However, it was George Ball who read and
approved the speech as the Acting Secretary because Dean Rusk was away for weekend.21
Actually, Rusk was shocked by the Hilsman speech and expressed reservations about it in
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private.22 Moreover, President Johnson did not read and comment on the speech because by
being “not too closely and personally identified with the decision to make it,” he could avoid
taking responsibility if it backfired.23 Hilsman’s resignation in February 1964, to some extent,
suggests that his China approach was not widely shared by the major policy makers of the
Johnson team. It does not matter whether the speech was Hilsman’s own initiative or it had been
approved by the White House. What matters is that the audience got the impression that the
Johnson administration was considering a new posture towards China. Here the impression
created by the media is more important than the actual positions of policy-makers.
Hilsman’s speech, as he said, served as a “test balloon” of public reaction at very little
risk to the Johnson administration’s future choice about the issue.24 Media’s positive response, as
James Thomson observed in his recommendations to National Security Advisor McGeorge
Bundy, suggested “a dramatic ebbing of passions on the China issue over the past decade.”25 The
ebbing of passion opened the door for more reasonable talk about a flexible China policy.
The Chinese media response to Hilsman’s speech was mild at the beginning. The
People’s Daily ran an article entitled “Hilsman Whining, Trapped in the Dead Alley of AntiChina, the U.S. is Attempting to Play Double Sides to Avoid Defeat.” Interestingly, other than
the sarcastic title, the article was moderate in tone as it fairly covered the main ideas of
Hilsman’s speech: the United States had to acknowledge the Communist government was here to
stay and expanding its influence; the United States was not ignoring the seven hundred million
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Chinese but trying to talk to them through channels like Warsaw; the two-Chinas policy; an
“open door” policy to push China give up its rigid policy and accept a diversified world.26 There
was neither a vicious attack on the American policy nor any commitment of official position.
Two months later, the People’s Daily published a much longer editorial with severe
attacks on U.S. officials’ recent talks about a possible “open door to China.” It reiterated the
Chinese support for the national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa as well as Latin America,
and warned the United States to give up hope that the Chinese leaders of the second echelon
would surrender their rigid values of class struggle. It even drew a parallel to 1949 when the
United States should not have had hope for the lovers of individual freedom and democracy in
China. At last, it argued that the change in U.S. policy served as a good “counter-example” that
would only “reinforce the confidence and determination” of the Chinese and Asian people in
their fighting against American imperialists. 27 Later on, even the Times noted the CCP’s
theoretical journal Red Flag’s concern that its young members might be subverted by Western
influences when it urged older party members to educate future leaders in revolutionary
traditions. Without any interest in reconciliation with Washington, Beijing viewed its flexibility
as a tool of “peaceful transformation” that might dampen the revolutionary spirit of the Chinese
people.28 It ridiculed Washington’s new posture in order to frustrate any hope of better relations
between the two countries.
The Chinese media response was in line with the guideline set by a Standing Committee
meeting of the CCP’s politburo held from January 7 to 17, 1960 and chaired by Mao. The
guideline suggested that China should “fully expose the imperialistic nature” of the United States
and stress that it was still the “root of war, the enemy to world peace, to the national liberation
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movement and world socialism,” and that it was trying to destroy world revolution with methods
including subversion and deception. With regard to the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, it
advocated a policy of “talk without breaking, talk but not in haste,” which meant that China
would keep negotiating with Washington, but it would not establish diplomatic relations in haste.
The idea was that delaying a few more years was good for China.29 After the Sino-Soviet split
became public in July 1963, when the Soviet Union signed the test-ban treaty with Great Britain
and the United States, Chinese attitude toward the United States became even more militant. In
competing with Moscow over who had more revolutionary credentials, Beijing did not want to
be viewed as “being soft” on the “imperialists.”
The French Recognition of China
When 1963 approached its end, the Times carried an editorial “An Atmosphere of
Détente” to describe the world situation. Among the evidence for optimism, it listed the
statements of President Johnson, West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev’s “gratification” at Johnson’s call for an end to the cold war, and Zhou
Enlai’s remark that China was seeking “peaceful coexistence with all nations.”30 Zhou made the
remark in a televised interview with the French state television during a visit to Morocco. While
the Post placed Zhou’s interview on page six, focusing on Zhou’s remark about peaceful
existence, the Times placed the story on its front page, focusing on his remark that he hoped for a
“normalization” of relations between France and China.31 By that time, France and China were
indeed close to establishing diplomatic relations.
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On January 7, 1964, the French government informed U.S. Ambassador Charles Bohlen

that it had decided to extend recognition to the People’s Republic of China.32 Before the official
announcements from Beijing and Paris, the White House chose to leak the information to the
media, as could be seen in the “authoritative sources” in the Times and “informed sources
confirmed” in the Post in their front-page stories. The Post interpreted it as an “official
reluctance to acknowledge the development.”33 In a phone conversation with his “mentor”
Senator Richard Russell (D-GA),34 President Johnson said he would send a low-key protest for
the record. When Russell said, “the time’s going to come when we’re going to have to recognize
them,” Johnson admitted, “Yeah, I think so--don’t think there’s any question about it.” Russell
pointed out that it was “poison” politically at the time.35 Russell was right, American public
opinion was not ready for a change in China policy in 1964. A January Gallop Poll showed that
71 percent of the respondents thought that Beijing should not be admitted to the UN.36
As the Times reported, the Committee of One Million published an advertisement with
the signature of 72 sponsors in the International Herald Tribune, appealing to the people of
France to oppose President Charles de Gaulle’s decision. Le Monde refused to publish the
advertisement without giving a reason. The Times also refused to carry it on the account that the
committee could not certify that it had obtained the consent of all persons named as sponsors for
using their names.37
When Johnson was asked to comment on the French intention to recognize China in a
press conference on January 25, he simply said, “we gave them our views and the general effect
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it would have on the alliance and on the free world, and it is a matter for them to decide.” When
Paris and Beijing finally made the joint announcement two days later, the State Department
called the French move “an unfortunate step when the Chinese Communists were actively
promoting aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.”38 The U.S. government
kept a low profile probably because of the frustration after repeated attempts to stop the French
move had failed.
The French recognition of China did not come as a surprise to the American audience.
Rumors of a Sino-French understanding had been spread since June 1963 when both countries
rejected the Limited Test Ban Treaty agreed on by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union.39 The Times, for example, reported frequent diplomatic and economic exchanges between
China and France between October and December in 1963. Among them were visits to Beijing
by prominent French businessmen and high-level official such as Senator Edgar Faure, a former
premier close to de Gaulle. In mid-December 1963, de Gaulle reportedly reassured Secretary of
State Dean Rusk that he had no intention to recognize China in the near future.40 As a man of
vision, Charles de Gaulle was convinced that sooner or later China would become a major power
with its reserves of manpower and resources.41 He thought it was wise to deal with the nation
before being forced to do so when it grew. De Gaulle may have been the first Western statesman
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to appreciate the importance of the Sino-Soviet split and decided to take advantage of it.42 This
grand design strategy is one of the reasons why Richard Nixon admired him. Things developed
faster than the U.S. government was willing to see. Within a month of his meeting with Rusk, de
Gaulle announced his decision that was disappointing to the secretary and embarrassing to the
recently inaugurated Lyndon Johnson.
If the official attitude toward the French recognition of China can be described as
unhappy if acquiesced, U.S. media showed more passion over the issue. The Times front-page
article described the French move as a “personal policy of General de Gaulle” and a “defiant
challenge” to the United States and that Washington was “informed,” not “consulted.” It argued
that the “reaffirmation” of France’s role as a “great independent world power” was the motive
behind the move. C. L. Sulzberger, the foreign affairs correspondent of the Times and part of the
family that owned the newspaper, in his column “Foreign Affairs,” claimed that de Gaulle
“jabbed” the United States at a time of “maximum inconvenience.” In his column “Washington,”
James Reston, the associate editor of the Times, maintained that the “weakness and the
greatness” of Charles de Gaulle was that “he is so sure that he is right.” He called the general a
“trouble least sensitive to the personal feelings of other men.”43 The Post editorial argued that de
Gaulle’s reputation made people suspect that he approached China not for any legitimate goal or
because of any serious calculation, but merely to “play out his private dream for France and to
irk the United States en route.”44
Different from newspapers, magazines used more dramatic language in order to attract
readers’ attention. Time claimed de Gaulle had “detonated a political bomb that scattered fallout
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from the Formosa Strait to Washington’s Foggy Bottom.” In its summary of the world response,
the newsweekly paid more attention to negative ones from West Germany, some African
countries, and especially the Chinese Nationalists who referred to the situation as a “state of
war,” predicting that a “showdown was not far off.” Its political cartoons pictured de Gaulle as
“a buzzing gadfly, a silly rake wooing an Oriental tart, a kook cutting loose a dangerous
dragon.”45 In contrast to the general hostility of Time, the response of Newsweek was milder. It
called the French decision as “troublesome” as America’s enemies. Its political cartoon featured
an arrogant de Gaulle riding a horse side by side with a silly-looking Mao on a small donkey,
with a subtitle “Don Charles and Sancho Mao: Who is leading whom?”46 It was more of a
mockery of de Gaulle’s decision rather than a demonization.
Despite their attack on de Gaulle’s personal style and the “timing and manners” by which
he made the announcement, journalists did not simply follow the official line that blamed
China’s “subversion and aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.” Several of them dwelled
upon the possible benefits to the United States. For example, a Times editorial argued that the
Paris-Beijing agreement was a blow to American “national pride” rather than “national
interests.” While blaming de Gaulle as “substantially, but not entirely” responsible for the
deterioration of Franco-American relations, it argued that American policy toward China was
“equally in need of reappraisal” since forty-nine countries had recognized the Communist
regime. It maintained that UN membership might be a “restraining influence” and that a
negotiation including China might help solve the problem in South Vietnam.47
The Post editorial argued that the United States would benefit from the French move in
the long run because it would sustain the Sino-Soviet quarrel and test the “taming effects of
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diplomacy and commerce” on China. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning column “Today and
Tomorrow” in the Post, Walter Lippmann claimed that the French recognition was a good thing
because it “opens the door, or at least unlocks the door” that the government of Beijing was in
fact the government of China. As he claimed, even though the U.S. government would go
through the “formality” of protesting the French move, Americans should be grateful because “it
takes the situation off the dead center.”48
In another Newsweek political cartoon, de Gaulle bends over to poke at the body of a fat
Mao while an angry Johnson in a cowboy dress stood afar yelling, “…I say he doesn’t exist.”
The article underneath the cartoon argued, “though officials in the U.S. pretend Communist
China doesn’t exist, it has long been recognized that eventual admission of Peking into the world
community was inevitable.” 49 What they targeted at was the U.S. policy of deliberately ignoring
the existence of China.
The issue of French recognition remained in the spotlight for a much longer period than
Hilsman’s speech. An important reason was the media’s obsession with the prospect of China’s
UN membership caused by the French move, which the Johnson administration was unwilling to
talk too much about. The United States hoped that Taiwan would not be too hasty to cut off
relations with France so that it would reduce the accomplishment of the Chinese government on
the mainland. On the day when the French government informed the United States of its decision
to recognize China, McGeorge Bundy suggested to President Johnson if Taiwan did not break
relations with France, it would “put the monkey right back on Peking’s back.”50
U.S. media wanted to see how the idea of “two Chinas” would play out because it would
open a door to solve the problem of China’s membership in the UN without sacrificing Taiwan.
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Noting that Beijing did not ask Paris to break off relations with Taiwan as a precondition for
recognition, the Times called it a “Communist concession,” which it regarded as the reason why
France moved so rapidly. Similarly, the Post called attention to the fact that the French
government used the word “establishing” instead of “re-establishing” relations in the
communiqué. It interpreted this nuance as a sign that Paris was leaving the possibility open that
Taiwan could retain ties with Paris. Its news analysis argued that the French recognition might
lead to similar moves by other nations, as the “tactical concession” of Beijing could enable it to
pick up more recognitions and get closer to UN membership.51
The U.S. media’s hope for “two Chinas” turned out to be wishful thinking. In an editorial
celebrating the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, the People’s
Daily especially attacked U.S. media’s speculation that China had become “soft” on the “twoChina” policy and reiterated Beijing’s determination to “liberate Taiwan.”52 On February 10,
1964, when the French Foreign Ministry announced that its government no longer regarded the
Nationalists as representing China in Paris, Taiwan announced its break of relations with France.
As the Times said on its front page, this break not only saved the difficulty of de Gaulle, but also
ended the possibility of “two Chinas.”53
France was the first major Western power that extended full diplomatic recognition to
China since the Korean War. As a Times headline described, it was the “first Western break from
U.S. aim of isolating China in fourteen years.”54 Though the media under study generally did not
like de Gaulle’s personality and the way he embarrassed President Johnson, they voiced criticism
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of the administration’s rigid policy of isolating or simply ignoring China. Their voices
constituted a challenge to the Johnson administration.
Chinese Nuclear Test
On October 16, 1964, one day after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s fall from
power, China successfully exploded its first nuclear bomb. In its official declaration, Beijing
celebrated it as a “great contribution to safeguarding world peace.” Labeling the test-ban treaty a
“fraud” intending to keep the three powers’ “nuclear monopoly,” it proposed a world summit
conference to discuss the “total banning” and “complete destruction” of nuclear weapons.55
The official U.S. reaction was to discount the military significance of the Chinese
explosion and to reassure the American public that Washington was prepared for it. In a
television address, President Johnson said that China still needed many years to build a stockpile
of reliable weapons with effective delivery means and the “free world nuclear strength will
continue to be greater.” He also stated that the bomb was a “tragedy” for the Chinese people
because the government used its scarce sources, which might be useful improving their lives, to
build a “crude nuclear device” which would only “increase the sense of insecurity of the Chinese
people.”56 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said at a news conference that the “longanticipated” explosion of a “primitive nuclear device” in China did not require any change in
U.S. strategic plans.57 As to the Chinese call for world summit conference banning nuclear
weapons, the State Department called it “neither serious nor constructive.” Dean Rusk dismissed
it as a propaganda “smokescreen.”58
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Despite the reassurance of the government, U.S. media showed two major concerns in

their evaluation of the significance of the Chinese bomb: the threat caused by the Chinese bomb
and the pressure to include China in the international community due to the danger of nuclear
diffusion. In its editorial response, the Times argued that the successful nuclear test by an
“industrially underdeveloped” country like China raised the specter of nuclear proliferation
because other countries might follow suit quickly. It urged older nuclear powers, including the
United States, to talk directly with China in order to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.59 The
Post, in contrast, advocated a tougher policy. Claiming that China’s bomb would enhance its
power image that it was “desperately trying to project in Southeast Asia, at Moscow and around
the world,” it called on Washington to display its “resolve to uphold American responsibilities in
Asia.”60 Newsweek had a cartoon with a dragon looking at itself in the mirror with a new tooth,
the nuclear device.61 Time called the Chinese nuclear test a “fateful firecracker,” for which Mao
had genuine reason to “triumph.” It argued that the United States and Russia “share one
dilemma” that they would have to “do something about the China problem” sooner or later.62
The comments of Time seemed to suggest a closer relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union vis-à-vis China.
As the prevention of nuclear proliferation required the participation of all countries, how
to include China became an issue for the United States because it was the only nuclear power
that had no diplomatic relations with China and denied its entrance into the UN. On October 17,
Senator John Pastore (D-RI), chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee,
was reported as saying that the Chinese nuclear test meant “the necessity of including Red China
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59

NYT, October 17, 1964, 28.
WP, October 17, A12.
61
Newsweek, October 26, 1964, 54.
62
Time, October 23, 1964, 36.
60

!

!

44!

in any and every inspection condition attached to any nuclear agreement America might take.”63
On October 18, Johnson again went on TV to comment on the recent ouster of Khrushchev and
the U.S. position on the Chinese nuclear bomb. Among the basics of U.S. policy, he stated that
China should join the non-proliferation agreement in the framework of the test-ban treaty and he
reiterated the U.S. commitment to support any country against “nuclear blackmail.”64 In covering
Johnson’s speech, the Times headline was “President Terms Strength of U.S. the Key to Peace”,
the Post headline was “Johnson Warns Peking on Nuclear Blackmail,”65 again demonstrating its
support for a tough policy toward China.
The Johnson administration was further put in a “defensive propaganda position” on
October 23 when the Times and the Post reported on their front pages UN Secretary General U
Thant’s proposal that the five nuclear powers, including China, meet in 1965 to discuss a ban on
nuclear tests and measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.66 The Times also reported on its
front-page that Patrick Gordon Walker, the foreign minister of the newly elected Labor Party
administration, declared after a meeting with U Thant that his government supported Thant’s
proposal and Britain would vote to seat China in the United Nations at the 1964 session of the
General Assembly.67
Washington did not respond enthusiastically to the proposal of the Secretary General.
State Department officials said that new international talks were unnecessary because there were
already many channels through which Beijing could communicate with the other four nuclear
powers, including the United States. As to the disarmament talks in Geneva, the spokesman
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conceded that “at some stage” China would participate in arms-control agreements. The two
newspapers interpreted this official gesture as “firm but negative.”68
The Times considered Thant’s proposal a sign of “China’s increased prestige,” arguing
that China’s admission in the nuclear club had enhanced its chances for UN membership because
many neutral states in Asia and Africa would call to include China in international agreements
stopping nuclear tests. As it suggested, if a five-power agreement could be reached, it might
mark “a first step in bringing Peking out of its isolation.” It urged Washington that “the moment
is now” as far as nuclear proliferation was concerned.69 The Post also advocated giving Thant’s
proposal “the widest and broadest consideration” because a flexible U.S. policy would keep the
world attention focused on China. It also criticized a recent U.S. underground explosion in
Mississippi as “ill-timed” because it had taken the mind of the world off the Chinese blast.
Similar to the Times, it urged the Johnson administration that “the months and years immediately
ahead” might be the “very last chance” to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear tests.70
If the recognition by a major Western power in early 1964 greatly elevated China’s
international position, its entry into the nuclear club in October constituted another reason that it
could not be simply ignored. U.S. media’s review of the Chinese nuclear bomb had two effects.
On one hand, their prominent coverage built up the image of China threat. On the other, they
constituted a vocal critic of the rigid policy of the administration. By elaborating on the urgency
of preventing nuclear spread, they pushed the idea that the inclusion of China in the international
community was no longer an option, but a necessity.
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U.S. Escalation in Vietnam
Before the Chinese nuclear test, the United States had dramatically escalated its
involvement in the Vietnam War with the response to the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents on August 2
and 4, 1964. On August 5, President Johnson authorized retaliatory bombing of patrol-boat bases
and a supporting oil complex in North Vietnam. On August 7, Congress passed the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, granting the president vast power in using American military forces to “head
off aggression.” From August 8, 1964 to Johnson’s inauguration on January 27, 1965, the
military and political situations in South Vietnam deteriorated rapidly and the United States had
to decide between direct military involvement and the loss of South Vietnam. In February 1965,
Johnson initiated the massive bombing campaign Operation Roller Thunder and sent the first
detachment of ground-combat troops--two battalions of marines--to Da Nang. By July 28, 1965,
U.S. troops in the theatre had risen to 175,000.71
The escalation in Vietnam dramatically changed Beijing’s posture to the United States in
its official media. In the first half of 1964, Zhou Enlai and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi on
several occasions had expressed Beijing’s willingness to reduce tension with the United States
and blamed Washington for refusing to sign two agreements with China. One was the “peaceful
coexistence based on the “five principles.” The other was the U.S. promise to withdraw all its
forces from the “Chinese province of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.”72 Also during this period,
the People’s Daily presented several neutral entries about the United States, such as the structure
of the Department of State, and the national conventions of the Democratic and Republican
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parties, in a special “World Knowledge” column.73 This was the time when moderates like State
Chairman Liu Shaoqi, Premier Zhou Enlai, and Party Secretary Deng Xiaoping were in charge of
the policies of the CCP.74 After the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, the People’s Daily completely
stopped using “peaceful coexistence” in its comments on the United States.75
Through the People’s Daily, Beijing issued warnings to Washington to show its support
for Hanoi. An article on August 6 threatened that the “invasion of the DRV is an invasion of
China” and that “the Chinese people will not sit still.” After Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, the Chinese government reportedly mobilized twenty million people in mass
demonstrations. The People’s Daily coverage of the mobilization highlighted how the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) was prepared “to defend China.” What was noticeable in the editorial
was that it sent a message to those who wanted better relations with the United States: “The
malicious aggression of the United States in Vietnam again reminded the Chinese people that
they should not cherish any illusion about the imperialists.” Ironically, on the same front page
covering the mass protest, there was a story about Mao watching a Beijing opera with other
leaders of the CCP.76 His activity shows that the Chinese government was not too worried about
the U.S. threat at this point.
With the U.S. deployment of ground-combat troops in South Vietnam, the Chinese
government increased the seriousness of its warnings and especially its commitment to support
the Vietnamese. On March 25, 1965, the People’s Daily published on its front-page a statement
from the National Liberation Front (NLF) and followed it with an editorial pledging that the
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Chinese people would “try all their means to provide necessary material support, including
weapons and all war materials, to the heroic people in South Vietnam.”77 Under a headline
“Peking Says It will Send Men to Vietcong if Asked,” the Times interpreted this statement as the
“most direct commitment” of Chinese intervention.78
Beijing also took military steps to deter the United States from expanding the war to the
Chinese border. On August 13, 1964, Mao told visiting North Vietnamese leaders that China had
deployed several air force and antiaircraft artillery divisions to provinces bordering Vietnam and
was planning to construct new airfields in this area. Mao specifically said, “We will not make
this a secret but will make this open.”79 In April 1965, Mao rescinded the “Six-Point Directive”
passed by the CCP Central Military Commission in January that instructed the Chinese military
not to attack U.S. aircrafts that entered Chinese airspace, and ordered them to “resolutely strike
American aircrafts that overfly Hainan Island.” On April 14, the CCP Central Committee
distributed the document throughout the party structure above the county level, alerting the
cadres to the grave danger posed by the American escalation of the war in Vietnam and stressed
the urgency of war preparations.80
The Chinese government sent serious warnings to the United States not only through
deterrent measures and its propaganda machine, but also through private channels. During his
visit to Karachi in April 1965, Zhou Enlai asked Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan to
convey three points to Washington: “1. China would not take the initiative to provoke a war
against the United States; 2. China meant what it said. 3. China was prepared.”81 In messages
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through Indonesia’s first prime minister Subandrio and the British chargé d'affaires Donald
Charles Hopson in May, Beijing added the fourth point: “If the United States bombs China, that
would mean bringing the war to China and there would be no boundary to the war.”82
Though Zhou’s “four points” were made in the form of a warning, they also indicated
Beijing’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with Washington. Mao expressed it clearly in his
interview with leftist American journalist Edgar Snow on January 9, 1965. When Snow said that
there would not be war between China and the United States, Mao agreed and said that China
would only fight when U.S. forces invaded China. Mao was probably expecting the journalist to
take the message to Johnson because Snow told him that he would meet with the President after
his return home. Mao also told Snow, “Wherever there is revolution, we issue a statement and
hold rallies to show support…We like to fire empty cannons, but we don’t send troops.”83
While escalating in Vietnam, President Johnson also displayed his openness to peace
negotiations. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, he pledged that his
administration would keep the conflict from spreading and remain ready for “unconditional
discussions.” He even offered “billion-dollar American investment” in Vietnam after peaceful
settlement was under way.84 Johnson’s speech was well received in the media. The Times
editorial praised him for opening a “hopeful phase” of the conflict and winning a “moral battle”
over China and the Soviet Union that, as it pointed out, either rejected or omitted Johnson’s
peace proposal in their propaganda machines. 85 The Post editorial warned Chinese and
Vietnamese Communists to take “sword and olive branch” in the speech very seriously because
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the American military power had shown just the “thinnest edge” and “there was more where the
power came from.”86
The editorial page of the Post strongly supported President Johnson’s Vietnam policy in
such articles as “Why we are in Viet-Name…in Defense of Self-determination” and one that
went as far as “Viet-Nam Policy: Critics Unwanted.”87Johnson once expressed his appreciation
to Editor Russell Wiggin’s support, saying that the Post’s editorials were worth “two divisions”
to him. Many reporters and their wives thought the paper’s editorial support for the war was
“morally wrong.” When Ben Bradlee returned to the Post as the Managing Editor in 1965, its
editorial page became less conservative as he hired several first-rate journalists including David
Broder of the New York Times, Don Oberdorfer, a foreign affairs expert, and Stanley Karnow,
who would become the Post’s chief China watcher and the head of its Hong Kong Bureau. The
change was complete in 1968 when Bradlee replaced Wiggins as its Executive Editor.88
With the escalation in Vietnam, administration officials constantly evoked the specter of
the “China threat” in their justification for Vietnam policy. In his Johns Hopkins speech, for
example, President Johnson referred to the conflict in Vietnam as “the new face of an old
enemy…the deepening shadow of Communist China,” which he described as “helping the forces
of violence all over the world.”89 Another good example was their response to a long article
entitled “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” published by Chinese Minister of Defense
Marshall Lin Biao in the People’s Daily on September 3 1965, in commemoration of the
twentieth anniversary of the victory over Japan in WWII. With a focus on the “People’s War,”
the article talked about the importance of “self-reliance” and condemned Khrushchevists in the
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Kremlin as “betrayers” of the people’s war. In lauding the contribution of Mao Zedong’s thought
to world revolution, Lin claimed that Mao’s theory of the countryside defeating the cities
through besieging them could be applied to world revolution because North America and
Western Europe were the “cities” and the developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America were the “countryside.”90
The Times gave high prominence to Lin’s speech. In a single issue, it not only covered
the story on the front page, but also followed it with excerpts of the article, whose English
version was circulated by the Chinese official press, and an editorial that called the speech Mao’s
“nightmare blueprint for world’s future.”91 Though the Post gave the article a lower prominence,
wrapping it in a page-four story about PLA Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing’s speech, Walter
Lippmann, in his Post column, compared the certainty of its revolutionary propaganda to the way
Hitler announced that his Reich “would last for a thousand years.” From the emphasis on “selfreliance” in the speech though, Lippmann claimed that Beijing wanted the war in Vietnam to
continue, but it was unwilling to intervene.92
Lin Biao’s article was soon taken up by administration officials to condemn China. In his
speech to block China’s UN membership, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg used it as evidence of its
attempt to “change world order by violence.” Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and his deputy
Cyrus Vance compared Lin’s article to Hitler’s Mein Kampf and used it as evidence of Chinese
expansion.93 McNamara explicitly said that the speech signified a program of “aggression” and
that the United States should “take the Chinese Communists at their word and develop improved

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90

PD, Sep. 3, 1965, 1-4.
NYT, September 4, 1965, 1, 2, 20.
92
WP, September 4, 1965, A4, September 9, 1965, A25.
93
NYT, September 24, 1965; October 2, 1965, SUA5_1; October 8, 1965, SU1_1; Chicago Tribune,
October 15, 1965, 15.
91

!

!

52!

means of coping with their threat.”94 People may wonder whether McNamara was sincere in his
claim about the nature of the China threat because as the secretary of defense, he was well aware
of the Chinese capability to project its power beyond its border. McNamara, along with many
Johnson aides, seemed to be deliberately calling attention to the Chinese words rather than
deeds.95 In 1965 when the United States was substantially expanding the war in Vietnam,
China’s bellicose rhetoric became useful political assets for administration officials who were
eager to exaggerate the “China threat” to justify American policy in Indochina.
Between 1963 and 1965, U.S. media’s call for China policy reform did not turn into
“widespread clamoring for change” because it had not been elevated to a pressing issue on the
American political agenda. There were strong anti-reform elements in the Johnson
administration. Since his assumption of office in late 1963, Lyndon Johnson depended heavily
on Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and Robert McNamara on foreign policies. These three
advisers, particularly Rusk, were opposed to any modification of China policy. Rusk wondered at
one time why “the question of Peking’s admission to the United Nations had been renewed
without adequate reproaches being made over their polices in South East Asia.”96
Moreover, Johnson faced severe restraints from Congress as well as public opinion. On
April 19, 1965, the Committee of One Million made a declaration opposing any concessions to
China, including opposition to recognition, its admission into the UN, and trade relations with it.
The declaration received the endorsement of 321 congressmen--fifty-one Senators and 270
members of the House.97 That was more than half of Congress. What contributed to the negative
attitude toward China included its bellicose rhetoric, its support for the Vietcong, and the threat
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caused by its possession of nuclear bombs. During this period, Americans opposed to the
recognition of China and its entry into the UN in public surveys consistently exceeded half of the
total. As a cautious politician, Johnson decided to “stay the course” in his China policy.98
Fulbright Hearings
Since President Johnson’s escalation in Vietnam, J. William Fulbright (D-AK), chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the most eloquent critics of his Vietnam
policy. On January 26, 1966, Fulbright’s committee began a routine hearing on a supplemental
aid bill for South Vietnam. He shrewdly transformed the sessions into an inquiry on U.S. policy
in Southeast Asia. When General Maxwell Taylor and Dean Rusk “clashed dramatically” with
General James M. Gavin, a parachute hero during WWII, and George F. Kennan, the father of
the “containment” policy, over war strategy in Vietnam, the media’s attention was attracted, in
particular the television networks, which began to report the sessions alive. Johnson became so
worried that he hastily held a conference with American military commanders and leaders of
South Vietnam in Honolulu to divert the media attention away from the hearings. But it did not
work very well. Between late January and March 1966, the hearings remained in the headlines.99
In his criticism of Johnson’s Vietnam policy, Fulbright repeatedly evoked the danger of
war with China if the conflicts in Vietnam escalated. Contending that reconciliation with China
was necessary if the United States wanted to find a solution in Vietnam, he proposed at the
hearings that Washington should reach “a general neutralization agreement for Southeast Asia”
with Beijing. 100 Beginning in March, he called a review of America’s China policy for
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“education” reasons, asking China experts, including A. Doak Barnett from Columbia, John
King Fairbank from Harvard and several others, to testify.
A few months earlier, more than 1000 students and several hundred faculty members of
Yale had published a full-page advertisement in the Times on December 10, 1965, calling for a
“nationwide reappraisal” of American policy in the Far East. This advertisement was sponsored
by a group called Americans for Reappraisal of Far Eastern Policy, which was started by Yale
students. According to the Times, the organization sponsored seminars on more than 20
campuses throughout the country on October 24 to discuss U.S. policy in Asia. An active
participant in those meetings, Fairbank also signed the advertisement. The effort by the group
probably could not attract much attention because the Times placed the news article on page
twenty-one and the advertisement on fifty-three.
The prominent media attention to the Fulbright Hearings provided the academics with a
much better forum to present their views. At the hearings, Barnett put forward his famous idea of
“containment without isolation,” which meant the United States should continue to contain the
expansion of China, but adopt measures to end its isolation from the world community. Fairbank
criticized U.S. officials who compared Lin Biao’s speech to a blueprint of world conquest or a
“Mein Kampf” type of outline, arguing that the statement was simply “a reassertion of faith” that
the “parochial example of rural-based revolution” in China was a model for underdeveloped
countries.101 As Newsweek reported, Senators Fulbright and Wayne Morse (D-OR) tried to push
Barnett and Fairbank to support their challenge to Johnson’s Vietnam policy at the hearings, but
they both refused. Even though they were concerned about a clash with China, the two
professors supported Johnson’s Vietnam policy and the containment of China, of which the
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commitment in South Vietnam was an important part. 102 In the media the two professors
appeared as moderate advice givers, which was in sharp contrast to radical leftists in the streets.
Their expertise and moderation made it reasonably easier for the public and those in Washington
to consider.
Overall, the elite media in the United States covered the Fulbright hearings prominently,
completely and favorably.103 Fulbright and the China experts were given prominence when they
made the front pages six times in the Times and five times in the Post in March.104 Among those
who were opposed to the “containment without isolation” policy, George Taylor and David
Nelson Rowe, professors from University of Washington and Yale University, and Walter Judd,
former Republican Representative from Minnesota and a prominent figure in the China Lobby,
were called to testify when the hearings were close to the end. They made the front pages of the
two elite newspapers only once without any editorial comment. 105 The Times placed the
testimony of former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson at
the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the last three paragraphs of the jump page of an article,
probably because he was an advocate of hard-line policy toward China.106
In their editorial pages, both the Times and the Post gave favorable reviews of the China
debate, especially Barnett’s “containment without isolation” thesis. The Post praised the hearings
for “contributing to public understanding” and particularly endorsed the distinction between
“containing” and “isolating” China. The most important factor that led “urgency” to Barnett’s
argument, as it pointed out, was the danger of U.S. defeat in the UN on the issue of Chinese
admission. While acknowledging the difficulty of ending the isolation of China, it argued that
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American thought had been turned toward that direction through the “ventilation” of those
ideas.107
The Times argued that the Fulbright hearings had validated its long-held view that “the
country was far ahead of the Administration” in openness to new approaches. Citing the fact that
a statement calling for a more flexible China policy had recently been supported by 198 scholars
and opposed by only nineteen members of the Association for Asian Studies, it tried to show
where the weight of “informed American opinion” was. It criticized Rusk and McNamara for
drawing “fallacious parallels” between China and Hitler’s Germany because they might close off
a “reappraisal of China policy” for many years. Similar to the Post, it showed concern for the
“urgency” of the UN issue. As it maintained, America’s open attitude would not only send
positive signals to new generation of China leaders, but also attract more international support
for American policy in Asia and reduce the danger of military confrontation with China.108
In an article named “Reading the Dragon’s Mind,” Time argued that the hearings were
“all right” for their educational purpose. Newsweek regarded the China debate as a subject that
permitted legislators a “remarkable degree of rational discussion and agreement.”109
As James Reston argued in his Times column, Fulbright’s official “teach-in” in front of
TV cameras was the “first serious open debate” on the problems of American foreign policy in
years, and the combination of Congress with TV cameras would be a “powerful influence for
understanding and change.”110 By the time the hearings ended, 71 percent of Americans polled
had heard about them, and almost 60 percent had seen some parts on television. Newsweek
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described them as the “most searching public review of U.S. wartime policy” since the
MacArthur hearings of 1951.111
Even though the China policy review was secondary to the discussions on Vietnam
policy at the hearings, the administration was happy about it because many critics of America’s
China policy supported the Vietnam policy. The consensus on a more open policy toward China
looked better than the division over Vietnam. In his appearance on NBC on March 13, Vice
President Hubert Humphrey echoed Barnett, saying that the U.S. policy toward China should be
one of “containment without necessarily isolation.” He mentioned that the administration had
decided recently to allow scholars and writers to travel to China, which he described as the
“beginning of a much better relationship.”112 Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO), an ardent
supporter of the official policy in Vietnam, said, “I do not see anything that I do not agree with.”
A White House aide also claimed that the President was pleased with the transcripts of the
week’s hearings. 113
With the media’s coverage, the China policy review served as a test balloon for the
government. It had the effect of explaining what the government had been doing but otherwise
was hesitant to state explicitly. Ultimately, the China debate at the Fulbright Hearings, as
Michael Lumbers argues, marked “something of a watershed.” Because of the media’s prominent
and favorable coverage, they “legitimized” the airing of views that would have been considered
“heresy” in the 1950s and “emboldened” those advocates of China policy reform inside and
outside the government to push that agenda.114

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111

Small, Covering Dissent, 61-2; Newsweek, February 21, 1966, 27.
NYT, March 14, 1966, 1; WP, March 14, 1966, A1.
113
Newsweek, March 21, 1964, 25-26.
114
Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain, 155.
112

!

!

58!
The media’s intensive and favorable review of the China debate at the Fulbright Hearings

played an important role in educating the public about America’s China policy. In December
1965, a Gallup Poll indicated that the ratio between those who supported China’s UN
membership and those opposed was 22 per cent to 67 percent with ten per cent having no
opinion. In March 1966, the ratio changed to 25 per cent to 55 percent with 20 per cent having
no opinion. When asked if China’s UN membership would improve relations with the United
States, the ratio between “yes” and “no” became 56 percent and 28 per cent.115 Similarly, as
reported in the Post, a Harris survey in June showed that 57 per cent of the respondents favored
U.S. recognition of China and 55 per cent supported Chinese entry into the U.N. so long as
Taiwan was not expelled.116 The polling results showed a growing openness to a more flexible
China policy after the Fulbright Hearings.
The Fulbright Hearing might also have led to the decline of the Committee of One
Million. When Marvin Liebman, the committee’s secretary, learned of the hearings, he
complained that he had not been given advance notice and that those scheduled to testify
represented viewpoints “contrary to the Committee and to the majority of Americans, including
Congress.”117 Indeed, in a Gallup Poll in September 1966, those who were opposed to China’s
admission into the UN still accounted for 56 percent of the total.118 Moreover, the Committee
still managed to obtain the endorsement of 325 members of Congress in October when it
published in a Times display ad its opposition to China’s UN membership. While publishing its
ad, the Times carried an editorial repudiating the committee. As it argued, “It is the opinion of
this newspaper that a majority of those Americans” concerned with the question “either favor
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inviting Peking into the United Nations or would at least “have no serious objections.”119 When
Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), who had appeared on the front page of the Times during the
Fulbright Hearings due to his support for ending the isolation of China, announced his decision
to withdraw from the committee, the Times placed his story on the front page, arguing that the
China hearings was a factor for his move. The Times also reported a memorandum sent by
Liebman to all Congressional members declaring that the committee would not use their names
on letterheads and publication. It interpreted the memorandum as a sign that members of
Congress had begun to have doubts about the committee’s policy.120 The Times story left an
impression that the Committee of One Million was declining.
The People’s Daily responded to the China policy review at the Fulbright Hearings with
mockery. It labeled the speakers as “clowns” and the hearings as a “farce of illusion” when the
Johnson administration was “at its wit’s end” in dealing with China. When Humphrey displayed
“unusual friendliness” to China, the official organ attacked his remarks as “dream talking” and
the “kiss of Judas.” Viewing the “containment without isolation” policy as an American effort to
subvert the Chinese revolution through “peaceful transformation,” it pledged that the Chinese
people would become more vigilant of the “trickery of the American imperialists.”121
A Lost Chance in 1966?
By early 1966, Beijing and Washington seemed to have reached a tacit agreement about
no direct confrontation with each other in Vietnam. Washington took measures to reassure China
that it neither wanted to attack China or destroy the Hanoi regime. In a memorandum to Under
Secretary of State George Ball, William Bundy, who took over Roger Hilsman’s position,
recommended clarifying the U.S. intention to avoid direct confrontation with China at the next
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Warsaw meeting on December 15, 1965.122 On May 10, 1966, the People’s Daily published
Zhou Enlai’s four points to the United States for the first time.123
On May 12, 1966, when the U.S. Air Force reportedly shot down a Chinese aircraft close
to the Vietnamese-Chinese border,124 Beijing’s response was quite restrained. In its “strong
protest,” the Chinese Defense Department declared that the Chinese people “are not easy to trifle
with” and that “blood would be repaid with blood.” Interestingly, it reiterated Washington of
Zhou’s “four points.”125 North Vietnamese Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap later
complained that Zhou’s remark “stabbed the Vietnamese in the back” because it was a signal to
the United States that “it could bomb Vietnam at will, as long as there was no threat to the
Chinese border.”126
Considering the favorable American public opinion after the Fulbright Hearings and the
two governments’ tacit agreement on Vietnam, Xu Guangqiu, in his book about the relationship
between Congress and China policy, claims that “a chance to improve Sino-American
relationships was lost” in the 1960s. He cites the memoir of Wang Guoquan, the Chinese
Ambassador to Poland who represented China in the Warsaw talks with the United States
between July 1964 and March 1967. Wang wrote, “If the Cultural Revolution had not happened
in 1966, the Beijing government might have modified its U.S. policy in that year, and U.S.-China
normalization might have started in 1966 rather than in 1972.” As far as Xu understands, when
Congressional leaders called for a change in China policy in the 1960s, the White House
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escalated the Vietnam War. Therefore, Beijing “suspected” the real intentions of the legislators
and “misunderstood” congressional suggestions about a flexible China policy.127
Xu and Wang are probably too optimistic about the status of Sino-American relations in
the 1960s, or early 1966. Though the Johnson administration was moving toward a more flexible
policy, the flexibility was rather limited and was far short of reconciliation with China. On the
part of Beijing, its actions to avoid confrontation with the United States were for its own interests
and they did not mean that Chinese leaders wanted better relations. Beijing did not need to
misunderstand the real intentions of either the congressional legislators or the academics. In the
first half of 1966, the People’s Daily still frequently referred to the United States the “most
dangerous” or the “worst enemy” to people all over the world.128 For a leadership bent on
revolution, “olive branches” from Washington looked even more dangerous because of their
potential ability to “soften” the revolutionary spirit of the Chinese people.
In reality, Chinese foreign policy witnessed a radical turn after the Tenth Plenary of the
Eight Congress in August 1962, when Mao criticized Wang Jiaxiang, the head of the
International Liaison Department of the CCP, for advocating a policy of “san he yi shao” (three
moderations and one reduction), which meant moderation of struggles against imperialists,
revisionists, and reactionary forces (in Taiwan), and a reduction in Chinese support for
revolutionary struggles in the third world.129 The radicalization accelerated with the deterioration
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of Sino-Soviet conflict in 1963 and the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam in 1964.
When Mao was considering the Cultural Revolution, the last thing he wanted was to reconcile
with the American “imperialists.”
Conclusion
As this chapter shows, between 1963 and 1966, many U.S. journalists criticized the
Johnson administration’s rigid China policy. Though Hilsman’s speech in late 1963 was not
initiated by high-level policy makers in the Johnson team, it worked as a test balloon. The
media’s positive review of the administration’s new posture toward China signified an ebbing of
emotion over the issue and suggested an opening for reasonable talk about it. In the case of
French recognition, while the elite media did not like the “timing and manner” of de Gaulle’s
decision, they criticized the administration’s rigid posture and called for a move toward a “two
China” solution before a U.S. defeat in the UN. When China joined the nuclear club, U.S. media
elaborated on the dangers of nuclear proliferation and urged Washington to use creative means
that could include China in international agreements on nuclear nonproliferation. In both cases,
media called for China’s inclusion in the international community. When the United States
expanded its military operations into North Vietnam, Congressional critics of Johnson’s war
policy found themselves allied with academics and the media because of their common concern
for military confrontation with China. Media discussions on these issues created forums for
public deliberations on America’s China policy.
By the end of 1966, more than half of the American population still opposed the
recognition of China as well as its admission into the UN, and a majority in Congress endorsed
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the Committee of One Million’s China policy. However, influential U.S. media moved ahead of
public opinion and pushed for a flexible China policy by prioritizing the critical voices from the
academic community and Congress in their front pages and making their own critiques in
editorials. Because of the media’s prominent and intensive coverage, critical voices at the
Fulbright Hearings were legitimized and accepted more widely in the public sphere, which
created a favorable environment for Johnson to ease the rigidity on China. Essentially, if the
Hilsman speech set off the “depoliticization” of the China issue, the Fulbright Hearings
symbolized the culmination of this process.
Unfortunately, while U.S. journalists were pushing Washington for a more flexible China
policy between 1963 and 1966, Chinese foreign policy turned increasingly radical. In this
context, the rhetoric of the Chinese media toward the United States changed from moderately
hostile to radically hostile. After the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, they dropped “peaceful
existence” with the United States and increased invectives against Washington to show moral
support for the Indochinese peoples.
In the first half of the 1960s, Beijing had no desire to improve relations with Washington.
It rejected talks about flexibility from U.S. officials and academics, attacking them as “hoax” and
tools of peaceful transformation. When Mao mobilized the Chinese people for his “continuous
revolution” and the ideological polemics with the Soviet Union, Washington became a
convenient “whipping boy” in the Chinese media.130
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Chapter 3: The Cultural Revolution as a Watershed: 1966-1968
Between 1966 and 1968, the heyday of the Cultural Revolution coincided with the high

point of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Mao frequently described this period as “all
under heaven is great chaos” when he talked about China’s domestic and international
conditions.1 The Cultural Revolution turned out to be a “watershed” for Sino-American relations
because several conditions for Nixon’s opening to China came into being during this chaotic
period.2 Among these conditions were the reduction of tension between Beijing and Washington,
the replacement of the United States by the Soviet Union as China’s primary enemy, and
Beijing’s open rift with Hanoi. This chapter examines how these conditions played out in the
media of both countries. It looks at U.S. media’s coverage of the factional struggles in China, the
Sino-Soviet polemics, the Sino-Vietnamese discord, as well as the Chinese media’s handling of
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam War.
U.S. media’s overwhelmingly favorable review of the Fulbright China Hearings in spring
1966 not only signified the depoliticization of the China issue, but also greatly encouraged the
Johnson administration to move toward a conciliatory posture toward China. On July 12, 1966,
President Johnson made what the White House officials called his “first major statement” on
China in his address to the annual conference of the American Alumni Council. Johnson called
for the “reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies” and maintained that
lasting peace in Asia could never come “as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are
isolated by their rulers from the outside world.” He also mentioned the steps his government had
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taken to permit American scholars and experts in medicine and public health to travel to China,
and particularly a case where Washington issued a passport for a leading American businessman
to exchange knowledge with the Chinese on the very day of his speech.3 Johnson’s statement
was covered prominently and favorably by the Times and the Post. The editorial of the Times
argued that it had laid a new basis for the “concrete measures” that would provide a solution to
the problems in Asia. The Post claimed that the United States should bring down its barriers in
order to “diminish the dangerous isolation” of China from the world.4
In his State of the Union address on January 10, 1967, Johnson again stated that the
United States would “continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of mainland China
and the world community” and that the United States would be “the first to welcome a China
which decided to respect her neighbors’ rights.”5 This time, the two newspapers did not pay
special attention to his remark about China. James Reston noted Johnson’s conciliatory tone in
his column a few days later, but he did not assign it too much importance except arguing that it
showed Johnson’s cautious attitude about the convulsions in China.6 By that time, Johnson’s
conciliatory tone had seemed much less exciting to U.S. media than the extraordinary turmoil in
China because of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
According to the Chinese official designation--“Resolution on Certain Questions in the
History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China”--passed at the Sixth
Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CCP on June 27, 1981, the Cultural Revolution lasted
ten years and it went through three phases. Phase one started with the adoption of the “May 16
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Notification” at the enlarged meeting of the CCP’s Politburo in May 1966 and ended with the
Ninth Congress in April 1969; Phase two went from the Ninth Congress to the Tenth Congress in
August 1973; The last phase was between 1973 and 1976 with the death of Mao.7 In their
analyses, many scholars, including this author, focus on phase one, which has been widely
referred to as the “most radical” stage, or the “Red Guards phase,” of the Cultural Revolution.8
As an important document of the Cultural Revolution, the “May 16 Notification” was
categorized as “highly classified” at first and circulated only among high-level CCP officials.9 It
went public on May 17, 1967, when the People’s Daily and Red Flag published a joint editorial
celebrating the first anniversary of the movement. As they claimed, this document had “sounded
the marching bugle” of the Cultural Revolution. The “notification” defined the purpose of the
movement as an effort to remove “those representatives of the bourgeois who have sneaked into
the Party, the government, the army and various cultural circles, and a bunch of counterrevolutionary revisionists.”10
As to the cause of the Cultural Revolution, Roderick MacFarquhar claims that what
happened in the Soviet Union had a major impact on Mao, who wanted to make sure his country
would not follow the Soviet path, which he believed had abandoned Marxist-Leninist revolution
in pursuit of a “capitalist restoration.” As MacFarquhar maintains, after China recovered from
the disastrous Great Leap Forward (GLF), Mao became worried about its future because he
thought that his colleagues, especially State Chairman Liu Shaoqi and CCP Secretary General
Deng Xiaoping, were no longer interested in his idea of “continuous revolution.” With the
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dismissal of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, Mao’s anxiety over Liu and Deng
increased and he decided that if revolution from above were impossible, he would start it from
below. If the party could not change society, he would “unleash society to change the party.”11
Harry Harding argues that for Mao, the greatest danger to the success of socialist
revolution was not the threat or attack from outside, but the restoration of capitalism at home.
Odd Arne Westad takes the opposite view and emphasizes Mao’s perception of external threats
in 1965, arguing that Mao always used “revolutionary housecleaning” as his “best form of
defense” because of his obsession with “foreign subversion.”12 Despite their disagreements on
the impacts of external threats and domestic concern on Mao, these scholars agree on Mao’s
preoccupation with the domestic transformation.
To start the Cultural Revolution, Mao first took steps to gain control of the propaganda
machines by which he could mobilize the whole country to join the campaign. By targeting a
historical play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office written by Wu Han, who was the editor-in-chief of
Beijing’s party mouthpiece Beijing Daily and the vice-mayor of the city, Mao successfully
purged Peng Zhen, Mayor of Beijing and a key member of the Politburo, Lu Dingyi, head of the
Propaganda Department, and Wu Lengxi, editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily. In their places,
Mao installed persons loyal to himself and set up a new Central Cultural Revolution Group
(CCRG) under the Standing Committee of the Politburo.13
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The main tool Mao employed in his attack on the Party establishment and his political

enemies were the Red Guards, a movement first born on May 29, 1966 when a small group of
students at one of Beijing’s elite high schools, attended mostly by the children of high-ranking
officials, pledged to defend the Chairman and his thought and to struggle against revisionism.
Mao gave his official endorsement to them when he attended a six-hour rally at Tiananmen
Square on August 18. 14 After the rally, the People’s Daily featured a headline “Workers,
Peasants and Soldiers should Support the Revolutionary Students,” which called the Red Guards
activities “revolutionary” and “legal” and deemed any action opposing them as “opposing
Chairman Mao and the Party.”15
In January 1967, Mao called on revolutionary people of all walks of life to overthrow the
existing Party authority at different levels and “seize power” for their own. Red Guard attacks on
Party establishments caused them to defend themselves by forming their own Red Guard
organizations, which fell into factional struggles and turned into armed fighting, bringing China
to what Mao later called an “all-round civil war.”16
In what was considered the “most spectacular uprising against the Cultural Revolution”
in Wuhan in July 1967, forces of the Wuhan Military Region mutinied and seized Minister of
Public Security Xie Fuzhi and Wang Li, both prominent members of the Cultural Revolution
Group. When Mao tried to mediate the situation in person, the mutiny went out of control and
even threatened his life. Mao ended up being escorted to the airport at two in the morning. On
another occasion, Red Guards broke into the British mission office in Beijing on August 22,
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1967 and set it on fire after the British rejected a Chinese ultimatum demanding it to release
Chinese agitators in Hong Kong and to lift the ban on two pro-Chinese newspapers.17
To stop the chaos, in October 1967, the CCP ordered classes to be resumed immediately,
but it had little effect. In the summer of 1968, Mao sent “Mao Zedong Thought Worker
Propaganda Teams” to universities to restore order. At Qinghua University, the Red Guards
greeted the worker teams with bullets and stones. After the incident, the central authority began
to dismantle the Red Guards, whose glory days were soon over as millions of them were
systemically sent to the countryside.18
Two years after Mao’s first review of the Red Guards at Tiananmen Square, the People’s
Daily published an editorial calling on the Red Guards to “cooperate with workers, peasants and
soldiers.” The meeting of the Twelfth Plenum of the Eight Congress between October 13 and 31
in 1968 meant that the CCP was ready to move on to the next stage. Its communiqué explicitly
stated that worker teams would stay at schools and lead them “permanently,” which meant the
Red Guards had been deprived of their leading role in the Cultural Revolution. Though Mao
never officially declared its ending, it was generally believed that the Cultural Revolution, or its
most radical stage, had come to an end with the convening of the Ninth Congress in April 1969,
whose communiqué stated that the focus of the Party should be “summing up experiences” since
the Cultural Revolution had achieved its “greatest and most decisive victory.”19
During the Cultural Revolution, the People’s Daily played important roles in mobilizing
the mass and causing chaos. On May 31, 1966, Mao’s former secretary Chen Boda, who was
also the editor of Red Flag and the head of the CCRG, seized control of the People’s Daily. After
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that point, the newspaper no longer reflected the views of the Central Committee of the CCP, but
the ideas of Mao himself. According to Ma Jisen, an employee at the Chinese Foreign Ministry
during the Cultural Revolution, when the Cultural Revolution started, acting Foreign Minister Ji
Pengfei told his staff, “Now the newspapers lead the Cultural Revolution movement. The
People’s Daily presents the guiding principle.” He told them to read it carefully when it came out
because it would “give the tenor of the movement.” The newspaper, with its provocative
language such as “sweeping away all Oxen, Ghosts, Snakes and Demons (OGSD),” “eliminating
all class enemies,” and many others, had become “a source of turbulence.”20
Due to Mao’s encouragement of big-character posters and the airing of views fully, the
Cultural Revolution witnessed a period of freedom of speech in China. Before the movement, the
CCP adopted a dual system of communication by which the latest Party directives were
transmitted through the internal system and were released to the public later in an always revised
version in order to cushion the possible negative impact. During the Cultural Revolution, this
system broke down when Red Guard newspapers and wall posters openly carried fresh directives
from the central authority. What was more, in some places the Red Guards broke into party
archives and accessed classified documents in search for “black materials” that would go against
the Party leaders. They would disclose the secrets, sometimes in “distorted” versions, through
Red Guard newspapers and wall posters.21 These newspapers and posters became important
sources for foreign correspondents in their reporting of the Cultural Revolution.
During the Cultural Revolution, people could learn from the Reference News about the
problems China had with several of its previously friendly neighbors because of Beijing’s
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militant and chaotic foreign policies. In early 1967 for example, it covered the frequent
exchanges and co-operation between Moscow and Pyongyang. There was even a report that
Pyongyang “had warned Beijing not to take unfriendly actions toward North Korea” and another
one explicitly stating that the recently concluded Soviet-North Korean Agreement showed that
“Pyongyang had returned to the embrace of Moscow.”22 In another case, while the People’s
Daily consistently praised Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and the traditional friendship between
the two countries,23 the Reference News covered many of his “unfriendly” remarks about China.
In September 1967, for example, it featured a story that Sihanouk had asked two pro-Beijing
cabinet members to resign and attacked China for “interfering with its internal affairs.” Sihanouk
was also reported as having said that the clashes between “white Communists” and “yellow
Communists” showed that the international Communist movement was “nothing but a farce.” It
even published stories that Sihanouk had requested the United States not to leave Asia, or
Cambodia would “fall into the hands of China.”24
Response of the Johnson Administration to the Cultural Revolution
When the Cultural Revolution broke out in the summer of 1966, Washington persisted in
sending peace signals to Beijing. In January 1967, the State Department advised all U.S.
diplomats and consular posts stationed abroad to emphasize the limited objectives of the United
States in Vietnam and to “seek ways of recognizing the past and potential greatness of China and
the history of friendly relations between the American and Chinese peoples.” When Romanian
Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who was on good terms with Chinese leaders, visited the United
States in June 1967, Johnson asked him to convey his message to Beijing that the United States
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did not want war with China or to change its system and that “all we want to do is to trade with
China and get along with her to the extent that she will permit.”25 Johnson’s public conciliatory
gesture toward China promoted the administration’s peace image to the “restless” and “warweary” American people and shifted the blame for the Sino-American deadlock to Beijing for
“domestic and international consumption.”26
In responding to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, senior U.S. officials believed that
the U.S. capability to shape events in China was limited and any hint of U.S. interference in
Chinese politics might “unwittingly” undermine the position of pragmatic elements in Beijing.
Therefore, they refrained from making comments on either China’s state of affairs or the
administration’s preferred outcome. National Security Adviser Walter Rostow later recalled that
Johnson deliberately refrained from condemning Mao in public. By refusing to publicly take
sides in China’s internal struggle or to gloat over its troubles, the Johnson administration tried to
reduce Chinese hostility as well as its “siege mentality.”27 As the main China hand in the NSC,
Alfred Jenkins acknowledged the U.S. posture of “quiet reasonableness” and the “hope for
ultimate reconciliation.” But he recommended postponing even “the minor policy changes” until
Washington could “make a better judgment as to the course of events in China.”28
While Jenkins was mainly concerned with the proper timing of China policy reform,
Rusk consistently believed that the U.S. “firm posture in Asia” was crucial and that any
significant “concessions” to Communist China would be “seriously misunderstood in key
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quarters, not to mention the Congress.” Ultimately, due to Rusk’s opposition, in addition to the
great domestic turmoil in 1968, Johnson’s search for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, the
distraction of the general election, and Beijing’s cold attitude, the Johnson administration did not
make much progress in improving relations with China.29
Beijing’s Attitude toward the United States
During the Cultural Revolution, Beijing not only rejected the U.S. initiatives, but also
reduced their contacts via the only communication channel in Warsaw. When the American
representative at a Warsaw meeting talked about Washington’s offer of trade and travel
relaxations, Chinese Ambassador to Poland Wang Guoquan turned them down, arguing that it
was “absolutely impossible to improve Sino-American relations” if the Taiwan issue was not
solved. Wang charged that the United States was trying to “deceive” the Chinese people and “lull
their fighting spirit” with proposals for contacts so that it can “impose war on Chinese people at
appropriate time.”30
From 1966 to 1968, the Chinese side deliberately lengthened the gap between the
meetings despite American requests to meet more frequently.31 While in both 1964 and 1965 the
two sides met five times, the number of meetings decreased to three in 1966, two in 1967, and
only one in 1968. Moreover, the contact was lowered to the level of second secretary between
meetings. On May 18, 1968, the Chinese embassy sent a letter to the U.S. embassy saying that it
wanted to postpone the 135th meeting to mid- or late- November because “there was nothing to
discuss.” Though Rusk was worried at one time that China might break or suspend the meetings,
U.S. representatives in Warsaw felt that Beijing wanted to retain the channel of
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communication.32 The Chinese side was also deliberate in putting off the meetings as agreed
upon by both sides. In 1967, the People’s Daily published three stories about the postponement
of Sino-American meetings for “institutional” reasons. The 134th meeting, in particular, was put
off by two months from November 8, 1967 to January 8, 1968.33 These gestures were Beijing’s
deliberate efforts to show the world how it degraded the importance of the meetings and how it
slighted Washington.
Beijing’s reduction of contacts with Washington also reflected its effort to avoid the
political embarrassment of dealing with American “imperialists” in secret when it attacked
Moscow for “colluding” with Washington. Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution,
Beijing’s official protests against U.S. military operations in Vietnam were usually accompanied
by attacks on the Soviet Union. In response to the U.S. bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in June
1966, for example, while the People’s Daily labeled the American “imperialists” as the “most
dangerous enemy” to people all over the world, it also charged the Soviet Union for acting as the
“number-one accomplice of American imperialists.” Attacking the Soviet Union for “colluding”
with the United States in sabotaging the struggle of the North Vietnamese through “peace ploy,”
it called on the “oppressed” people of the world to “abandon any hope for the American
imperialists and Soviet revisionists.”34 When People’s Daily charged the Americans with a “war
provocation” by bombing Chinese civilian facilities close to the Vietnamese border, it blamed
the Soviet Union for “cooperating with and instigating” the Americans in their plot to “spread
the war to all of Indochina.”35
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According to People’s Daily, the Soviet official organ Pravda in July 1966 insinuated a

“Sino-American deal” by publishing American Ambassador to Poland Gronouski’s remarks
about a Sino-American meeting in an interview. In order to show Beijing’s ideological
orthodoxy, the People’s Daily published on its front page the full texts of Wang Guoquan’s
opening statement and his remark to the media after the meeting. On both occasions he used
strong words repudiating both the United States and the Soviet Union.36 Under the table, Wang
complained several times to Gronouski about the leak of the meeting contents by the American
side.37
In January 1967, both the Times and the Post featured on their front pages a story by a
French editor, who claimed that a Chinese diplomat in Paris a year earlier had asked the French
Foreign Ministry to relay Beijing’s message that China would not enter the Vietnam conflict so
long as the United States observed three conditions. Taking into account the performance of U.S.
military operations in North Vietnam, both newspapers concluded that the two countries had
reached an “accord” about no heads-on collision in Vietnam.38 The story was soon picked by the
press of the Soviet Union and India. In response to “rumors” of “understanding” or “tacit
agreement” between Beijing and Washington, the People’s Daily attacked the “slandering” of
China by the Soviet and Indian press as the “enemies’ ploy” to “sabotage” the close friendship
between the Chinese and Vietnamese people.39 As mentioned in the last chapter, up to May
1966, when the U.S. Air Force downed a Chinese plane, the People’s Daily was still talking
about Zhou Enlai’s “four points.” After that, the “four points” was no longer found in the CCP’s
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official organ. The Chinese media eliminated any sign that could be interpreted as a
“compromise” with the United States with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.
In order to consolidate Beijing’s revolutionary credentials, the Chinese media promoted
conflicts between China and the United States. Between 1966 and 1968, the People’s Daily
carried stories where Chinese fishermen were killed or the Chinese embassy in Hanoi was hit by
U.S. bombs. 40 More importantly, it reported several shooting incidents where the Chinese
military downed U.S. aircrafts.41 On August 21, 1967, the Chinese Air Force shot down two U.S.
navy jets straying into the Chinese air space and captured a pilot named Robert Flynn. The
People’s Daily published the photos of Flynn as well as the plane wrecks, arguing that the PLA’s
punishment of U.S. “aggressors” would inspire the Cultural Revolution at home.42
At the Warsaw talks, when Gronouski proposed a joint investigation of the incidents,
Wang rejected it as “unnecessary” and charged it as an American effort to “cover its crime” and
“deceive the people.” In one incident where the U.S. military seemed to have rescued several
Chinese fishermen in December 1966 on the basis of their testimonies in Saigon, Wang accused
the U.S. side of “maltreating” them and attempting to “recruit them as spies or defectors to
Taiwan.”43 On the front page of the People’s Daily, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a
statement protesting the killing and injuries of Chinese fishermen because of U.S. bombing.44
Beijing’s rejection of joint investigations suggested that it wanted to avoid dealing with the
United States as much as possible. More importantly, whether those incidents actually happened
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or how they were solved was much less important to the Chinese than their propaganda value
showing Sino-American conflicts.
While the front-pages of the People’s Daily highlighted the “conflicts” between China
and the United States, its interior pages featured many stories of the domestic problems in the
United States, such as the anti-war protests, race riots, and inflation. In its short comments on
Johnson’s State of the Union Address in 1967, the People’s Daily omitted his message about
China, describing him as being “engrossed in problems at home and abroad.”45 The Reference
News reprinted a story from a Hong Kong newspaper that the American desire to build
connections with China had been rejected by the CCP, but its abridged version of Johnson’s
address kept the message about China.46 The Chinese media gave the impression that the United
States was in a state of decline and that its offer of friendliness simply showed its weakness.
U.S. Media on the Cultural Revolution
When the Cultural Revolution broke out in China, U.S. media were confused and did not
pay much attention to the “cultural” aspect in the Chinese official propaganda. However, the
downfall of Peng Zhen, a key member in the Politburo and one whom they viewed as a possible
successor to Mao, became a headline in the Post and the Times. Because Mao had disappeared
from the public view since November 1965, they speculated that he had lost control of the
situation.47 The Post published A. Doak Barnet’s speculation that Mao was probably dying and
the current turmoil was a power struggle around his succession.48 The Times first learned of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45

Ibid., January 13, 1967, 5.
RN, January 11, 1967, 1; January 13, 1967, 4.
47
NYT, June 4, 1966, 1; July 26, 1966, 1; WP, May 30, 1966, A16; June 4, 1966, A1.
48
WP, May 30, 1966, A16.
46

!

!

78!

official name of the campaign--“Cultural Revolution”--on June 18 when Zhou Enlai informed
leaders of Romania during his visit to that country.49
After disappearing from the public view for several months, Mao swam in the Yangtze
River on July 16, 1966. For some unknown reason, the Chinese media chose not to release the
story of the swimming until July 25. With several pictures on its front page, the People’s Daily
claimed that Mao had swum thirty li, approximately nine miles, within an hour.50 Mao’s sudden
appearance drew the attention of the two key newspapers and magazines. While reprinting a
photo of Mao’s swimming, they ridiculed the story as propaganda. The Post claimed that the
mass swimming demonstrations at the bidding of Mao allegedly had caused mass drowning due
to ill preparation. Time magazine ran an article entitled “The Great Splash Forward.” Since the
disastrous Great Leap Forward, its variations had appeared frequently in U.S. media.51 The
newsmagazine pointed out that Mao’s performance of swimming nine miles in one hour was four
times the world record of marathon swimming, which was obviously impossible for a seventytwo-year old. Newsweek used the title “No Ordinary Swim: New Light on the Great Purges as
Chairman Mao Surfaces.” It showed skepticism by reprinting a London Daily Mirror
commentary that suggested Mao might have been held up “by inscrutable Chinese frogmen.” As
it correctly pointed out, Mao’s appearance showed that he was in good health and had been in
full control of the Party and the purge from the beginning.52
With the Cultural Revolution increasing in intensity, stories on the mass violence
appeared frequently in U.S. media. This is not surprising because of the media’s “penchant for
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drama.” 53 U.S. media were deeply disturbed and horrified by the government-supported
“xenophobic frenzy” in defiance of diplomatic norms when the Red Guards targeted Western life
styles as well as foreign nationals in response to Mao’s call to “eliminate the bourgeois
influence.” In August 1966, for example, the Times and the Post reported on their front pages
how the Red Guards in Beijing attacked churches in Beijing. Western journalists received a rare
first-hand experience of the Red Guards brutality when eight expelled nuns crossed the border
into Hong Kong. As Newsweek described it, when an eighty-five year old nun fainted, she was
“unceremoniously dumped faced down on a baggage cart” and wheeled across the border while
scores of Red Guards stood nearby and jeered. Both Time and Newsweek presented a photo of
the sister wheeled across the border. The story that the sister died in a Hong Kong hospital the
next day added horror to the scenario.54
To solve the problem of no direct access to China, U.S. media used the stories of
Canadian, Japanese, Soviet, and Czechoslovak journalists based there. Often, journalists used
wall posters or Red Guard newspapers for their source of information. One merit of these
unofficial channels was that they provided news that would never appear in the Chinese official
media, such as stories about the bloody fights and casualties, personal attacks on Mao’s wife
Jiang Qing, Lin Biao, and even Mao himself. One big problem was that information in these
posters could not be verified. For example, a Post front-page article reprinted dispatches from
Japanese and Czechoslovak correspondents who employed wall posters claiming that fifty-four
persons had been killed during the riots in Nanjing. As to the number of the injured, the Japanese
report was 6,000 while the Czechs listed 60,000. The Czech news agency also quoted Red
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Guards leaflets circulated in Beijing that described tortures of their own members by opposing
factions: “Their fingers, noses, and ears were chopped off and their tongues were cut off.” The
Post admitted that there was no eyewitness to such events. 55 These leaflets might have
deliberately exaggerated the atrocities of opposing factions in order to arouse anger and hatred.
Even though some stories could not be confirmed, the audience got a sense of the extent of chaos
in China.
In covering the Cultural Revolution, the Post seemed to present more graphic and
sensational pictures than the Times. While the Times used “red guards” or “Maoists,” the Post
mostly used “mobs.” When reporting the Red Guard harassment of Soviet women and children
at the Beijing airport, for example, the Times used a headline “Soviet Dependents Harassed in
Peking.” It claimed that the Chinese demonstrators at the airport were “evidently under a
measure of discipline” because Red Guards fists “stopped within inches of Russian face.” The
Post, in contrast, used a headline “Soviet Wives Forced to Crawl in Peking,” describing how
Soviet officials were pushed and manhandled when they tried to protect their women and
children who “had to crawl” beneath the portrait of Mao.56 The Post also seemed to be more
impressed by the provocative rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution that could be shown in
headlines such as “Peking Declares War of Annihilation” and “Mao Urges Crushing of Foes.”57
The Post’s reporting of the Cultural Revolution was in line with its somewhat tougher position
on Beijing in general.
For all the differences on their front pages, the Post and the Times both expressed disgust
to the Red Guards in their editorials. The Times compared the “officially organized violence
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against foreigners” in China to Empress Dowager’s endorsement of the Boxers in 1900.58 The
Post argued that the image of China had become dominated by “a steadily darkening ugliness”
and that the “young fogeys of Peking are frightening.”59
Stories in U.S. media often misread Cultural Revolution propaganda when they took the
Chinese papers at their face value. For example, in a story entitled “Lin Piao is Made Red
Guards’ Head: Chou Enlai and Ho Lung Also Named to High Posts in Chinese Youth Unit,” the
Times reprinted the Japanese monitoring of a Beijing broadcast that reported Zhou Enlai as
having said, “I will join your picket corps and will serve as an adviser” when the Red Guards
placed an armband on him. The radio also said Marshals He Long and Lin Biao had agreed to
serve as chief of staff and commander in chief of the Red Guards when the youth asked them.60
During the Cultural Revolution, there was never any official Red Guards organization with Lin
as the commander-in-chief, Zhou as the adviser, and He Long as the chief of staff. What the
Japanese picked up from the Chinese radio was nothing but propaganda aimed to show the
endorsement of the Red Guards movement by the top leaders. Actually, in its coverage of the
Red Guard rallies, the People’s Daily consistently called Mao the “paramount commander.” Mao
and his wife had much more influence on the Red Guards than Lin, Zhou and He, who probably
would have had reservations about their rampages.
Because the Chinese media repeatedly attacked Liu Shaoqi as Mao’s chief opponent,
U.S. media also described him as the “rallying point” of “Mao’s foes.” The Times considered Liu
and Deng as either “fence-sitters” or “leaders of the reported opposition.”61 Time reprinted the
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Chinese propaganda that “Liu’s faction” had tried to “vote Mao out of power.”62 Newsweek
maintained that “pitched battles between the supporters of Mao and Liu” had become almost
daily occurrence.”63 In the summer of 1967, when Deng Xiaoping came under attack, the Post
speculated that he was “a major figure functioning behind the scenes to mobilize Mao’s
adversaries.”64 In a typical example, Time listed pictures of Mao, Jiang Qing, and Lin Biao as
“Heroes” on the left column, and those of Liu Shaoqi and his wife, Tao Zhu, Peng Zhen, Deng
Xiaoping, Li Xuefeng, and Zhou Enlai as “Villains” on the right. 65 The list revealed the
American media’s tendency to oversimplify the struggle in China into one between Mao and his
alleged “enemies,” or one between “good guys” and “bad guys.”
The reality in China was much more complex because the factions fighting against each
other all claimed to be followers of Mao. Those who were purged more recently might have been
beneficiaries of previous purges. They were later purged merely because they were unfortunate
to have fallen out of Mao’s favor or they might have stood in the way of his political
maneuvering. In the above list of “villains,” Tao Zhu and Li Xufeng had been promoted to
replace Peng Zhen and Wu Han who had been purged earlier. As for Zhou Enlai, even though
the Red Guards attacked him for being “too soft on Mao’s foes,”66 he was not purged because
Mao needed him to ensure the functioning of the country in the middle of the “civil war.”
Another case was the PLA. While Mao wanted it to “support the left” and seize power from the
Party establishment and organize revolutionary committees, local military forces did not
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cooperate well with mass representatives supported by the radical Cultural Revolution Group
even though they all claimed to be loyal to Mao.67
When U.S. media linked all opponents to radicals together into a consolidated bloc that
was anti-Mao in nature, the result was the exaggerated strength of “Mao’s opponents.” In an
article “Some Doubt Survival of Present Peking Setup” published on the eve of the Chinese
National Day in 1966, the Post speculated that Mao and Lin Biao could be overthrown by an
opposition that had “grown significantly.” The Times editorial also maintained that the turmoil in
China had raised questions about the “stability of the Peking regime” with signs denouncing
Mao.68 On the cover of a January 1967 issue, Time magazine featured a large picture of Mao’s
head wound up by a dragon of the Great Wall with a subtitle “China in Chaos.” The
accompanying article described China as reaching the final stages of the “legendary dance of the
scorpion--just before it stings itself to death.”69 The speculation about the downfall of Mao’s rule
might have been wishful thinking. However, the troubles inside China, as James Reston argued,
reduced the possibility of China’s military intervention in Vietnam.70
U.S. media’s misunderstanding also included projecting U.S. values on Chinese realities.
When the Cultural Revolution started, for example, a Post editorial speculated that the
movement might signify another “Great Leap Forward” modernization.71 In March 1967, it
claimed that Mao was retreating from his Cultural Revolution and the central issue now was
“how to modernize China,” which needed help from the outside world. Therefore, it argued,
Beijing in its weakness would be “receptive to arrangements with Washington.”72 The Post was
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probably too optimistic about China’s need for modernization as a driving force for it to seek
reconciliation. It well reflects the prejudices of the “modernization theory” at the time, which
posited that every country would go through “development,” defined by “progress” in
technology and economy among many other things.73 Being embroiled in power struggles, Mao
was probably much more interested in revolution than “modernization.” Moreover, even if China
needed modern technologies, it could have obtained them from other Western countries rather
than the United States. Lastly, modernization counted little when Chinese leaders made the
decision to reconcile with Washington later.
Despite the chaos in China, U.S. newspeople persisted in criticizing the rigid China
policy and pushed for more flexibility. The newspapers were more straightforward than the
administration in expressing their preference. The Post argued that the United States had a
“stake” in the outcome and a flexible American posture would give encouragement to moderate
forces in China. The Times also maintained that it was in the interest of the United States to
encourage the “rational” faction in China by “holding open the door wherever possible.”74
In July 1967, those who disapproved of Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War exceeded
50 per cent for the first time in the Gallup Poll.75 In face of the rising criticisms of the Vietnam
War, the Johnson administration mounted its offensive on the critics in fall 1967. Many
administration officials responded to media interviews with “predominantly hawkish advice,”76
and invoked the specter of the “China threat” in their defense of the administration’s Vietnam
policy. A typical example was Dean Rusk at a press conference on October 12, 1967. When
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asked to elaborate on why U.S. security was at stake in Vietnam, Rusk responded that in another
ten or twenty years, “there will be a billion Chinese on the Mainland, armed with nuclear
weapons, with no certainty about what their attitude toward the rest of Asia will be.”77 In their
front-page stories reporting Rusk’s press conference, the two newspapers obviously did not
support him. The Post mentioned Rusk’s “unwarranted obsession about Communist China.” The
Times noted that his “usual calm tone was missing,” giving the impression that he was
emotional. In a column, James Reston argued that Rusk’s remarks were “good theatre but bad
policy” and that the reporters liked his “loyalty, optimism, and appealing conviction” but simply
could not “believe he was right.”78 Rusk’s remarks caused more controversy when Senator
Eugene McCarthy (D-MN) accused him of obscuring the issue by invoking the “yellow peril.”
Even though Rusk denied it promptly, it became headlines in both the Times and the Post. In his
Post column article entitled “Rusk’s Raising of Yellow Peril is Truly Dangerous Escalation,”
Joseph Kraft argued that Rusk had put his country in a position that had “elements of
madness.”79
Dean Rusk was not the only administration official who used the “China peril” to defend
the administration’s Vietnam policy. When speaking at the National Shrine of Our Lady of
Czestochowa in Pennsylvania on October 15, Vice President Hubert Humphrey reasserted that
the U.S. security was at stake in Vietnam and that the “current threat to world peace is militant,
aggressive Asian communism, with its headquarters in Peking, China.” The Times seemed to be
more critical of the “hawkish” remarks of administration officials than the Post. It placed
Humphrey’s speech on its front page while the Post did not.80 Interviewing specialists on China
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affairs and U.S. diplomacy, the Times published an article “Some Specialists Say U.S. Aides
Exaggerate Peking Threat.”81
As U.S. media watched the rise and fall of unrest in China, their call for better SinoAmerican relations was soon swamped by new stories of Red Guard violence. In March 1967,
both the Times and the Post claimed to have found signs that Mao’s Cultural Revolution was
subsiding. A Post editorial was so optimistic that it claimed a “propitious moment” had come to
“assay the small steps with which America’s eventual reconciliation with China must begin.”82 A
month later, world famous violinist Ma Sicong and his family arrived in the United States
seeking asylum after they fled China. Their arrival caused much interest because the Ma family
was among the very few Chinese witnesses of the Cultural Revolution to set foot on American
soil.83 After learning of Ma’s “mistreatment” by the Red Guards, an editorial in the Post
condemned the Communist madness, predicting that such a system would not “persist long
enough to imperil for generations the safety and security of millions of people.” 84 While both
newspapers claimed to have noticed signs that the Cultural Revolution was coming to a close as
early as October 1967, Time and Newsweek reported that bodies were still flowing down the
Pearl River to Hong Kong and Macao in July 1968.85 With stories of recurrent violence, China
seemed too unpredictable to work with diplomatically. For the American people, the media’s
coverage of Red Guard brutalities, their violent xenophobia and fanaticism must have alienated
them.
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For all their misreading of the situation in China, U.S. media were right in perceiving

from the struggles Mao’s weakness in keeping the country under control. Mao’s use of the
military to deal with his opponents, as the Times saw it, was an “admission of weakness.”86 In
response to the munity in Wuhan in July 1967, the Times argued that if Mao could not even
“liquidate his opponents in so central an institution as the armed forces,” it only showed that he
was not “fully the master in his own realm.” The Post also maintained that the incident suggested
Mao was failing in his effort to impose the “discipline and purity of his Cultural Revolution
across his distressed land.”87 The resistance and obstruction to Mao, although exaggerated by
U.S. media, destroyed the myth of an “impenetrable” Chinese leadership. 88 The media’s
coverage of the chaos indeed presented the irrational image of China. However, stories of chaos
also created the impression that China was preoccupied with domestic troubles, which reduced
the likelihood of an oversea adventure or overture.
Escalation of Sino-Soviet Polemics in U.S. media
During the Cultural Revolution, U.S. media were not only attracted by the struggles in
China, they also watched closely its conflicts with the Soviet Union. Coverage of strife between
Communist countries could not only discredit the ideological opponents of the United States, but
also benefit it in one way or another.
As mentioned earlier, Mao’s decision to start the Cultural Revolution was closely related
to the developments in the Soviet Union. He disagreed with Khrushchev’s “secret speech”
attacking Stalin’s “cult of personality” at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) in 1956 and especially opposed his policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the
West. Sino-Soviet conflict turned public after the Soviet Union signed the test-ban treaty in
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August 1963. Between September 1963 and July 1964, the People’s Daily published a series of
nine “polemics” spelling out the causes of Beijing’s breaking with the CPSU. The ninth polemic
entitled “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and Historical Lessons for the World” published
on July 14, 1964, stipulated that “successors of the proletarian revolutionary cause can only be
born in the mass struggle and grow up in the great winds and waves of revolution.” This
document contained the essence of what would become the Cultural Revolution.89
After Khrushchev was forced to resign in October 1964, Zhou Enlai went to Moscow
trying to express Beijing’s goodwill to the new Soviet leadership. However, new Soviet leader
Leonard Brezhnev disappointed him by publicly reiterating the “peaceful coexistence” policy
with the West and his endorsement of the test-ban treaty. Worse still, a personal dimension was
added when Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii allegedly told Marshal He Long, “We
have already gotten rid of Khrushchev, you ought to follow our example and get rid of Mao
Zedong.”90 Concluding that Moscow would not abandon its “revisionist” policy, the People’s
Daily and Red Flag ran a joint editorial “How Khrushchev Lost His Power,” attacking the new
Soviet leadership as practicing “Krushchevism without Khrushchev.”91
After the Cultural Revolution started, Mao was not hesitant to use anti-Soviet slogans to
advance his domestic cause when he targeted the “Khrushchev sleeping by our side.” In the
communiqué of the Eleventh Plenum that passed the “Sixteen Points Decision” about the
Cultural Revolution, “struggle against the Soviet Union” was adopted as an official policy.92
Under the strong anti-revisionist propaganda in China, the Red Guards targeted the Soviet
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embassy for mass rallies and demonstrations in August 1966. They also renamed the street in
front of the Soviet embassy as the “Anti-Revisionism Street.” The Chinese government’s failure
to rein in the Red Guards’ attack on the embassy annoyed Moscow, whose protests only served
to add fuel to the Red Guards’ frenzy.
Sino-Soviet quarrels reached its peak with the “Moscow Incident” in January 1967. On
January 24, sixty-nine Chinese students studying in Europe arrived in Moscow on their way back
to Beijing to take part in the Cultural Revolution. When they requested to present a wreath to
Stalin’s grave, they were rejected by the Soviet authority but allowed instead to pay tribute to the
Lenin Mausoleum, which was also at Red Square. After laying the wreath, the students refused
to leave and together they read aloud Mao’s quotations that included anti-Soviet slogans. Clashes
broke out when the Soviet police tried to stop the Chinese students. In protest, the Red Guards
laid siege to the Soviet embassy in Beijing for several weeks. In retaliation, the Soviets besieged
the Chinese embassy in Moscow for several days. When tensions in Beijing caused the Soviets to
evacuate Russian women and children, as mentioned earlier, many of them were harassed by the
Red Guards on their way to the airport. In Moscow, Soviet citizens broken into the Chinese
embassy complex, grabbed the display articles inside, and beat up Chinese diplomats. These “titfor-tat” struggles intensified the Sino-Soviet tension and sent it on a no-return track.93
What complicated the Sino-Soviet “war of words” was the tension along their disputed
frontiers. Since the Cultural Revolution started, violence against Soviet diplomats and the antiSoviet hysteria in China further aroused Moscow’s fear of war with China. In a CPSU plenum in
December 1966, several key party leaders complained that Chinese leaders had put struggle
against the Soviet Union in the first place. As a result, Moscow accelerated its military buildup
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along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders in 1967 and 1968. From 1965 to 1969, the
number of Soviet divisions reportedly increased from seventeen to twenty-seven. Brezhnev’s
assumption was that more troops would reduce the danger of military confrontations.94
In Xinjiang, an autonomous region in central Asia, the chaos caused by the Red Guard
movement and their hunt for Soviet sympathizers triggered large numbers of Uyghurs and
Kazakhs to flee to the Soviet Union, which the Soviet press reported as several hundred thousand
in January 1967. In response, Mao ordered all border forces on the Soviet frontier to be alerted
on February 11. In February, Moscow reported a withdrawal of Chinese troops one hundred
miles from the Soviet and Mongolian borders.95 In late 1966, the Reference News had started to
reprint Western media stories about increasing Soviet troop deployment, frequent military drills
and Soviet leaders’ anti-China indoctrination during their visit to the Sino-Soviet border.96 All
news of Sino-Soviet border tensions was censored in the People’s Daily though. It shows that
Mao was not expecting a real war against the Soviet Union when the Cultural Revolution was
raging. He was mainly interested in using the ideological differences with Moscow to serve his
domestic struggle against “revisionists.”
American journalists covered the Sino-Soviet polemics with prominence and not without
drama. They published vivid stories of the “war of words” emanating from Moscow and Beijing
in early 1967. Under the headline “Moscow and Peking in Loudspeaker War,” the Times
described a scene where large Soviet loudspeakers mounted on two trucks blared against two
smaller ones installed by the Chinese embassy.97 The Post, Time and Newsweek placed pictures
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of demonstrators burning effigies of Soviet leaders in Beijing side by side with the Russians
shouting “shame on Mao” in Moscow. In an article entitled “Mao Baits the Russian Bear,”
Newsweek reported the clashes at the Red Square with an amusing effect. As it went, when the
Chinese embassy in Moscow produced two of the “allegedly injured students at a press
conference, one of them spoiled the whole effect by becoming so excited that he unwittingly
ripped off his bandages to reveal an unblemished face.”98
While U.S. media admitted that Beijing was more provocative than Moscow, they did not
appreciate the “quiet self-congratulation” of the Soviets.99 For example, the Times claimed that
the Soviet press was “more graphic about unrest and violence in China than many Western
papers.” James Reston noticed that U.S. officials talked about the Cultural Revolution far less
than the top leaders of the Soviet Union. In an editorial entitled “Moscow Fishes in Peking,” the
Post argued that the Russians were conducting an extensive campaign to “dislodge” Mao by
putting pressure on him and making his rule as “arduous” as possible. Newsweek pointed out that
Moscow had good reason to be worried by the fact that Beijing had accorded it the same “archdemon status” as Washington.100 During his visit to Great Britain in February 1967, Kosygin
remarked in a television interview that the Soviet Union sympathized with Chinese people who
were struggling against “the dictatorial regime of Mao Tse-tung.” The Post interpreted
Kosygin’s unusual condemnation of Mao as a sign that Moscow was giving priority to better
relations with the West. In the editorial “Kosygin Drops the Mask,” the Times argued that his
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remark “in the capital of a capitalist nation” was “counterproductive” because it only served to
inform the West of the “extreme seriousness of the Sino-Soviet crisis.”101
U.S. media also gave prominence to the Sino-Soviet border tensions and speculated about
a possible war between the two Communist giants. Before 1967, Time magazine had called
attention to the border conflict, which it described as a “lesser known and potentially dangerous”
aspect in the Sino-Soviet disputes. Citing the increase of Soviet anti-China indoctrination on the
border, it claimed that “the war of words” might become an “Armageddon at the summit of the
Communist world.”102 Similarly, an editorial in the Times argued that by provoking a crisis with
Moscow, Mao might be preparing a campaign to win some of the disputed territory in Siberia.
With regard to Kosygin’s remarks in London, it again raised the question whether it might spark
a war between the two Communist powers.103 On February 10, 1967, journalists from the
Japanese news agency Kyodo reported from leaflets in Beijing that Mao had given orders to alert
all Chinese border troops. The Times, the Post, and Time quickly picked up the story even
though they had no means to confirm it. Newsweek also talked about the “War of Nerves” on the
Sino-Soviet border.104 By February 1967, the seriousness of the Sino-Soviet conflict had become
so clear to newspeople that a permanent split seemed very likely to them.105 In general, their
coverage of the Sino-Soviet conflict was more accurate than their perceptions of the Cultural
Revolution.
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As the Sino-Soviet rift developed, it provided a foundation for new thinking for those

who were concerned about Sino-American relations. In February 1967, scholars on China
convened a conference at University of Chicago’s Center of Policies Studies. In his speech at the
conference, Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY) asserted that the United States had “widely
exaggerated” the threat of China and underestimated the significance of the Sino-Soviet split. He
called on administration officials to distinguish between “armed attack and internal revolution,”
between “Chinese direction of revolutionary forces and Chinese exhortation.” Kennedy’s speech
made the front pages of both the Times and the Post.106 The next day, the Times covered ideas
from the conference with a title “Victory for Mao held Best for U.S.: Experts See Chinese-Soviet
Rift as an Advantage.”107
Several Post columnists criticized Kennedy. Claiming that the senator’s proposal had
existed inside as well outside the government for some time, Joseph Alsop complained that
Kennedy had appeared on the front pages too often and that he was given too many credits for
pressing a so-called “brand new” China policy. William S. White, in his column article “Who’s
Advising Bobby?...China Proposals Shock Associates,” criticized Kennedy by reemphasizing the
Chinese “aggression” in Korea and Vietnam. He attacked the senator for “becoming a part-time
dove” on Vietnam where his brother JFK had been a “resolute hawk.” He also described
Kennedy’s academic advisers as “splendid” writers but not “wise politicians.”108 Though not
shared by all, these criticisms of Kennedy reflected opposition to China policy reform during the
Cultural Revolution.
In reality, the United States had been much closer to the Soviet Union than to China since
the early 1960s. It was especially true during the Cultural Revolution when the Soviet leadership
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was truly alarmed by the Chinese anti-Soviet hysteria. In January 1967, the Soviet Politburo
approved a policy to maintain Soviet-American relations on a certain cordial level to help the
Soviet Union avoid fighting on two fronts.109 At the Glassboro Summit in June 1967, though
Kosygin and Johnson did not reach any concrete agreement, the intimate atmosphere at the
meeting was interpreted by the Times and the Post as the beginning of a better Soviet-American
relationship.110 At the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967, Harrison Salisbury,
a prominent journalist on the Soviet affairs and the assistant managing editor of the Times, wrote
a column “China Tops Soviet List of Potential Dangers,” arguing that the United States had
dropped to the third place on the list of potential threats to the Soviet Union with China and West
Germany on the top two.111 The Johnson team appreciated the Soviet cooperation over the Paris
talks. They were unwilling to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift because of their fear of alienating the
Soviets, whom they believed might help find a settlement in Vietnam.112
U.S. Media on China’s Role in Vietnam
U.S. media not only followed the Sino-Soviet polemics, they were also interested in the
relations between Beijing and Hanoi because any rift between them could affect the U.S. war
effort in Vietnam. As one of the greatest victims of the Sino-Soviet disputes, Sino-Vietnamese
relations had started to strain after Moscow increased its role in the Vietnam War with Kosygin’s
visit to Hanoi in January 1965. When Kosygin proposed a Sino-Soviet “joint action” to support
Vietnam, Mao dismissed his proposal, asserting that China’s argument with the Soviet Union
would “continue for another 9,000 years.” 113 Beijing’s obstinate rejection of “joint action”
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proposals of world Communists supporting Vietnam severely embittered Hanoi. Several years
later, when China invaded Vietnam in 1979, Hanoi listed the “crimes” of Beijing in “sabotaging
the united action” in its publication of the history of Sino-Vietnamese relations.114
Beijing not only rejected the joint-action proposal, but also demanded that Hanoi should
take sides in the Sino-Soviet quarrel and repudiate Soviet revisionism. Evidence shows the
existence of great differences between Beijing and Hanoi in 1966. In his talks with Le Duan, the
General Secretary of the Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP), in March 1966, Zhou Enlai
emphasized that “opposing the U.S. should necessarily go hand in hand with opposing
revisionism” and the two things could not be separated. He also complained that Vietnamese
newspapers were carrying stories about Chinese aggression against Vietnam in the past. When he
failed to convince the North Vietnamese to distance themselves from the Soviet Union, Zhou
insisted that mentioning the Soviet aid together with the Chinese aid was an “insult” to China.115
These actions only alienated the North Vietnamese and pushed them further toward Moscow.
Beijing also disagreed with Hanoi’s military strategies, especially on the launching of the
Tet Offensive. As an advocate of protracted people’s war or guerilla warfare in rural areas, Mao
opposed using large units fighting conventional warfare in urban centers because he believed the
North Vietnamese would expose themselves to the heavy bombing of the superior American air
force. However, with more sophisticated weapons and heavy artillery provided by the Soviet
Union and the expectation that simultaneous uprisings would emerge everywhere in South
Vietnam, in January 1968 Hanoi launched the Tet Offensive, which consisted of simultaneous
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conventional attacks on major cities in South Vietnam. Though the United States defeated the
Tet Offensive, the enemies’ ability to mount such a large-scale offensive after heavy U.S.
bombing caused a “shock” to Americans who now began to raise serious doubts about official
reports of “progress” and the prospect of victory in Vietnam. Public support for the war and
Johnson’s handling of it went on a big “downward spiral.”116 Since July 1965, Americans had
been polled repeatedly about whether they thought the United States had made a mistake sending
troops to fight in Vietnam. In February 1968, those who answered “yes” exceeded those who
said “No” for the first time.117 In order to seek a settlement, President Johnson on March 31
declared his de-escalation plan by offering a partial halt to U.S. bombing against North Vietnam
unilaterally. After suffering heavy casualties, Hanoi started to negotiate with Washington in Paris
in May.
As the rift between Beijing and Hanoi developed, the Times had spotted sign as early as
May 1966 when Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu visited China. From the joint announcements
made by Chinese and Albania leaders that there could be no “neutrality” or “the middle of the
road” in the struggle against Soviet revisionism, it sensed “thinly veiled attacks” on Hanoi’s
leaders. When the Cultural Revolution erupted, Newsweek speculated that Hanoi might have
been “disillusioned” by the upheavals in China because they might affect its war effort. During
the Glassboro Summit in June 1967, the Post featured the story “Talks Said to Cool HanoiPeking Ties,” arguing that the gap between Beijing and Hanoi would widen when the Soviets’
increasing influence on Hanoi would facilitate its role as a “high-level broker” between the
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United States and North Vietnam.118 In other words, a closer Soviet-American tie would alienate
the relations between Hanoi and Beijing because of Hanoi’s closer relations with Moscow.
When the Paris talks started in May 1968, the People’s Daily remained silent and reduced
coverage of Vietnam, especially on its front pages. The Post interpreted Beijing’s continued
silence as an indication of its unhappiness with Hanoi. In a front-page article “Hanoi and
Moscow Appear to Mesh Tactics on Talks,” the Times noted that China had been excluded from
policy formulation over negotiations. It also featured an editorial entitled “Hanoi and Peking:
They Don’t Always See Eye to Eye.” Seeing China’s upgrading of the Viet Cong mission in its
capital, Newsweek interpreted it as Beijing’s effort to “drive a wedge” between Hanoi and the
Viet Cong if Paris talks went on.119
Moreover, both the Times and the Post reported stories of Chinese demonstrations in
front of North Vietnamese consulates in Chinese cities. The Post even obtained information from
a Red Guard bulletin in Guangzhou (Canton), which claimed that Red Guards had stormed the
North Vietnamese consulate and taunted its diplomats in Nanning, the capital of Guangxi
Province adjacent to North Vietnam, on June 2, 1968.120 In July, the two newspapers reported
that Chinese leaders including Zhou Enlai blamed the factional strife for halting the shipment of
Soviet and Chinese aid to Vietnam. They speculated that the Red Guards might be deliberately
blocking the transportation to show their discontent toward Hanoi.121
The Red Guards could have learned about the Paris talks from the Reference News, which
had followed them closely since the Vietnamese representatives arrived in Paris in May. It even
featured a story about how Hanoi’s chief negotiator Xuan Thuy met with Kosygin en route to
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Paris and reprinted several of his speeches at the negotiations.122 Stories of discord between
Beijing and Hanoi reduced Beijing’s role in Vietnam, which to some extent weakened the China
threat.
Impact of the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia
In the last year of the Johnson administration, the domestic and international
environments for both the United States and China moved in a direction that favored a better
relationship between them. As the chaos in China showed apparent signs of decline, Johnson also
started his de-escalation plan through negotiation. Moreover, the China Lobby in the United
States had been severely weakened with the Committee of One Million losing the endorsement
of congressional majorities.123 Candidates of both parties no longer took it as a taboo to publicly
talk about negotiating with China. 124 Most important of all, the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the introduction of “the Brezhnev Doctrine,” which used the
conception of “limited sovereignty” to justify the Soviet military intervention in another socialist
state, greatly increased Beijing’s concern about the Soviet threat. Slowly, Beijing started to turn
its attention away from Vietnam to the mounting danger to the north.
In denouncing the Soviet invasion, the People’s Daily described Moscow as “having
degenerated into a social-imperialist and social-fascist” state.125 The change from “revisionist” to
“social-imperialist” in the Chinese official discourse symbolizes that the Soviet Union had
shifted from an “ideological opponent” to a “strategic threat.”126 In September 1968, the official
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organ began to publicize strategic threats from the Soviet Union. For example, the People’s
Daily for the first time revealed tensions along the Sino-Soviet border by publishing a Foreign
Ministry protest against Soviet intrusions into China’s air space in the past, particularly in
August. In October, it published Zhou Enlai and PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng’s public
speeches with reference to Soviet troop deployment and “provocations” on the Sino-Soviet and
Sino-Mongolia borders.127
The People’s Daily also singled out Moscow when it attacked countries that formed the
anti-China strategic circle. In an article entitled “Warning to the ‘Heroes and Good Fellows’ in
the Anti-China Circle” from the PLA’s point of view, it listed recent “anti-China activities”
conducted by the Soviet Union.128 Between September and November 1968, while the People’s
Daily ferociously attacked the “Soviet socialist imperialists” on its front pages, it only briefly
referred to the American military “failures” in Vietnam and great civil disturbances at home in
interior pages. It seemed that Beijing was more concerned with a threatening Soviet Union than a
weakened United States.
The Reference News displayed signs that Beijing regarded Moscow as its “principle
enemy” after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. A front-page article entitled “Soviet
Revisionists Is Playing the Leading Role in the Anti-China Circle at the Acquiescence of the
United States” argued that the Soviet military drills between 1965 and 1967 reflected that China
had become the “number one imaginary enemy” of the Soviet Union after Moscow had
effectively reduced tensions with the West. As it stated, while the “anti-China circle” put
together by the United States had collapsed due to the resistance of the Vietnamese in the initial
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stage of the Soviet-American understanding, the Soviet Union had taken up the leading role in
the second stage, by containing China from both sides with “the two claws of the crab.”129
After the Paris talks began, Hanoi’s refusal to repudiate the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia further weakened Sino-North Vietnamese relations. During the National Day
celebration of 1968, the People’s Daily placed Vietnamese representatives after guests from
Albania, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia and New Zealand when it reported the state reception held
by Zhou Enlai. Lin Biao totally ignored the conflict in Vietnam in his speech at the Tiananmen
Square celebration the next day. On the same occasion a year earlier, Vietnam had been ranked
next only to Albania and Congo, and Lin had expressed warm support for the Vietnamese.130 The
Post read Lin Biao’s speech as a sign that Beijing had shifted its focus away from Vietnam to the
danger of a possible collision with the Soviet Union.131
Beijing’s public attitude toward the Paris talks began to change in October 1968, when
the People’s Daily for the first time ran a front-page article pointing out that the talks had
reached its “delicate stage” after twenty-six formal negotiations since their beginning on May 13.
As it reported, “more and more signs show that the stalemate at the Paris talks might have be
broken” when Johnson was planning to use the “fraud” of a comprehensive halt to bombing. It
grudgingly claimed that the stories needed to be “further confirmed as the situation develops.”132
The Times speculated that Beijing chose to disclose the Paris talks because it needed to prepare
its public when progress was “imminent.”133 Before that, the Reference News had featured a
story about Washington’s intention of complete halt to bombing in order to make a breakthrough
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in the Paris talks.134 Beijing did not want its cadres to be too surprised when progress in Paris
became a reality.
When Johnson declared in a television address on October 31 a complete halt to the
bombing, the People’s Daily, to the surprise of the foreign media, published the full text of his
address.135 It also published Hanoi’s official response declaring that it was ready to join the
quadripartite talks that included the NLF and South Vietnam, along with Ho Chi Minh’s message
to the Vietnamese people. On November 18, it published the statements of the U.S. State
Department and the Foreign Ministry of the DRV on their positions on the recent Paris talks.136
In Beijing’s strategic consideration, if Hanoi’s support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
was a sign that it had “lost out in its competition with the Soviet Union over Hanoi’s
allegiance,”137 the beginning of the quadripartite talks in November consolidated the Soviet
victory. By publicizing Hanoi’s negotiations with the United States, Beijing seemed to be
discrediting Hanoi and preparing for its own disengagement from Vietnam. While in private Mao
expressed his endorsement for the “fighting and talking” strategy before the DRV and NLF
leaders in November 1968, China started to withdraw support troops from North Vietnam at the
same time.138
More importantly, in November, Beijing signaled to Washington its wish to renew
Warsaw contacts. When the United States proposed to put off the 135th meeting to February 20
1969, a month after the inauguration of Richard Nixon, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made a
quick reply that was unusually longer and more detailed than any previous statements. The
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statement, with its attack on the “typically imperialist” attitude of the United States, stated that
China would like to talk with the United States on two principles: the U.S. withdrawal from
Taiwan and its willingness to sign an agreement with China based on “the five principles of
peaceful coexistence.”139 This rhetoric had disappeared from Chinese media since the Gulf of
Tonkin Incident in August 1964. The Chinese government could have just sent the letter to the
U.S. embassy and published a statement when the meeting was over, as it normally did.
Publishing the response in full served as a defense of Beijing’s position before the domestic
audience. It could also demonstrate that the government of China was not afraid of talking to the
“imperialists” in a rational manner.
In the United States, the Times was the most excited about the Chinese offer, granting it a
front-page prominence. It argued that the “peaceful coexistence” clause might signify “a possible
shift in the Chinese foreign policy from belligerency back to the flexible policy of the 1950s.”
Considering Beijing’s “overture of coexistence” and the starting of quadripartite negotiations
over Vietnam, its editorial pages expressed great optimism about peace prospects in Asia at the
end of 1968.140 The Post was not too impressed by Beijing’s proposal at first when it placed the
story on page sixteen and did not read too much meaning from the Chinese statement. In
December, it changed to argue that it was amazing that the United States was “wooed” by both
Beijing and Moscow.141
Of the three TV networks, only CBS reported the Chinese story in the evening news of
that day. It put the story at the end of a clip showing the recent activities of the president-elect
Richard Nixon, whose foreign policy advisor Robert Murphy was reported as saying that he was
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“pleased but not excited” about the Chinese offer to talk.142 ABC reported the news a week later,
claiming that change in the Chinese attitude might be an opportunity for Nixon to make
concessions in his China policy.143 NBC reporting came out three weeks later after it had time to
weigh the significance of the Chinese announcement. While showing the film of Mao’s recent
meeting with the Pakistani president, the anchor said that Mao wanted to test the temper of
Nixon by using the “five principles of coexistence,” which could have been condemned as “rank
revisionism” a year ago. It concluded that Nixon was the “first beneficiary of the Cultural
Revolution.”144
Of the two newsweeklies, Henry Luce’s Time described the signals from Beijing as
“erratic, vague and contradictory,” but it acknowledged them as a positive sign that China’s
relations with the world could expect to become “more rational and more flexible.” Newsweek
did not cover the Chinese call for talks until February of the next year.145 It took U.S. media
several weeks to gradually dwell upon the positive significance of the Chinese call for the
renewal of the Warsaw talks. As is often the case, the evaluation of the Times may have exerted
some impact on the others.
The Johnson administration responded to the Chinese offer with restrained optimism. In
his memo to National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, Alfred Jenkins argued that he did not
believe it was much of an “invitation for rapprochement.” He thought it was probably a signal of
Beijing’s “readiness” to listen to any interesting change in policy from the new administration.
Rostow and Dean Rusk recommended that President Johnson approve a change in trade
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regulations and permit U.S. subsidiaries abroad to sell a limited range of non-strategic goods to
China. Rusk believed that this change was a useful move prior to the scheduled meeting with the
Chinese in Warsaw. Rostow thought that they could set up a “modest precedent” that Nixon
could either follow or ignore, but it would reduce the significance if Nixon initiated it.146 The
Johnson administration ended up leaving the initiative to Nixon.
Conclusion
As this chapter indicates, the Cultural Revolution became a “watershed” in SinoAmerican relations.147 While the U.S. escalation in Vietnam caused the Johnson administration
to cautiously reduce tensions with China through tentative bridge-building gestures, the Cultural
Revolution witnessed the dramatic escalation of Sino-Soviet tension and the open rift between
Beijing and Hanoi. What came out of the chaos was an international environment that favored a
better relationship between China and the United States.
During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese media promoted Beijing’s image as a fighter
against both “American imperialists” and “Soviet revisionists” in order to inspire the struggle
against Mao’s political enemies. The contrast between Chinese words and deeds shows that
Beijing did not if ever want to fight either of the superpowers while China was in a state of
turmoil. The Chinese media played an important role in provoking the Soviet Union and
intensifying the Sino-Soviet polemics. As they continued in their ideological invectives against
the United States, the Chinese media displayed Beijing’s slight of Washington by repeatedly
delaying the already reduced contact in Warsaw. In order to defend China’s revolutionary
credentials and to dispel the “rumor” of its “understanding” with Washington in Vietnam, they
eagerly took advantage of the propaganda value of the “conflicts” between the two countries in
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the high seas as well as along the Chinese border. Their attacks on the “U.S. aggression” usually
served the additional purpose of embarrassing the Soviet Union when it constantly labeled
Moscow as the “number-one accomplice” of the United States.
With the start of the Paris talks in May and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968, Chinese media demonstrated Beijing’s unhappiness with Hanoi and its increasing
concern with the Soviet Union as a strategic threat. As the importance of Vietnam declined, the
Soviet Union first equaled, and then replaced the United States as the primary threat to China in
the media.
While the Johnson administration refrained from making public comments on the
domestic politics of China, U.S. media’s penchant for drama caused them to cover the power
struggles and Red Guard violence in China prominently. These stories unavoidably caused the
decline of China’s image among the American audience. Due to the lack of access to China and
their simplified reading of the Chinese propaganda, U.S. journalists tended to over-simplify the
situation in China and to project their own wishful thinking on the Chinese reality. Their
coverage of the resistance to the Cultural Revolution, however, suggested the weakness of Mao’s
control and shattered the myth of a united Chinese leadership. Despite the chaos in China, some
commentators persisted in criticizing the government’s rigidity and pushed for a more flexible
policy. The chronic violence in China, in turn, shattered the optimism for improved SinoAmerican relations.
In comparison to their coverage of Chinese domestic politics, U.S. media were more
accurate in assessing China’s international environment, especially the Sino-Soviet and SinoNorth Vietnamese rifts. The seriousness of the Sino-Soviet split discussed in the media
encouraged those who were concerned with Sino-American relations to think more seriously
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about exploiting the rift, even though the lame-duck Johnson team did not move in that direction.
Accounts of the rift between Beijing and Hanoi described Beijing’s reduced role in Vietnam.
Essentially, U.S. media pictured a disorganized and greatly weakened China with deep domestic
as well as international troubles, which made it less likely to intervene in Vietnam. At the end of
1968 when Beijing offered to renew contacts in Warsaw, U.S. media were looking for a more
promising Sino-American relationship in the coming Nixon administration.
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Chapter 4: The Sino-Soviet Crisis: “Danger and Opportunity” in 1969
The year 1969 witnessed the opportunity for a thaw in Sino-American relations. When

Richard Nixon came into office, he faced much more favorable domestic and international
environments than Lyndon Johnson had in dealing with China. Not only had the China Lobby
been severely weakened, but China entered into a period of stability when the Ninth Congress of
the CCP put an end to the most radical stage of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, Beijing had
openly expressed its desire to renew talks through the Warsaw channel. Most important of all,
the Sino-Soviet tensions suddenly intensified and turned into military conflicts. In the Chinese
language, the word for “crisis”--weiji--has two characters: “danger” and “opportunity.”1 The
crisis not only brought about the “danger” of large-scale war between the two Communist giants,
but also provided an “opportunity” for Washington and Beijing to move closer.
This chapter looks at how U.S. media responded to the Sino-Soviet crises and especially
how they dealt with the prospect of Sino-American accommodation in the new context. It also
studies the media’s role when Nixon sent clear signals to Beijing about the American intention to
improve relations. Also, by looking at the performance of the Chinese media, this chapter
examines how Beijing reconsidered its policy and moved slowly toward Sino-American
reconciliation.
Abortion of the Warsaw Talks
On January 20, 1969, Richard Nixon was inaugurated as the 37th president of the United
States. He was faced with an opportunity to improve Sino-American relations because the
previous November Beijing had offered to renew talks in Warsaw. Beijing stated, “We totally
understand your proposal because the new president is coming into office. And it would be easier
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for you to make decision by the time we meet next time when the new president would have
been in office for a month.”2 This statement was seen as a gesture to the incoming Richard Nixon
for improved Sino-American relations.3
Chinese media did not assign too much importance to Nixon’s inauguration. For a week,
the People’s Daily kept it off the front pages without publishing any major editorial comments
against the American president. It reported only a few demonstrations in Washington, D.C. and a
small one in Austria in the interior pages.4
A week later, a campaign against Nixon suddenly started in the Chinese media when the
People’s Daily and Red Flag published a joint editorial “A Confession in an Impasse: Comments
on Nixon’s Inaugural Address and the Shameless Flattering of the Soviet Revisionists.” It
depicted American “monopoly capitalism” as a “failing, yet brutal and aggressive system over
which Nixon presided as a frightened ineffectual front man.” Mocking Nixon’s peace proposal as
a “façade for further aggression,” it claimed that he was “beset with difficulties at home and
abroad” and that he would “not fare any better than his predecessor.” In the following days, the
Party organ published many stories about how Chinese workers and soldiers who, upon learning
of the editorial, swore to repudiate Nixon and the Soviet Union. Many of these articles used titles
with personal invectives against Nixon such as, “Let Nixon’s ‘Benevolent Rule’ Go to Hell!”
“Dump Nixon into the Trash of History!” “Get Rid of Nixon’s Junk of Ideas.” To highlight the
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importance of the editorial, the newspaper even reported that organizations in Japan and Africa
had expressed their support after reading it.5
One may wonder why Beijing waited for one week before it started the media campaign
against Nixon. A probable reason was that Liao Heshu, the chargé d'affaires of the Chinese
embassy in the Netherlands, had defected on January 24 before seeking asylum in the United
States.6 Before Liao’s defection was known to the world, China might have started the campaign
to show that it was not compelled to do so.
Beijing remained silent on Liao’s defection until February 4, when the State Department
announced that he had been admitted to the United States.7 In response, the People’s Daily
published Beijing’s strong protest, attacking Washington for “deliberately engineering” the
serious anti-China incident in collusion with its “little flunky” the Dutch government. It claimed
that the incident showed that Nixon and his predecessor Lyndon Johnson were “jackals from the
same den” in terms of their hostility toward China. What was notable about the statement was
the line that the Chinese representative at Warsaw had filed a strong protest to American
Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel, demanding Liao be handed back, or the United States
would have to “bear any serious consequences” it caused.8 This was unusual because Beijing had
never before publicly announced its protest through the Warsaw channel even when U.S.
bombing had caused Chinese casualties. The statement threw a cloud over the coming Warsaw
meeting. On February 18, two days before the scheduled meeting, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
announced the decision to back out, stating that the “undeniable crime” of the United States
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against China in inciting Liao’s defection rendered the atmosphere “unsuitable” for diplomatic
talks.9
Washington did not expect that the defector incident could have caused Beijing to cancel
the meeting because Chinese officials had still come to Warsaw in a similar case in 1966.
Moreover, when Stoessel inquired of the Chinese whether the official meeting could be held in
either the U.S. or Chinese embassies, they responded on February 5, the day after Washington
announced the defection, and said that the meeting should be held at the usual venue. Stoessel
described the atmosphere of their brief discussion as “relaxed and pleasant.” As for the Chinese
protest, a State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) report claimed to have
found a departure from its standard accusations against Lyndon Johnson because it had not
accused Nixon of wanting to “wage war on China” or using Vietnam to threaten its security. INR
concluded that these “significant holes in Beijing’s propaganda” suggested its willingness to give
Nixon a chance.10 Another sign of Washington’s failure to see any indication of the Chinese
cancellation was that National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger still sent a memo to Nixon
making recommendations about the coming Warsaw talks as late as February 12. INR interpreted
Beijing’s abrupt decision as the “latest and most striking evidence of disagreement and
indecision at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership.”11
While U.S. media were still talking about Chinese moderation signaled by its calling for
the renewal of the Warsaw talks, their sudden cancellation was shocking. The networks reported
the Chinese announcement that emphasized the defection. The Post blamed China for cutting the
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tie, alleging that it seemed to be “less interested in being accepted” into the international society
than in “reasserting its traditional role as the great power, paid tribute to by countries nearby.”
Newsweek quoted a China specialist who described Washington as an “innocent victim” of
Beijing’s leadership problems.12
With many first-rate China watchers, like Tillman Durdin who headed its Hong Kong
bureau, the Times was probably the least shocked because it had sensed bad omens from the
Chinese media in the past. When Beijing started the campaign against Nixon a week after his
inauguration, the Times interpreted it as a “calculated blow at détente with the United States”
because the attacks had been withheld for several weeks. It thus suggested that the outlook for
the Warsaw meeting on February 20 would be “less favorable.” Moreover, when Washington
announced Liao’s defection, the Times had displayed its worry that the announcement might
become a source of “potential diplomatic embarrassment” for the two governments. On the
Chinese cancellation, the Times not only talked about the possible leadership problems in
Beijing, but also criticized the Nixon administration for the lack of initiatives toward China.
Along with the Post, it argued that the U.S. government should not limit itself to the Warsaw
channel in seeking accommodation with China.13
Though Beijing cancelled the Warsaw meeting, there were signs of flexibility in the
Chinese media. One noticeable thing that escaped U.S. media’s attention was that the People’s
Daily published the full text of Nixon’s inaugural speech in the same issue as the joint editorial.
What was more interesting was that other major newspapers all over China, following the
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general practice during the Cultural Revolution of reprinting the editorials of the People’s Daily,
also published Nixon’s address. This was unprecedented in the history of the PRC.14 There was
evidence that Mao had personally ordered the publication of Nixon’s address. When editors of
the People’s Daily and Red Flag sent their editorials to Mao for approval, his instruction was:
“Publish the article as it is. Nixon’s [inaugural] speech should also be published.”15
Nixon did not specifically mention China in his inaugural address, but his meaning was
not hard to perceive when he stated, “Let all nations know that during this administration our
lines of communication will be open. We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the
exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry
isolation.”16 Mao’s head nurse Wu Xujun said that Mao, who had been impressed by the line,
asked her to keep it in mind.17 The phrase “angry isolation” echoed Nixon’s 1967 Foreign
Affairs article in which he famously stated, “We simply cannot afford to leave China forever
outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its
neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people
to live in angry isolation.” In that article, Nixon also predicted that China had the potential to
become one of the five major power centers of the world.18 There is evidence that Mao not only
had read the article, but also had shown it to Zhou Enlai. When Senate Majority leader Mike
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Mansfield (D-MT) visited China in 1972, Zhou told him, “It is Chairman Mao’s decision to open
up Sino-U.S. relations. Actually, he has read an article written by Nixon before he won the
presidential election in 1968.”19 Mao might have inferred from the article a possible change in
U.S. China policy if Nixon were elected president.
Nobody knows for certain Mao’s motives. Chen Jian argues that Mao might have ordered
the publication of the address to reveal that “he had noticed Nixon’s message.”20 Mao might
have had other considerations. While brainstorming on Sino-American relations, he might have
wanted to keep different options open by letting the Chinese people know about Nixon’s original
meaning. It might also be his direct message to the American president.
Another sign of Chinese flexibility was reflected in how the People’s Daily treated
Nixon’s first press conference on January 27. When asked about his China policy, Nixon said his
administration would “continue to oppose Communist China’s admission to the United Nations.”
Among the reasons, he cited the Chinese lack of interest in joining the UN, its refusing to abide
by the U.N. Charter, and its insistence on the expulsion of Taiwan, which Nixon described as a
“responsible member of the international community.” Though he expressed interest in what
China had to say at the next Warsaw meeting, Nixon concluded that he saw “no immediate
prospect of any change” in U.S. policy “until some changes occur on their side.”21
Nixon’s remarks about China, as Newsweek commented, could have been “eagerly cited
as proof of America’s evil intentions” a year earlier. In an editorial “Coolness to China,” the
Times called it the “the most disappointing section” of his press conference as he chose to ignore
the fact that the Chinese initiative in calling for the Warsaw talks was itself a change of its earlier
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stance.22 Interestingly, neither the People’s Daily nor the Reference News cited these lines in
their coverage of the conference. Headlines of the People’s Daily gave more priority to
criticizing the Soviet Union for “shamelessly flattering” Nixon and “colluding” with him.23
Beijing displayed a keen interest in the relations between Washington and Moscow.
After Nixon’s inauguration, the Chinese media sent conflicting signals. Although Beijing
launched the media campaign against Nixon, the lack of “teeth” in those invectives showed that
Chinese leaders might not have wanted to completely shut the door on him. At best, the media
inconsistencies demonstrated that they were not ready for dealing with the United States. Its
sudden lack of interest in talking also had the effect of testing the Nixon administration’s
intentions towards China.
Eruption of Sino-Soviet Border Clashes
Even though the initial probing between Washington and Beijing failed, the eruption of
Sino-Soviet military conflicts provided an opportunity for the two sides to make bolder moves
toward each other. The fighting that broke out on March 2, 1969 was a culmination of SinoSoviet border tensions that had been brewing for years, especially over two small islands,
Zhenbao and Qiliqin, on the Wusuli (Ussuri) River. According to A. Ielizavetin, a Soviet
diplomat then in Beijing, his embassy had proposed several times that the Soviet border forces
should “attack and repulse” the Chinese patrol units on the islands. The most serious incident
occurred on January 5, 1968, when a group of Soviet armored vehicles attacked Chinese working
on Qilinqin Island and killed four. The Soviets moderated their actions upon strong protests from
Beijing. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the CCP’s twelfth Plenum in
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the second half of 1968, tensions rose sharply in this area. Between December 1968 and
February 1969, several incidents occurred where Soviet armored vehicles landed on Zhenbao
Island and its soldiers beat up Chinese soldiers with sticks or caused injuries by other means.
After careful preparations, Beijing authorized its border troops to teach the Soviets a “bitter
lesson.” On March 2 and 15, they inflicted heavy casualties on Soviet forces in the two battles at
Zhenbao Island. When clashes broke out, neither China nor the Soviet Union seemed to be
considering a large-scale war. Soviet leaders did not even change their foreign visit itinerary
upon learning of the first clash. After the second battle on March 15, Mao’s order was “We
should stop here. Do not fight any more.”24 !
In their immediate response, the Times and the Post were both surprised not by the
fighting but by the fact that it was promptly announced by both governments. They knew there
had been skirmishes along the border for years, but Beijing and Moscow had either denied
unofficial reports of border incidents or dismissed them with vague references. The Post said that
the conflict was “important for being announced as for being fought.” The Times claimed that
territorial issue was only a “sidelight” that can be turned on or off as the overall climate
changed.25 Time claimed that China had put its border clash with Russia to use “in a new
domestic campaign” similar to the Great Leap Forward.26 Giving equal coverage to the Soviet
and Chinese versions of the battle, the diplomatic notes and domestic reaction from both sides,
the background provided by both sides and their explanations of their motives, Newsweek left the
readers to decide who was right.27
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The three networks used Soviet-provided film showing the memorial service for fallen

Soviet soldiers and Chinese border guards violently waving Mao’s Red Books and shouting in
the face of Soviet guards. To add to the sensation, they all quoted the Soviet Foreign Ministry
announcement that the Chinese had mutilated dead Soviet soldiers with bayonets.28 The overall
impression was, of course, that the Chinese were more provocative than the Soviets.
From the exchange of words between Beijing and Moscow, U.S. media found the
atmosphere was not that intense. Even in the Soviet-provided film, some Russian civilians,
though shouting slogans, did not look furious but relaxed and some were even smiling. ABC
reporter Irv Chapman described the atmosphere as overall “good-humored.” The Times claimed
that the banners and shouts of the marchers brought forth by cheerleaders in loudspeaker trucks
in Moscow were in contrast with “the gay comportment” of many demonstrators. It described the
crowd in Beijing, many of them women or schoolchildren, as more relaxed and less threatening
than the protest meetings by the Red Guards during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution. The
Post depicted the Soviet demonstrators as “restrained” when they passed the Chinese embassy in
an “orderly fashion, six abreast.”29 By contrasting the official fury with the relaxation of the
protestors, U.S. media seemed to be mocking the two governments for staging the
demonstrations.
Between April 1 and 24 in 1969, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened its Ninth
National Congress. At the 12th plenum of the 8th Congress that convened the previous October,
Mao had said that the Cultural Revolution would probably last three years and might end in the
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summer of 1969. 30 Even though Mao never officially declared the ending of the Cultural
Revolution, with the dissolution of the Cultural Revolution Leading Group and the restoration of
power to the Politburo, its most radical stage had ended.31
At the Ninth Congress, leaders did not seem to show too much concern about the border
clashes either. Though Lin Biao condemned the Soviet Union in his official report, he stated that
the Chinese government was considering the Soviet request for negotiation. Mao talked about
preparing for war, but mainly in a “spiritual sense,” which was not different from his position
since the early 1960s. He did not demand special material mobilization or extra alerts to deal
with the Sino-Soviet conflict.32 After the eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Mao told his head
nurse Wu Xujun, “Now that China is fighting against the Soviet Union, it provides an excellent
topic for the Americans to write a good essay.”33 Mao’s words might not be sufficient evidence
to show that he started the conflicts for Nixon to act. At least, they suggest that he was well
aware of the opportunity for Washington and Sino-American rapprochement.
What was noticeable was that in the March/April joint issue of Red Flag, the editorial
“About Summing up Experience” was placed in front of another one attacking the Soviet Union
for the border clashes. It declared that the Cultural Revolution had achieved its “great and
decisive” victory and called on citizens to work harder in the “fronts of industry, agriculture and
education.” 34 This editorial, along with another one entitled “Make Revolution, Promote
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Production and Win New Victory in the Industrial Front,” both reprinted in the People’s Daily,
reflected the shift of China’s focus from “revolution” to “production.” Its placement suggested
that for the leadership in Beijing, reorganization of the Party and the shift of its focus were more
important than the conflict with the Soviet Union at the time.!
As the Ninth Congress was the first major meeting of the CCP in thirteen years and it was
announced in the 1969 New Year’s joint editorial of the People’s Daily, Red Flag and the PLA
Daily, U.S. media were well aware of its importance. At the beginning of the year, the Times and
the Post had managed to obtain the draft of the new Party Constitution circulating at the
provincial level.35 When the congress started, they observed on their front pages that it would put
an end to Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Newsweek argued the fact that “military men and career
bureaucrats” were the majority in China’s top ruling organs was a sign of moderation in Chinese
domestic policy. Time viewed the Ninth Congress as “China’s search for stability,” arguing “the
fact that the congress was convened at all showed that Mao had made at least some progress
toward domestic peace.”36
With the general impression that the Ninth Congress would bring stability to China, some
U.S. news agencies began to dwell on its significance for Sino-American relations. In an article
headlined “Washington Hopes Peking Meeting Leads to Talks with U.S.,” the Times shrewdly
referred to an ongoing China policy review headed by Henry Kissinger as “disclosed” by U.S.
officials and Secretary of State William Rogers’ recent remark to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the Ninth Congress “might result in the formulation of new policies setting the
course for China’s future developments.” NBC went even further than the Times. After reporting
Rogers’s statement that the United States would not exploit Sino-Soviet troubles and that it
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wanted better relations with both countries, the anchor said that the CCP’s Ninth Congress might
result in a “softer” China policy and that “diplomatic gossip” in East Europe about US-China
warming-up gave the Russians “sleepless nights.” 37 Although Rogers’ statement gave the
impression of American neutrality, the anchor’s comments pointed toward better relations with
China, because of the Sino-Soviet conflict.
The NBC story is a typical example where U.S. media tilted toward China when the
government assumed neutrality on the Sino-Soviet conflict. In covering the fighting, U.S. media
generally described the Soviets as more aggressive than the Chinese and many of them argued
that the current trouble between the two Communist giants provided a good opportunity for
Washington to improve relations with Beijing. The Post’s editorial followed the line of Stephen
Rosenfeld, former chief of the Post’s Moscow bureau, who argued that the United States should
avoid exploiting the Sino-Soviet trouble and develop close relations with both. Stanley Karnow,
the Post’s main China watcher in Hong Kong, however, advocated tilting toward Beijing when
he described the Soviets as more threatening, as seen in “Moscow is Strident: China Tones Down
Trouble on Border” in his front-page article and “Soviet Anti-Chinese Blasts Provide Openings
for U.S.” for his column. The Post featured a headline “Chinese Threat Obsesses TablePounding Brezhnev” to refer to the Soviet leader’s performance at the Warsaw Pact countries.38
In “Rethinking China policy,” Time pointed out that China had been involved “less
dramatically outside its borders than the Soviet Union” and concluded that “with the passing of
monolithic Communism, interesting possibilities open up for U.S. diplomacy and the case for
change in U.S. policy is powerful.” Newsweek argued that if the Russians won the war against
China, it would dramatically change the “the international balance of power” to the disadvantage
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of the United States and would cause deeper suspicion and animosity in Soviet-American
relations than those that prevailed during the worst of the Cold War.39
On its editorial page, the Times reprinted a speech of former White House counsel
Theodore Sorensen, who presented evidence to show that Beijing was more hostile in words but
Moscow was more threatening in deeds.40 Sorensen made his address at the National Committee
on United States-China Relations conference on March 20, chaired by Edwin O. Reischauer of
Harvard, former Ambassador to Japan and A. Doak Barnett. It attracted prominent media
coverage due to the attendance of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who in his keynote address
called for a “sweeping change” of America’s China policy in the context of Sino-Soviet
conflicts. After reporting Kennedy’s speech on their front pages, the Times and the Post ran
additional stories about how China specialists praised his proposal. In a NBC telecast, the anchor
started with, “however improbable it may seem, the United States and China might have an
understanding.” He then explained that when the New York liberals met to talk about China
policy, Russia’s New Time condemned the meeting because it seemed to “coincide with” the
Chinese attack. When he pointed out that the meeting had been planned a year earlier, it may
have been a blow to the Soviet accusation.41
As with the Fulbright Hearings three years earlier, the media appeared to be again
working with academics and Congress to push for a reform in China policy. In covering the
Sino-Soviet conflicts, U.S. media, unlike the U.S. government, did not have to worry about
upsetting the Soviet Union when they openly talked about moving closer to China. They helped
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the government educate the public by elaborating on something it might want to do, but was
otherwise unable to state explicitly.
The Four Marshals’ Reports
The Ninth Congress of the CCP in April not only ended the most radical stage of the
Cultural Revolution, but also marked a watershed in China’s foreign relations. In its wake,
Beijing began to normalize its diplomatic activities by sending out its diplomats again.42 As early
as January 1969, the Times had obtained information that a leading tailor shop in Beijing was
busy making suits for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which it interpreted as a sign that Beijing
was “contemplating a more active role in foreign affairs.”43 In order to improve relations with
other countries, Beijing invited several foreign envoys to join Mao and other Chinese leaders for
the May Day celebration at the Tiananmen rostrum.44
The most significant event after the Ninth Congress was the review of China’s foreign
relations by four highly esteemed marshals: Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie
Rongzhen, who had been sidelined because of their complaints about the Red Guard violence in
the “February Reverse Current” incident in 1967. When Lin Biao was officially designated as
Mao’s successor at the Ninth Congress, his followers and radicals headed by Mao’s wife Jiang
Qing won most of the key positions in the central leadership. In order to counterbalance their
power, however, Mao inserted several veteran civilian and military officials into the party
leadership. Even though the four marshals had lost their power to control the military, they
retained some sort of influence because all of them entered the Central Committee and kept their
positions as the vice chairmen of the Central Military Committee at the Ninth Congress. Marshal
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Ye Jianying even entered the Politburo.45 Ye would play an active role in the Sino-American
talks after Kissinger’s secret visit to China in 1971.!
Under the instructions of Mao, Zhou Enlai asked the four marshals, who were “studying”
at factories in the suburb of Beijing, to meet from time to time and discuss current international
affairs. Zhou encouraged them not to limit themselves to conventional thinking in their analyses
and said that he would pass on their reports to the chairman. Zhou also assigned Xiong Xianghui,
a spy during the Chinese Civil War and the former chargé d'affaires to the United Kingdom, who
later acted as his aide in talks with Kissinger, to assist the marshals with English materials.!
Between June 7 and July 10, the four marshals met six times and talked in total for nineteen
hours about the international situation, especially about the triangular relations among China, the
United States and the Soviet Union."#!
$%! &'()! **+! ,-.! /0'1! 2314-3(4! 4'526,,.7! ,-.61! /614,! 1.801,9! As they argued, even
though the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated with each other, their hostilities
toward each other were fiercer than before. They explicitly pointed out that the Soviet Union
posed a more serious threat to the security of China than the United States. While they
discounted the possibility that Washington and Moscow would start a large-scale war against
China, either jointly or separately, they recommended that China should “postpone” the conflict
with either of them. In terms of China’s overall foreign policy, they recommended the
enhancement of its offices abroad and the expansion of their diplomatic activities.47!:;;0176%<!
,0!=60%<+!the General Office of the CCP distributed their report to leaders of the central authority
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as a party document on July 20.48 The spread of their report reflected Mao’s approval of their
evaluation of the triangular politics. !
There were some interesting developments in the Chinese media in June and July.
According to Gao Wenqian, a researcher at CCP Central Party Literature Research Center
involved in writing the official biographies of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong after the Cultural
Revolution, in late June 1969, when Chinese newspapers were about to publish their routine
editorials attacking the American “invasion” of Taiwan nineteen years earlier, Zhou Enlai at a
Politburo meeting proposed that the current focus was the struggle against the Soviet Union and
that attacks on the American invasion of Taiwan should be toned down.49
Xiong Xianghui pointed out another change in the Chinese media after the congress. As
he said, even though the report of the congress had described the relations between Washington
and Moscow as “competing and colluding” with each other, the Chinese official documents and
the media dropped the Soviet-American “competition” and shifted to highlight the “collusion”
between them, especially their collusion for anti-China purposes.50 In June and July 1969,
besides reporting more incidents supposedly started by the Soviet Union, the People’s Daily
carried several articles charging that the United States and the Soviet Union were collaborating
with each other or were working with Japan in carrying out activities against China.51 In the past,
Beijing had attacked the Soviet-American collusion in order to embarrass the Soviet Union and
serve its domestic purpose. Now its tough rhetoric was a test to see which side the United States
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would stand on. If Washington did want to improve relations, it had to adopt concrete measures
to show that it did not want to “collude” with Moscow against China.
Nixon’s Initiatives in the Summer of 1969
In evaluating the Ninth Congress, the Nixon administration was not as optimistic as the
media in finding signs of moderation in Beijing. On April 29, Kissinger submitted to Nixon a
report prepared by the CIA, the Department of State, and the NSC. Referring to the signs that
continued “power stalemate” existed in the Chinese leadership and the “denigration” of the
United States in the party communiqué, Kissinger claimed to have seen “no indication that the
Chinese leaders intend to become less cautious in avoiding foreign commitments.”52
What triggered the Nixon administration to take more rigorous initiatives toward Beijing,
according to Kissinger, was the “heavy-handed” Soviet diplomacy in handling the clashes with
China. According to him, when he met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on March 11,
1969, the latter told him “passionately” that China was “everybody’s problem.” When Kissinger
described the encounter to Nixon that evening, the President was intrigued and talked about how
“unexpected events could have a major effect.” Kissinger then suggested that the United States
had a chance to “gain a great deal strategically.” In May when new border clashes broke out in
Xinjiang where the Soviets had much better logistic lines than the Chinese, Kissinger changed
his perception of their powers and began to think that the Russians were more aggressive. What
intrigued Washington further was Brezhnev’s proposal of “collective security in Asia” in his
speech to the International Conference of Communist Parties on June 8, which was obviously
directed against China. Kissinger reported to Nixon that these signs showed that the growing
Soviet obsession with the China problem had reached the point that it could be turned to the
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advantage of the United States. When Nixon read the report, he wrote down the following
comments on the margin, “This is our goal.”53
In July and August 1969, through a series of public diplomatic activities and private
channels, the Nixon administration sent clear signals to Beijing of its intention to improve
relations. On July 21, 1969, the State Department announced the easing of trade restrictions and
travel ban on China. The timing of the announcement was based on shrewd calculations. Nixon
had made the decision in June, but he chose to announce it on the day of his trip to countries that
included Pakistan and Romania, both of which had friendly relations with China. In so doing,
Nixon hoped that his policy change would be viewed as a friendly gesture by the Chinese
leadership. Another reason why the announcement was made in July before the Nixon trip was
that a delay might force the United States to deal with “unforeseeable situations” such as the
worsening of the Sino-Soviet border situation. It could “preclude” the announcement and thus
cause Washington to lose the diplomatic benefits. Also, if Nixon waited to announce the decision
until he returned from Romania, which was not on good terms with Moscow, it probably would
be tied in with speculation regarding a “putative anti-Soviet” purpose in the “Bucharest
stopover.” This would give his decision too much “overt anti-Soviet significance.”54
Nixon’s decision to relax trade and travel restrictions with China received a variety of
contradictory comments in U.S. media. ABC praised him for dismantling “the most formidable
barriers” between the two countries, which showed that he was “really interested” in improving
relations. An NBC anchor appeared somewhat skeptical. He said that the United States wanted to
be “somewhat friendlier” to China and that the U.S. policy was not “a warm or loving embrace”
as the trade restrictions were partly lifted, but not eliminated. He also doubted China would
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respond. CBS just reported the announcement and did not make further comments on the
significance of the Nixon policy.55
Different from TV programs that were limited by time constraints, newspapers have
enough space to elaborate on the background, significance, and response to a government policy.
Calling attention to the effective date of the Nixon policy, the Times referred to the recent China
policy review by the NSC and the endorsement of the policy by Senate majority leader Mike
Mansfield (D-MT). It concluded that they seemed to signal an “official response to evolving
attitudes in the United States toward the Chinese, away from the hostile rigidity.”56 While the
Times placed the story on the front page, the Post assigned it to page twenty, arguing that the
Nixon move had “greater symbolic meaning” than any practical application that might result
from the changes. Recalling Nixon’s tough words about China at his first press conference and
the recent Chinese attack on him, it expressed doubt about the possibility of an open door
between China and the United States. 57 While the Times presented a picture of favorable
domestic environment for a change of relations, the Post seemed to emphasize the empty half of
the glass.
During his trip, Nixon sent public gestures of friendliness to China on several occasions.
In his informal conversations with the press in Guam on July 25, he announced what would later
be known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” by which the United States, despite its commitment to honor
its commitments in Asia, would “look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.” He also told the press that China was
not nearly as effective in exporting revolution as it was five or ten years ago and it was playing a
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“minimal role” in Vietnam as compared to the Soviet Union.58 Here Nixon was underplaying the
China threat in comparison to the Soviet Union to justify his move toward Beijing. During his
private visit to the Pacific area four years earlier, Nixon had declared in Australia that the United
States should bomb China if it were “so rash as to introduce so-called volunteers [into
Vietnam].”59 Now Vietnam had declined as a major issue between China and the United States in
Nixon’s rhetoric.
Besides public gestures, Nixon also pushed hard through private channels. During his talk
with Pakistani President Yahya Khan, Nixon told him that the United States wished to see an
accommodation with China and would appreciate it if Khan’s government would pass on this
message to Zhou Enlai when the Chinese Premier visited Pakistan. Even though Nixon told
journalists in Guam that his trip to Romania should “under no circumstances” be interpreted as
“an affront to the Soviet Union or as a move toward China,” in his conversation with Romanian
President Nicolae Ceausescu, Nixon said Washington would not join in a Soviet arrangement
against China in Asia and expressed his hope that Ceausescu would play a “mediating role”
between Washington and Beijing.60!
Due to China’s friendly relations with Pakistan and Romania, U.S. media alluded to the
China connection in their coverage of Nixon’s trip to these countries. ABC correctly guessed that
their leaders might serve as the middlemen between the United States and China. It even reported
a rumor that Nixon might meet Chinese officials in Romania.61 Both the Times and the Post in
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their editorials argued that Nixon’s visit to Romania, a dissident in the Communist movement,
could help the United States open its door to Beijing.62
During Nixon’s trip, Secretary of State William Rogers also went on a Pacific tour
visiting Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand to
explain American policy in Asia, especially its decision to slowly withdraw from Vietnam. On
his tour, Rogers openly reiterated the willingness of his government to talk to China. While he
was in Hong Kong, the Post featured on its front page a photo of Rogers playing gulf at a
countryside lodge three miles from the Chinese border. As the Times reported, Rogers cited the
recent American effort to lift trade restrictions and criticized China for not responding to it. In
Australia, Rogers made a major speech declaring that Beijing would “soon” be asked to reopen
the Warsaw talks.63 !
The People’s Daily responded to Washington’s overtures with invectives. It attacked
Nixon’s visit to Asia as a cover for his policy of “aggression and war” and ridiculed his
withdrawal from Asia as merely a change in tactics to serve the long-term goal to “occupy” Asia.
It reported several demonstrations in countries Nixon visited with people shouting slogans like
“Down with Nixon” and “Out with Nixon.” In order to justify the U.S. withdrawal from Asia,
Nixon had proposed the idea of “collective security” by Asian countries themselves in dealing
with aggression as part of the “Nixon Doctrine.” The official organ compared it to the Soviet
proposal of Asian collective security and used them as evidence of Soviet-American “collusion”
in containing China, listing both as the “worst enemies” to the Asian people.64 !
While the People’s Daily attacked the “evil designs” of the Nixon administration, the
Reference News fed Chinese cadres at higher-levels undistorted stories of Washington’s
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intentions. During the Ninth Congress in April, it reprinted articles introducing the China policy
review in Washington along with the U.S. hope that the congress would lead to the moderation
of China. The most notable line was the Agence France-Presse’s comment that there had never
been such an “advantageous moment” to normalize the U.S.-China relations in the last twenty
years.65
When Nixon’s Asian trip was announced in late June, the Reference News carried a story
claiming that Nixon’s acceptance of Ceausescu’s invitation to visit Romania was aimed at China.
On its front pages, it not only featured the State Department’s announcement of relaxing trade
and travel restrictions to China in an article entitled “The United States Put on a ‘Conciliatory’
Posture,” but also carried Taiwan’s complaints about Washington’s change in policy. In covering
Nixon’s meeting with Indonesian President Suharto, it reprinted Indonesian Foreign Minister
Adam Malik’s remark that “Nixon was not interested” in the Soviet proposal of collective
security in Asia. It also reported Roger’s statements about Washington’s desire to renew contact
with Beijing when he visited Hong Kong and Australia.66!
>6?0%@4! 8.3;.! 6%6,63,6A.4! B.1.! '%7.14,007! B.((! 6%! C.6D6%<9! On July 16, the Chinese
captured two American yachtsmen whose lifeboat drifted into Chinese territorial waters close to
Hong Kong. According to Kissinger, Washington decided not to announce it immediately to see
if Beijing would use it for anti-U.S. propaganda. When Zhou Enlai learned of the incident, he
instructed the Foreign Ministry and the Public Safety Ministry to do a thorough investigation and
to be cautious not to attach political meaning to the captured Americans. The Chinese media,
under Zhou’s instruction, remained silent on the incident. Beijing released the two Americans on
July 24 after the U.S. relaxation in trade and travel. Kissinger argued that Zhou Enlai, who had
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understood the American gesture, also made a move that required no reciprocity from the United
States.67!
In the Shadow of the War Scare!
As the Nixon administration was sending friendly signals to China, Sino-Soviet military
conflict suddenly escalated. On August 13, the Soviet armed forces ambushed a unit of Chinese
border patrol in Xinjiang with superior force consisting of helicopters, tanks and armed vehicles,
which caused heavy Chinese casualties. After the attack, Moscow gave the impression that it was
considering a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Besides deploying nuclear
strike groups along the border, Soviet diplomats also inquired of diplomats from its Eastern
European allies and the United States about what their response would be if the Soviet Union
initiated a nuclear attack against China.68 In response, on August 28, the CCP Central Committee
issued the “Order for General Mobilization in Border Province and Regions.”69
When war fervor began to increase along the Sino-Soviet border in August 1969, the
Nixon administration began to seriously consider how to deal with the scenario of a large-scale
war between China and the Soviet Union. At a NSC meeting on August 14, Nixon stated that it
was against the interests of the United States to let China be “smashed” in a Sino-Soviet war. His
view was in line with Kissinger’s, who had pointed out that history had shown that it was better
to align with the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic powers, when some Russian
experts expressed concern that better relations with China might ruin those with the Soviet Union
at an earlier NSC meeting in May.70 The administration ended up excluding the option of siding
with the Soviet Union and focused on only two options: “impartiality” and “shading” toward
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China. A NSC memo concluded that trying to be “even-handed and impartial or neutral” when
China was attacked would be “tantamount to supporting the USSR.” However, an open partiality
toward China might cause dramatic reaction from the Soviet Union and hurt the arms reduction
talks. So the memo recommended Washington maintain public impartiality and at the same time
give a strong signal that it would not encourage a Soviet nuclear attack on China.71
In a speech at the 65th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in
Baltimore on September 5, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson made what was
considered Washington’s first official statement on the Sino-Soviet conflict. After explaining the
U.S. position to associate with neither side against the other, he said, “We are not going to let
Communist Chinese invective deter us from seeking agreements with the Soviet Union.
Conversely, we are not going to let the Soviet apprehensions prevent us from attempting to bring
China out of its angry, alienated shell.”72 The next day, the Times featured a headline “Nixon
Aide Affirms U.S. Will Press for China Ties,” which only published the statement “we are not
going to let the Soviet apprehensions prevent us from attempting to bring China out of its angry,
alienated shell,” omitting his remarks about Washington seeking agreements with the Soviet
Union. Essentially it rendered what appeared to be a neutral statement of the government into an
official bias toward China. The Post headline in contrast, used the title “Keep Peace, U.S.
cautions China, Soviet.” which claimed that Richardson’s statement was the “first high level
public admonition to the Soviet Union and China not to breach the peace of the world.” 73 The
Post gave the impression that the United States assumed the moral high ground over the SinoSoviet conflicts and adopted a tough policy toward both of them. The agenda of improving
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relations with either of them was underplayed. For some reason, the newsweeklies and the
nightly newscasts ignored Richardson’s statement.
Kissinger argues that Richardson’s statement was a “revolutionary step” for the U.S.
government when it publicly warned against a threat to China, a country that had been hostile to
the United States and with which it had no communication since Nixon took office. In his memo
to Kissinger on October 8, NSC staffer John Holdridge suggested calling the Chinese attention to
Richardson’s statement as part of the U.S. overtures.74 Actually, the Reference News reprinted
the full text of Richardson’s statement,75 which might have impressed leaders in Beijing.
While fears of a full-scale war between China and the Soviet Union were increasing,
Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin suddenly stopped at the Beijing airport on September 11 to meet
with Zhou Enlai on his way back from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh. After the meeting, Tass
declared “the two sides openly explained their positions and held a conversation useful for both
sides.” The People’s Daily published a terse statement, declaring that the two premiers had met
and engaged in a “frank” conversation. 76 According to Gao Wenqian, in drafting the
announcement of the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, Moscow had used several positives adjectives such
as “comradely” and “friendly” to create the impression that the Sino-Soviet tensions had been
relieved. However, Zhou Enlai crossed them out when he received the Soviet draft and only
retained the word “frank.”77 Even though Zhou Enlai made an effort to reduce tensions, the cold
atmosphere between Beijing and Moscow still left the door open for the Nixon administration to
approach China.
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U.S. media expressed great “astonishment” upon learning of the Zhou-Kosygin meeting.

All three networks made the news one of their lead stories. NBC used “enigmatic” in describing
the behavior of the Chinese and the Russians.78 Both the Times and the Post read from the
Russian statement of “useful” and the Chinese statement of “frank” as signs that no substantial
progress was achieved at the talk. In their editorial pages, while the Post was skeptical that the
Sino-Soviet war had been avoided, the Times interpreted the meeting as a sign that “the tension
had been eased” and suggested those observers who had been predicting an imminent war to
“take another look.”79
Even though the Kosygin-Zhou meeting relaxed the “extreme tension” between China
and the Soviet Union, it did not relieve Beijing’s suspicion of a Soviet surprise attack.80 The
pressure from Moscow had the potential of pushing Beijing further toward Washington. On
September 17, the four marshals, who had read reports of Nixon’s recent initiatives and the
minutes of the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, submitted another report. They proposed that China use
negotiation as a tactic and wage “a tit-for-tat struggle” against Moscow and Washington since
they were both trying to exploit the other two countries in order to gain strategic advantages.
Besides agreeing on the Soviet requests for negotiation on border issues, they suggested
responding “positively” to the American request for resuming the Warsaw talks when the
“timing is proper.” Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister who had lost his actual power,
submitted a separate report to present his “wild” thoughts about how to pursue a “breakthrough”
in the Sino-American relations. He recommended that at Warsaw China should take the initiative
to propose talks at the ministerial level or even higher without raising prerequisites and that the
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Taiwan question could be gradually solved by talks at higher levels.81 Nobody can tell for certain
whether Mao followed the suggestions of the marshals. At least they provided perspectives and
some legitimacy for Mao if he was thinking about moving in the same direction. More
importantly, the articulation of Sino-American rapprochement by the four marshals itself shows
that this concept was no longer a taboo among the top leadership. When Sino-American talks
were renewed in early 1970, things developed just as Marshal Chen had proposed.
The Zhou-Kosygin meeting did not eliminate Beijing’s worry. Some people thought that
Kosygin’s Beijing trip might be a smokescreen for a Soviet surprise attack. On September 17,
the People’s Daily published twenty-nine slogans for the National Day celebration. The twentysecond slogan called on people of the world to “oppose the invasion started by any imperialist or
socialist imperialist powers, especially nuclear wars” and asked the people to “be prepared right
now.” The next day, it ran an editorial pointing out that the twenty-second slogan was a “great
order of mobilization with profound strategic significance.”82
After the publication of the “great order of mobilization,” there were more significant
developments in the People’s Daily. On September 21, it published Mao and Lin’s order to
honor ten soldiers in the Zhenbao battle as “war heroes.” In an October Day joint editorial,
Beijing expressed its desire to “use negotiation” to solve border disputes between countries. At
the same time, it called on the Chinese people to be “highly alert” against the enemy’s “surprise
attack” and to be prepared to defend China’s “sovereign frontier.” In an address to foreign
dignitaries at the National Day reception, Zhou Enlai reiterated the principle that China would
never attack any country unless attacked first and the Chinese determination to “fight to the very
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end until victory” if anyone imposed the war of aggression on China. In order to inspire the
morale of the Chinese people, the official organ on October 5 reported a story that China had
been successful in exploding another H-bomb and in its first underground atomic test a week
earlier. It claimed that these new achievements were a “severe blow to the nuclear hegemony of
the American as well as socialist imperialists.”83 These calls for war preparation against the
socialist imperialists--the Soviet Union--revealed the intensity of war nervousness in Beijing.
The Reference News also emphasized the atmosphere of war preparation when it reprinted
foreign news agencies’ response to the editorials and speeches of Chinese leaders.84
On October 7, China took a major step to defuse tensions with the Soviet Union by
announcing its decision to start border negotiations at the level of vice foreign minister. Beijing’s
statement went, “the Chinese government has never covered up the fact that there exist
irreconcilable differences of principle between China and the Soviet Union and that the struggle
of principle between them will continue for a long period of time. But this should not prevent
China and the Soviet Union from maintaining normal state relations on the basis of the five
principles of peaceful coexistence.” The next day, it published Beijing’s “five-point proposal”
calling for mutual troop withdrawal from the disputed areas. What was noticeable was that it
even carried the letter from the Soviet Union congratulating the twentieth anniversary of the
People’s Republic.85 It was an effort to show the reduced tensions between the two governments.
Beijing’s decision to sit down and talk with Moscow was watched with great interest in
Washington. In a memo to Kissinger, John H. Holdridge wrote that he found the thesis of
“normal relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence” in the Chinese
statement particularly interesting because it reminded him of the Chinese call for the renewal of
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Warsaw talks a year earlier and that it could apply to the United States as well. Holdridge also
pointed out “concrete evidence” of Beijing’s reduced hostility toward Washington. For example,
he mentioned the Norwegian Ambassador who had talked about the “even-handed” discussions
he had with Chinese officials about Sino-American relations. As the French ambassador related,
Zhou Enlai did not reject resuming the talks in Warsaw, but he said that the “situation was
complicated,” apparently referring to the situation in Beijing. He also referred to Zhou’s
statement that the American attitude in the Sino-Soviet conflict was “ambiguous.” Based on
these indicators along with the “apprehensive tone” he saw in the Chinese statement, Holdridge
suggested it might be an “opportune moment” for a move toward Beijing.86
Interestingly, Holdridge’s report was leaked in a Times story “U.S. Aides Discern Signs
that Peking is Easing Enmity.”87 It resulted in widespread attention when reporters tried to verify
its contents with the State Department. CBS reported that the State Department had denied the
“rumor” through “unspecified channel” that China had become “soft” on the United States as it
cited the Chinese cancellation of Warsaw talks as evidence.88 The Times article even attracted
the attention of the Chinese media. The Reference News carried a front-page article in which
State Department spokesman Carl Bartch stated that Washington had always hoped to improve
relations with Beijing when he was asked about the article.89
The Post noticed the “unusual display of candor” in Beijing’s statement, which it
interpreted as a sign that China had emerged from “three years of rigidity” to a period of
“relative realism.” However, its headline “Fear Drives China to Talk to Russia” emphasized
Chinese fear when it claimed that Beijing’s move towards a détente with Washington suggested
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a lesson that “nothing has a greater impact on Peking than the menace of force.” In an editorial
on “A Momentous Sino-Soviet Breakthrough?” the Post maintained that the United States had a
“compelling interest in cooling off of the dispute.” That is, if Moscow could get the China border
issue in hand, the Soviet-American missile talks would “soon” begin.90 An editorial of the Times,
in contrast, suggested a different lesson, which was, “Chinese leaders were not mad, but rational
men able to weigh the costs and advantages of alternative policies.”91 Here, the Post editorial
seemed to be more interested in the Soviet Union, while the Times was more interested in China.
Beijing’s effort to relax tensions with the Soviet Union not only reduced the terror of war,
but also meant that the Chinese need for improved relations with the United States was no longer
especially urgent. In a way, it became a test of intentions for the Nixon administration. In order
to obtain a diplomatic advantage, it was better for Washington to establish contact with Beijing
before it reached any settlement with Moscow. ABC showed the eagerness of Washington when
it reported the State Department’s statement that the United States was ready to talk with China
“anywhere” and “as soon as possible.” 92 The story appeared only one day after Beijing’s
announcement of border talks with Moscow.
Meeting again after the “Unusual Encounter”
In order to contact Beijing as soon as possible, the Nixon administration tried different
channels. On October 27 1969, U.S. Consul-General in Hong Kong Edwin W. Martin wrote Liu
Xingyuan, chair of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee of Guangdong, inquiring about the
whereabouts of two Americans who had been imprisoned in China since February. With Zhou
Enlai’s personal instruction, the Foreign Ministry reported the inquiry to the Central Committee
on November 7 with a note, “This is obviously a new act on the part of the U.S. government to
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test our response. We suggest that we take over the matter and have the two released at the right
moment.”93
On November 16, the Nixon administration sent another friendly signal to China by
deceasing its naval patrol in the Taiwan Strait by two destroyers attached to the Seventh Fleet on
account of “budget reasons.” Earlier that month Pakistani President Yahya had called the
Chinese Ambassador to inform him of his impressions of the talk with Nixon in August and the
U.S. intention to withdraw the destroyers. 94 Interestingly, the story about the removal of
destroyers did not show up in U.S. media until Christmas through a Japanese news agency
claiming that the United States had informed Japan of its decision. Neither the Times nor the
Post made a big deal about the issue, and they merely ran short stories in interior pages.95 In the
case of naval patrol withdrawal, the U.S. government may have tried hard to keep it under the
radar. It is also possibly due to the unwitting cooperation of U.S. media, which did not prioritize
it, that Nixon avoided serious opposition from conservatives at home.
As early as September during the height of war scare, Nixon and Kissinger had urged
Ambassador Stoessel to get in touch with his Chinese counterpart as soon as possible. It was not
until December 3 that he finally had a chance to approach a Chinese diplomat at a Yugoslavian
fashion show at Warsaw’s Palace of Culture. Without clear instructions from Beijing, the
Chinese diplomat did not know how to handle the situation. As a result, he tried to flee the scene
with the U.S. ambassador running after him. Stoessel managed to catch a Chinese interpreter and
told him that he had an important message for the Chinese government.96
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When the American ambassador’s “unusual behavior” was reported to Zhou Enlai, he

immediately relayed this “encounter” to Mao and said, “the opportunity is coming; we now have
a brick in our hands to knock at the door [of the Americans.]” Zhou Enlai at once instructed the
Chinese embassy in Warsaw to let the Americans know of Beijing’s interest in reopening
communications. Moreover, with Mao’s approval, on December 7 Zhou Enlai ordered the
release of the two Americans whom the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong had inquired about.97 In
order to make sure the American side receive this signal, Zhou suggested that the release should
be announced in the press and that the Chinese ambassador to Poland be informed of it.98 As the
Chinese leadership hoped, the release of the two Americans duly appeared on the front pages of
the Times and the Post.99 After the People’s Daily announced the release of the two Americans,
the Reference News noted on its front page the “surprise” of the State Department, whose
spokesman stated that they had learned of the news from the Xinhua News Agency.100 Beijing
was sending signals to Washington through its media. The incident at the fashion show thus
became a turning point, after which Beijing became much more responsive in reciprocating the
initiatives from Washington.
On December 11, the Chinese embassy took the initiative by calling the American
embassy and invited U.S. representatives to have a meeting at the Chinese embassy the next
day.101 When State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey announced the meeting the next
day, it was placed among the lead stories of the television programs and the headlines of the two
elite newspapers. Both the Times and the Post called it an important “breakthrough” in SinoAmerican relations after two years of “diplomatic silence.” As an editorial of the Times pointed
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out, the importance of the meeting could be shown by the speed at which China responded to
Stoessel’s informal initiative a week earlier and from the fact that he was invited to the Chinese
embassy. The Post, by taking into account the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks in
Helsinki, the renewal of Sino-American contact in Warsaw, as well as the Sino-Soviet border
negotiation in Beijing, concluded that the formation of the “Washington-Moscow-Peking
triangle” by the end of 1969 had become a “historic event in international affairs.”102
Conclusion
The last year of the 1960s witnessed great changes in world politics. As the Ninth
Congress of the CCP officially ended the most radical stage of the Cultural Revolution, it started
the normalization of China’s domestic politics as well as diplomatic activities. At the same time,
the United States began to reduce its involvement in Asia with the announcement of the “Nixon
Doctrine.” Most important of all, the eruption of the Sino-Soviet crisis created an opportunity for
Washington and Beijing to take concrete steps to move toward reconciliation.
In covering the CCP’s Ninth Congress and Beijing’s handling of the Sino-Soviet border
negotiations, U.S. media presented a rational China that was potentially more responsive to U.S.
overtures. On the Sino-Soviet conflict, U.S. media not only pictured the Soviet Union as more
aggressive than China, but also called attention to the Soviet fear of possible Sino-American
“unity.” While Washington assumed a public posture of detachment, U.S. media were not
worried about upsetting Moscow as they elaborated on the benefits of improving relations with
Beijing. They played important roles in educating the American public and creating a favorable
opinion environment for Nixon to take more active steps approaching China.
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In this year, Chinese media showed aloofness as well as reception to the U.S. overtures.

Even though the People’s Daily maintained a hostile posture toward the United States, it
revealed signs of flexibility, especially from the treatment of Nixon’s inaugural address and his
first press conference. In the context of Sino-Soviet crises, Chinese media’s attack on SovietAmerican “collusion” not only served to mobilize the domestic solidarity against foreign
invasion, but also could test which side Washington stood on. What was remarkable was that the
Reference News objectively reported Washington’s overtures that might have impressed the
Chinese. Through these measures, Beijing effectively left open the option of reconciliation with
Washington when it was deliberating on its foreign policy.
The war nerves in the Chinese media from September through the Chinese National Day
shows that Beijing was truly worried about a Soviet surprise attack. This worry was decisive in
pushing Beijing toward Washington. As Beijing was patiently waiting for the right moment to
reciprocate the Washington overtures, “the unusual encounter” at the Yugoslavian fashion show
finally convinced it to drop its hesitation and became a more active player in Sino-American
reconciliation.
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Chapter 5: From Warsaw to Beijing: The “Intricate Minuet”: 1970-1971
The “unusual encounter” at the Yugoslavian fashion show in December 1969 not only

reassured Beijing of Washington’s sincere desire to improve relations, but also satisfied Chinese
national pride. Mao and Zhou later repeatedly told other Chinese leaders, “It is the Americans
who need something from us, not the other way around.”1 This sentiment could also be seen in
the People’s Daily announcement, which particularly emphasized that the initial Sino-American
meeting at the Chinese embassy was held “at the request of the American ambassador.”2
After the encounter at the fashion show, Beijing became a much more active player in
advancing Sino-American rapprochement. As Henry Kissinger claimed, between November
1969 and June 1970, there were at least ten instances where U.S. officials exchanged words with
Chinese officials at diplomatic functions and on at least four occasions the Chinese initiated the
contact. However, twenty years of hostility without direct contact had made Sino-American
relations so delicate that leaders of both countries had to be extremely cautious in
communicating their intentions in order to avoid a backlash at home. Kissinger described the
signaling between Beijing and Washington as “an intricate minuet” that was “so delicately
arranged that both sides could always maintain that they were not in contact, so stylized that
neither side needed to bear the onus of an initiative, so elliptical that existing relationships on
both sides were not jeopardized.”3
This chapter examines how the “intricate minuet” between Beijing and Washington
played out through the media from the renewal of the Sino-American Warsaw talks in early 1970
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to Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in July 1971. It also looks at how Beijing began to actively
promote the Sino-American rapprochement, particularly by employing the media.
The Beginning of Triangular Politics
The Warsaw talks had a good beginning when they were officially reopened in early
1970. Beijing took the initiative to propose that the meetings be held alternatively at the Chinese
and U.S. embassies instead of the venue provided by the Polish government. This arrangement
could avoid eavesdropping because Poland was a close ally of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile,
Washington stopped the previous administrations’ “standard practice” of briefing the Russians
with records of the Warsaw talks. These changes also signified an important change in
Washington’s attitude toward the two communist powers. In proposing the policy shift to Nixon,
Kissinger argued that he saw no point in giving the Russians the opportunity to “gloat” to Beijing
that they were kept informed, which he thought would heighten Chinese suspicions from the
start.4
The Chinese approach to the meetings with the Americans also witnessed an obvious
change. In contrast to its aloofness during the Cultural Revolution, Beijing gave special
prominence to publicity. On December 11, 1969, Chinese chargé d'affaires Lei Yang called U.S.
Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel Jr., inviting him to talk at the Chinese embassy. When
Stoessel said he would be happy to arrive “discreetly at the rear door,” Lei told him that the main
entrance was “eminently suitable.”5 Lei’s arrival at the American embassy a few days later, as
described by both the Post and the Times, was quite an “impressive” scene. Crowds of passersby
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reportedly watched “the largest and longest black limousine in Poland, sporting silk red-and-gold
starred flags on its fenders and curious tail lights, shaped like Chinese lanterns” drive up to the
American embassy.6 When the two sides decided on the date of the next formal U.S.-China
ambassadorial talk, Lei Yang immediately proposed making the plan public. Lei Yang’s
“flamboyant” arrival at the American embassy and his proposal to announce the meeting, as
Kissinger correctly observed in his memo to Nixon, indicated Beijing’s intention to show the
“appearance” of its ability to deal with the United States--primarily for “Soviet consumption.”7
On January 8, 1970, when the United States and China announced simultaneously that
the Warsaw talks would resume on January 20, the State Department used the term “People’s
Republic of China” (PRC) for the first time. In their front-page articles, both the New York Times
and the Washington Post called attention to the change.8 An editorial in the Times and a column
by Harrison Salisbury instantly used the term. Actually, that was not the first time for the
newspaper. It had used that term several times a year earlier, though not in prominent places.9
The U.S. signal was instantly caught by the Reference News, which reprinted on its front page
the full text of the U.S. announcement, where the PRC appeared several times. It also pointed out
that Lei’s visit to the U.S. embassy was the first time by a senior Chinese diplomat and that the
meeting signified “a progress the Nixon administration had achieved in its attempt to improve
relations with Beijing.” In contrast to the Sino-American progress, two articles on the same page
talked about the fruitlessness of the Sino-Soviet border negotiations and the possibility of
increased Soviet pressure on China.10
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On their front pages, while the Times interpreted the renewal of the Warsaw talks as the

“fruition of a year-long effort by the Nixon administration” to engage China, the Post viewed it
as China’s “formal entrance into a triangular relation” with its two main adversaries. In an
editorial, the Times editorial was optimistic about a “good beginning” toward better SinoAmerican relations. Even though it ruled out the possibility of a “Sino-American plot” against
Moscow, it conceded that Beijing’s decision to talk with Washington would have a “sobering
impact” on Moscow. In contrast to the optimism of the Times, the Post argued that Beijing only
wanted to use Washington as a “counterweight” against the Soviet threat and it doubted there
would be genuine progress in Sino-American relations because Mao had been believed to be the
“most opposed to doing business with the United States.” It even claimed that Mao’s absence
and the resumption of Warsaw talks suggested something “unusual” in China.11
The Post’s somberness on the improvement of Sino-American relations was not
groundless. With the Sino-Soviet conflict in the background, U.S. media could not fail to draw
the Soviet connection in their coverage of the renewal of the Warsaw talks. The day after the
Sino-American joint announcement, both the Times and the Post reported on their front pages the
fierce attacks on Beijing in the Soviet media. The Post noticed that Sino-Soviet polemics had
resumed a week earlier after several months of quietness after the Sino-Soviet border talks
began. The Times claimed that Moscow appeared to link the scheduled resumption of talks with
Beijing’s “military psychosis” against the Soviet Union. It mentioned Soviet officials who drew
attention to the resumption of the talks in early December, which was at about the same time the
Sino-Soviet talks reached a deadlock.12
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The newsmagazines also made references to the Soviet Union in their analyses of the

Sino-American talks. Both Newsweek and Time took note of the violent attack of the Soviet
Army newspaper krasnaya zvezda (Red Star) on Beijing. While Newsweek argued that the Soviet
reaction would benefit Washington in its strategic arms limitation talks with Moscow, Time
claimed to have found signs of Soviet fear of attacks from its newly released maps, which had
modified the location of many cities close to the Chinese border.13 Though U.S. media showed
different levels of confidence for the prospect of Sino-American relations, one thing they seemed
to agree on was the beginning of triangular politics in early 1970.
The Cambodia Incursion
In early 1970, it seemed that Beijing and Washington were on the verge of a
breakthrough. At the 135th meeting of the Warsaw talks, Lei Yang stated Beijing’s offer to talk
through “higher-level discussions or any other channel that both sides might agree upon.” At the
136th meeting in February, he made an unusually conciliatory statement and accepted the U.S.
proposal to send an emissary to Beijing.14 On April 28, the Chinese side informed the U.S.
embassy that it was ready to meet on May 20. However, what happened in Cambodia
complicated the international situation. On March 18, 1970, when Prince Norodom Sihanouk of
Cambodia visited Moscow seeking Soviet support in dealing with Hanoi, the National Assembly
deposed him from power and installed the pro-U.S. general Lon Nol as the head of the
government. With the tacit support from Lon Nol, U.S. forces moved into Cambodia to clear
Viet Cong sanctuaries on April 30.15
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Beijing’s response to the Cambodian incursion was mild at the beginning. On May 4, it

issued a statement warning the United States against its “flagrant provocation.” Even though it
declared that 700 million Chinese would be the strong backing for the three Indochinese peoples,
what it offered was merely Mao’s quotations that the United States was just a “paper tiger” and
that they would definitely defeat the American “imperialists” if they worked together and
persisted in fighting. Kissinger told Nixon, “The Chinese have issued a statement, in effect
saying they wouldn’t do anything.”16
At that time, it seemed that Beijing still wanted to go ahead with the scheduled Warsaw
talks on May 20. What made the situation more complicated was the Sino-Soviet polemics,
which had resumed in late November 1969, when border talks between them made little
progress. On April 22, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and the PLA Daily published a joint
editorial in memory of the centenary of Lenin’s birthday. In what was seen as the most violent
attack on the Soviet leadership since the opening of border negotiations, the editorial condemned
the “Soviet renegade” for having degenerated into a “dictatorship of the Hitler type” and called
the Brezhnev doctrine a “fascist theory.” In a counterattack, Pravda ran a 5,000-word editorial
entitled “Pseudo-Revolutionaries with their Masks Off” on May 18. It charged that the Chinese
rejection of the Soviet call for joint action had enabled “imperialists to carry out anti-popular
designs” in Indochina, implying the U.S. invasion of Cambodia. The Soviet attack was so intense
that even the Post reprinted its excepts.17
Having been the first to recognize Sihanouk’s Beijing-based government-in-exile upon its
establishment on May 5, 1970, the Chinese government was extremely sensitive to the Soviet
accusation of selling out in Indochina. When many Communist countries, including Albania and
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North Korea, followed suit in extending recognition, Moscow was still uncommitted.18 The day
after the Pravda editorial, which had been almost three weeks after the United States launched its
operation, Beijing announced its decision to put off the scheduled Warsaw talks. In a terse
statement, it declared, “In view of the increasingly grave situation caused by the United States,
which has brazenly sent troops to invade Cambodia and expanded the war in Indochina, the
Chinese government deemed it no longer suitable for the 137th meeting of the Sino-U.S.
ambassadorial to be held on May 20 as originally scheduled.” However, it left the door open for
further communication, declaring that the date of the next meeting would be “decided upon later
through consultation by the liaison personnel of the two sides.”19
In coordination with the cancellation of meeting with the Americans, Beijing launched a
national campaign to display its support for Sihanouk’s Cambodia. To start the campaign, Mao
issued a personal pronouncement entitled “People All Over the World, Unite and Defeat the
American Aggressors and Their Running Dogs” on the scheduled day of the Warsaw meeting. In
the pronouncement, Mao mentioned that more than twenty countries had recognized Sihanouk’s
Cambodia within ten days of its establishment. Besides displaying to the world the Chinese
support for the exiled leader, Beijing also used the campaign to embarrass the Soviet Union for
failing to offer support for him. The day after his pronouncement, Mao, along with Lin Biao and
Sihanouk, attended a rally of half a million people in Tiananmen Square. In reporting the rally,
the People’s Daily front-page article did not focus on the statement. It instead listed the names of
almost every one on the Tiananmen rostrum, especially representatives from Communist parties
in India, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, North Korea, Romania, Albania, Pakistan, and Japan.
Interestingly, while it placed most of the foreign dignitaries at the front of the guest list, it
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consigned the names of the Soviet representatives to the very bottom of the article to display its
slight of Moscow.20
U.S. media were confused by the vehemence of the Chinese response. Both the Times
and the Post related the Chinese decision to cancel the Warsaw talks to the Vietnam War,
especially a message to North Vietnam in the People’s Daily on the late Ho Chi-Minh’s 80th
birthday anniversary when Beijing called on the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to
continue fighting the United States “until complete victory.” The Times speculated that the
Warsaw cancellation had been decided a week earlier when first secretary of the North
Vietnamese Party Le Duan was in Beijing. The Post argued that the talks might be resumed
when U.S. forces were out of Cambodia by the end of June. As to Mao’s “unusual
pronouncement,” the Times described it as “another expression of the leadership role” in world
revolution China had taken lately, whereas the Post saw it as a sign of “stiffening Chinese
attitude towards the United States.”21
In reality, when Beijing cancelled the talk on May 20, it offered to meet again on June
20.22 However, a CCP Politburo meeting on June 16 decided that the official Warsaw Talks
should be further postponed “in view of the current situation,” but it decided that liaisons of the
two governments would still meet on the day.23 Even though Beijing once again postponed the
official talks, it announced the meeting between the liaisons. The announcement in the People’s
Daily was noticeably milder in tone than the one a month earlier. Without blaming Washington
for the postponement, it referred to the current situation as “clearly understood by both sides”
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and stated that the date of the next meeting would be discussed “at a proper time.”24 Beijing’s
mild announcement not only signaled to Washington its interests in continued contacts, but also
had the effect of unsettling Moscow.
After the U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia in late June, Beijing made a friendly move on
July 10 by suddenly releasing James Walsh, a 79-year-old Roman Catholic bishop who had been
detained in China for 12 years on charges of espionage. 25 Different from the statement
announcing the release of two American yachtsmen on December 8, 1969, Beijing offered
detailed information about the prisoner’s name, age, and hometown. The justification for his
release was that “the bishop had confessed his crime upon education from the Chinese authority.
Considering his senior age, our authority decided to release him ahead of schedule on the
proletarian principle of ‘leniency to those who confess and severity to those who resist.’”26 Its
prominent position on page two and the detailed introduction of the bishop showed the
importance Beijing attached to his release.
As the Chinese government hoped, the bishop’s release made headlines in U.S. elite
media. Both elite newspapers related the timing of his release to the exit of U.S. forces from
Cambodia. The Post commented that by doing so Beijing sought to “take the edge off some of its
recent sharp verbal attacks on the United States.” In an editorial titled “…and a Signal from
China,” the Times argued that his release was not accidental and Beijing might be sending a
signal to Washington, “the most important signal since the Chinese People’s Republic agreed to
resume the Warsaw talks.”27
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The three networks showed vivid images of the bishop crossing the border into Hong

Kong and his press conference afterwards. ABC and CBS rushed to interview Walsh’s sister and
brother, both of whom said his release was a “miracle.”28 When the bishop showed up in a wheel
chair at the press conference, he was described as “alert.” Even though he claimed that he had
been forced to sign the confession and that he found it hard to justify the severity of the sentence
“meted out” to him, he said that overall he received “good treatment” in prison and he “could not
feel angry toward any Chinese” because he just “loved the Chinese people.”29 Instead of a
condemnation of the Chinese government, the message from the press conference was more
about the gratitude people felt about Walsh’s release. The bishop’s experience stood in sharp
contrast to the brutal scene when the eight expelled nuns crossed the border into Hong Kong
during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution. Through the media’s prominent coverage, Beijing
showed to the U.S. government as well as its people that China had become much more rational
and it was taking steps to reduce the tension between the two countries.
Besides releasing the bishop, Beijing did not make any other gesture in the summer of
1970. During this period, there was a power struggle going on between Mao and his heir
apparent Lin Biao. According to Kissinger, on July 2, two Chinese Mig-19s carried on an
“apparently premeditated attempt” to intercept a C-130 reconnaissance plane flying one hundred
miles off the Chinese coast. He thought it very likely that someone in the power structure wanted
to “wreck” Sino-American relations, citing that the Air Force was the most radical in the Chinese
armed service during the Cultural Revolution.30 The power struggle in the Chinese leadership
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escalated into a “de facto showdown” between Mao and several of Lin’s main supporters at a
party Central Committee plenary session held between August 23 and September 6 at Lushan, a
mountain summer resort in mid-Southern China.31 Mao’s preoccupation with the power struggle
might have hindered him from making further moves toward the United States.
Signals through Edgar Snow
As it turned out, Mao prevailed in the struggle against Lin Biao and his followers at the
Lushan Conference. In the fall of 1970, Beijing sent signals to Washington through Edgar Snow,
an “old friend” of the Chinese Communists since the mid-1930s when he visited their
headquarters in Yan’an and interviewed their leaders. Snow’s greatly acclaimed book, Red Star
over China, published in 1938, provided a favorable description of the Chinese Communist
revolution to readers within China and without.32 The Chinese government sent the invitation to
Snow in the name of Mao in June and he arrived on August 14, 1970.33 Snow’s first public
appearance in China was at an exhibition match between the Chinese and North Korean pingpong teams. On its front page, the People’s Daily placed him among dignitaries from Communist
parties around the world and featured a separate photo story about Zhou Enlai’s meeting with
him.34 On the October Day for national celebration, Zhou Enlai deliberately arranged Snow and
his wife to stand next to Mao on the Tiananmen rostrum in reviewing the parade and a picture of
Snow with Mao and Lin Biao was taken.35
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Interestingly, the People’s Daily did not publish the photo immediately. On its front page

the next day, pictures of Mao with the guests on the Tiananmen Square were mostly those taken
from the distance and Snow could barely be recognized in them.36 Mao’s photo with Snow was
not published in the Peoples’ Daily until Christmas 1970. Its caption stated, “The Chinese
people’s great teacher Chairman Mao has recently met friendly American Edgar Snow and had a
cordial and friendly talk with him.” Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, all Chinese
newspapers carried a quotation of Mao’s in the small box at the upper right-hand corner of every
front page. The Mao quotation for that day was, “People of the world, including the American
people, are our friends.” When they met in January 1965, the People’s Daily also published their
photo, but it called Snow “an American writer, the author of Red Star over China.”37 The
different treatments Snow received in the official organ illustrated the change in Sino-American
relations. When the two countries were locked in hostility, he was treated as a private citizen
without hint of friendship. In 1970 Snow had become a representative of the American people
whom Beijing wanted to befriend.
Scholars agree that Snow’s photo with Mao was an important message to Washington.
Several of them, however, have neglected the three-month delay in its publication.38 Chen Jian
refers to secondary sources claiming that Zhou Enlai had overseen its publication in late
December for other major Chinese newspapers to follow, but he fails to explain the cause of the
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delay. 39 What happened during those months might have changed Mao’s attitude to SinoAmerican rapprochement.
On October 12, Zhou Enlai wrote a note on a Foreign Ministry report to Mao, suggesting
that he take the interview with Snow before October 15 because the American journalist would
leave Beijing by then. Mao wrote, “All right. <I am> planning to listen to his views about
international affairs.” 40 Though Mao agreed to meet with Snow, he deferred it until midDecember. From his note to Zhou, Mao seemed to be more interested in consulting with Snow
than in delivering the message in October. Xia Yafeng and Yang Kuisong argue that Mao had
been vacillating between revolution and reconciliation even in 1970 and that he might not have
been “psychologically ready” for reconciliation at the time.41
Xiong Xianghui, Zhou Enlai’s aide who had assisted the four marshals in their study of
international condition in 1969, claimed that Mao’s decision to take the interview with Snow had
to do with his earlier interview with Zhou Enlai, which had appeared in the Italian magazine
Epoca on 13 December. The Reference Materials reprinted not only the article, but also several
stories about how Zhou’s interview had impressed Western news agencies. Xiong thought that
Mao must have read them. From the “minutes of the Mao-Snow conversation” later distributed
among Chinese leaders, moreover, he found that not long after the interview started, Mao took
the initiative to talk about the Epoca article, saying that it was “pretty good.” Finally, Snow
wrote in The Long Revolution that he was summoned to meet with Mao without advance notice
and that Mao had a slight cold when they met. Based on these observations, Xiong argued that
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the Epoca article must have inspired Mao, who then decided to meet with him immediately even
though he was not feeling well.42 Xia Yafeng and Yang Kuisong claim that it was Snow’s line
“China was building a broader anti-imperialist united front not excluding the Americans” in the
article that had enlightened Mao.43
In his interview with Snow, Mao “casually” said that Nixon would be welcome to visit
China because the current problems between China and the United States had to be solved by
him and that he would be happy to talk with Nixon “either as president or as a tourist.” This
remark was later published and known to the outside world as Mao’s invitation to Nixon.
Actually, Mao sent more messages. Because of the Chinese censorship, the “minutes of SnowMao Talk” that later circulated among Chinese officials contained more details than Snow’s Life
magazine article in April 1971.44 In the “minutes,” Mao said that Nixon had expressed his desire
to talk with Chinese leaders in Beijing or Washington under extreme secrecy without even the
knowledge of the Foreign Ministry or the State Department. Mao said, “If he really wants to
come to Beijing, you can take a message to him. Tell him not to sneak in. He can just come in a
plane.” When Snow asked Mao, “Since I don’t know Nixon, but if I meet him, Can I...?” Before
he finished the sentence, Mao said, “You can just say <that I think> he is a good person, the
world’s top good person. Brezhnev is not good. Brandt is not good either.”45 This conversation
indicates the comfortable position in which Mao handled the accommodation and that he was
expecting Snow to pass on the message to Nixon. Publishing the photo a week later was in line
with his state of mind at that time.
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Mao’s increased confidence in rapprochement in late 1970 might also have been

influenced by the new overtures from Washington. In his interview with Time magazine
published on October 5, 1970, Nixon said, “If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to
go to China. If I don’t, I want my children to.”46 Nixon’s willingness to visit China did not stand
out in the article titled “I Did Not Want the Hot Words of TV,” which was mostly about his
general view of the world. It was literally ignored in U.S. media at the time. The Times did not
pay attention to the interview. The Post reported the interview, but it ignored Nixon’s remarks
about visiting China.47 Maybe they did not want to credit their competitor with a scoop.
In this month, when Nixon met with several countries’ leaders who were in the United
States to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, he sent more messages to
Beijing. In his meeting with Pakistani President Yahya Khan on October 25, Nixon asked him to
convey two points to the Chinese leadership: 1) the U.S. government would “make no
condominium against China” and he wanted the Chinese leaders to know it whatever may be put
out; 2) the U.S. government would “be glad to” send emissaries to Beijing and to establish links
secretly. Before Mao’s interview with Snow, Beijing had received Nixon’s message and sent
their warm reply through Yahya.48
The day after his meeting with Yahya, in his toast to Romanian President Nicolae
Ceausescu at a White House banquet, Nixon stated that he was in a rather unique position
because “he heads a government which is one of the few in the world which has good relations
with the United States, good relations with the Soviet Union and good relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” That was the first time an American president addressed China with its
proper name on an official occasion. Even though the Times and the Post both made references
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to China in reporting the meeting, they failed to catch the nuance in the President’s message. The
Times quoted Nixon’s toast on the jump page without commenting on its significance. The Post
did not pay attention to the toast, to say nothing of Nixon’s signal.49 While U.S. media missed
the significance of Nixon’s new posture, the Reference News was quick to understand the
nuances of the “historical” toast and reprinted its full text.50
Moreover, Mao might have gained confidence from the elevation in China’s international
standing when it established diplomatic relations with Canada and Italy in October and
November. In negotiating with these two countries, Beijing became more flexible and no longer
insisted that they recognize its sovereignty over Taiwan as a precondition for diplomatic
recognition. When Beijing and Ottawa issued the joint communiqué on October 13, its most
important line was, “the Canadian government recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the
sole legal Government of China...The Chinese government reaffirms that Formosa is an
inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Canadian government
takes note of this position of the Chinese government.” Both the Times and the Post picked up
the Chinese concession on Taiwan when they interpreted the phrase “taking note of” as not
accepting.51 With the formula provided by the Canadian recognition, the Italian government
quickly concluded the treaty with Beijing and issued the joint communiqué on November 6,
1970.
Beijing’s recognition by two major Western powers had a great impact on the General
Assembly voting on China’s UN membership. On November 20, the PRC won 51 percent of the
votes supporting its admission and the expulsion of Taiwan, a simply majority for the first time.
Even though it was not admitted because of the American insistence on a two-thirds majority,
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journalists viewed it as a “setback” for the United States and a sign that Beijing would enter the
UN very soon.52 Washington had changed its rhetoric even before the voting. In his speech to the
General Assembly on November 12, Christopher H. Philips, the deputy permanent representative
of the United States, said, “The United States is as interested as any in this room to see the
People’s Republic of China play a constructive role among the family of nations.” He also went
out of his way to compliment “the industry, talents, and achievements of the great people who
live in that ancient cradle of civilization.” Before and after the voting, the two newspapers noted
that Washington had refrained from saying anything that might be interpreted as opposition to
China’s entrance into the world body.53Their depictions of Washington’s change in position on
China’s UN membership were another friendly signal to Beijing.
Beijing’s signals to Nixon through Snow did not produce timely effects. When the Times
and Post received a copy of Zhou’s conversation with Snow in Epoca, they only paid attention to
his remark that “China was still threatened with war by the superpowers with some one million
men as well as rocket troops to the north and west; and with the United States in alliance with a
remilitarizing Japan on the east.” They interpreted this line as evidence of Beijing’s inflexibility
and refused to buy Snow’s argument that “Zhou Enlai’s willingness to have serious
conversations with an American writer after the Cultural Revolution was itself meaningful.54 The
magazines and networks simply ignored the article. Even though Beijing Review, the only Chinapublished English magazine targeting the Western audience, published Mao’s photo with Snow
in the first issue of 1971, American journalists did not pay much attention. C.L. Sulzberger of the
Times did mention it in his “Foreign Affair” column entitled “The Tea Leaves Change,” but it
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was published in late January.55 Other U.S. media were not impressed by Mao’s high-profile
appearance with Snow probably because of their natural suspicion of leftists, especially those
with a pro-Communist record. During the Cultural Revolution, Robert F. Williams, author of
Negroes with Guns published in 1962 and a black power activist hounded into exile by the U.S.
government over criminal charges, had been treated as a head of state when he joined Mao on the
Tiananmen rostrum with the honor of making a speech to the throng for China’s National Day
celebration.56 Williams’ experience in China had received very little coverage in U.S. media.
Nor could Snow deliver Mao’s message at an earlier date. His interview with Mao was
not published in Life until April 30, 1971, the same issue that called attention to Nixon’s remark
to Time that he would like to visit China.57 By that time, they could only stand in the shadow of
the “aftershock” caused by Ping-Pong Diplomacy. Richard Nixon claimed in his memoir that he
learned of Mao’s statement to Snow within a few days after their conversation.58 Nixon was
probably bragging or simply lying because nobody else could verify his claim. Nor did he
produce any evidence about how he obtained it.59
According to Snow, after every interview with Zhou Enlai and Mao, he had to submit to
the Chinese for correction a long dispatch based on his notes. When the clearance came a week
later, the official version omitted things not publishable. Huang Hua, a senior diplomat who
would become the first Chinese Ambassador to the UN and the Foreign Minister, also said that
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when Snow’s wife left China before Christmas 1970, he had to wait for the interview draft.60 The
Chinese arrangements made it difficult for Snow to publish the interview at an earlier date.
Seymour Topping, foreign editor of the Times, claimed that, after he left China in
February 1971, Snow sent to his newspaper a lengthy article based on a series of interviews with
Zhou Enlai. Unfortunately, executive editor Abe Rosenthal, who was strongly anti-Communist
due to his experience as a reporter in Poland, felt uneasy about giving too much space to a piece
written by a journalist known for his strong sympathy for the Chinese Communists. He insisted
on drastic cuts, arguing that the article was too long and “propagandistic.” When Snow refused
to make the cut, Rosenthal “summarily” rejected his article, not knowing that it reflected Mao’s
attitude that had been conveyed to Snow in “off-the-record remarks.”61 The Times thus missed a
precious opportunity to pass on the important signal to the Nixon administration and also a
scoop. The suspicion of communists in U.S. media, to some extent, had prevented Mao from
delivering his message through Snow at an earlier date.
Kissinger’s version was that the State Department probably could not have obtained a full
text of Snow’s talk with Mao because a memo to him on April 1, 1971 did not mention the
element of an invitation to Nixon. It instead reported that Snow had gained the impression from
his meetings with Chinese leaders that “there was no immediate prospect of improving SinoAmerican relations because of the war in Indochina.”62
The Snow scenario reflects the different roles of Zhou and Mao in handling SinoAmerican rapprochement. While Zhou’s job was to set up the mechanisms or to deal with details
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such as arranging the photo shoot, Mao had the final say on when and how to deliver the
message. According to Gao Wenqian, after the Ninth Congress, Zhou often picked noticeable
international developments and commentaries as reference materials for Mao to read, thus to
influence Mao’s thinking on foreign policies in a subtle way.63 Without Mao’s approval, Zhou
Enlai was extremely cautious in the signals he sent out. It explains the mixture of restrained
optimism and tough rhetoric in his interview with Snow in November. It is probably why the two
U.S. elite newspapers did not read any significant change from the interview published in Epoca.
The difference in their importance was also illustrated by the fact that Zhou Enlai’s photo with
Snow in August as well as his interview with Snow caused much less sensation and were
interpreted with much less symbolical meaning than Mao’s. After all, only Mao’s conversation
with Snow was later distributed as a party document.
Breakthrough via Secret Diplomacy
The missing of signals between Nixon and Mao well exemplified the delicate nature of
the “intricate minuet” between Beijing and Washington. These signals through public media had
the danger of being delayed or even totally lost. Since the break-off of the Warsaw Talks in
February 1970, Nixon and Kissinger tried to reestablish contact with Beijing through different
channels. At first they tried Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, the military attaché in Paris.
Between July and September, Walters tried several times to tell his Chinese contact that he had
an important message from Washington to Beijing. However, the Chinese official only said that
he would inform his government that Walters had a message without making any further
response.64 The Paris channel did not produce any result.
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It was mainly through the Pakistani channel that Washington and Beijing achieved a

breakthrough. As mentioned earlier, on October 25, Nixon had asked Pakistani President Yahya
Khan to take his message to Zhou Enlai. Yahya visited China from November 10 to 15. On
December 9, the Pakistani ambassador Agha Hilaly met with Kissinger and dictated Zhou’s
“authoritative personal message” to Nixon. Acknowledging Washington’s past messages from
different sources, Zhou emphasized that it was “the first time a proposal has come from a Head
through a Head, to a Head” and that he spoke not only for himself, but also for Mao and Lin
Biao. He also expressed wishes to receive a special envoy of Nixon in Beijing to talk about the
Taiwan issue. Kissinger never obtained an adequate explanation why Yahya waited for three
weeks after his return to Pakistan before transmitting the message. He speculated that Beijing
might have deliberately wanted Yahya to postpone communicating it.65 As with what had been
mentioned earlier, Beijing probably felt more comfortable delivering the message in December.
On December 16, Kissinger summoned Hilaly and asked him to tell the Chinese that
Washington was “prepared to attend a preliminary meeting at an early date” to make
arrangements for sending a U.S. delegation to Beijing for higher-level talks, but he stated that the
talks would not be “confined to the question of Taiwan” but all issues concerned with improving
relations between the two governments. He also said the Chinese request for withdrawing U.S.
forces from Taiwan was not hard to comply with because there were no military forces there
except “advisory and training missions.”66
Zhou Enlai’s reply came through Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan on January
11, 1971. Even though he insisted that the U.S. “occupation” of Taiwan was the only
“outstanding issue” between the two governments, Zhou wrote that Beijing was ready to receive
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a U.S. special envoy if the United States had a “desire to settle the issue” and a “proposal for its
solution.” More importantly, he added, since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and
Belgrade, he would also be welcome to visit Beijing. It was the first time Zhou formally
expressed Beijing’s willingness to receive the American President in China. Unfortunately,
Nixon and Kissinger interpreted his message as China’s insistence on the U.S. agreement to the
Chinese principle on Taiwan as a prerequisite for negotiations. Nixon wrote a note on
Kissinger’s memo, “I believe we may appear too eager. Let’s cool it. Wait for them to respond to
our initiative.”67 As the two sides were bargaining over the agenda through intermediaries, South
Vietnamese forces invaded Laos with the air cover of the United States in February 1971. The
incursion put the Sino-American secret negotiations on a temporary hold.
The Laos Incursion
The Chinese response to the Laos incursion was even milder than its response to the
Cambodian invasion a year earlier. This time, Mao did not make any personal pronouncement
attacking the United States. What the People’s Daily offered was his words, “So long as the
peoples of Indochina work closely with each other and persist in a prolonged people’s war, they
will definitely overcome whatever difficulties and win the final victory.” When it covered a halfmillion-person demonstration against the United States in Beijing ten days later, it did not
mention any Chinese leader being present.68
According to Kissinger, on the day of the editorial attack on the Laos incursion in the
People’s Daily, Qiao Guanhua, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister and an old associate of
Zhou Enlai, told Ole Aalgard, the Norwegian Ambassador to China, that Beijing was aware of a
new trend in American policy and he particularly expressed a desire to meet with Kissinger.
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Washington noted the message and reassured Beijing of its limited purposes in Laos. In a press
conference on February 17, Nixon declared that the operation in Laos was not directed against
China.69
Because part of the area invaded by the Saigon forces was close to the Chinese border,
the response from Beijing was significant. Both the Times and the Post read from the Chinese
statement that it would not resort to military counterattack in response. Under a Times headline,
there was a small caption, “Peking Issues a Warning on Incursion--Ziegler Says It Is No Threat
to China.” The juxtaposition of the two made the Chinese warning look much less threatening.
When Xuan Thuy, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator in Paris, made the front page of the
Times by declaring that the Laos incursion posed a threat to China, his statement was followed
by the comments of the administration’s China specialists who expressed confidence that China
would not intervene when the United States was withdrawing troops from the region.70 Similarly,
when Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma reportedly claimed that Chinese volunteers might enter
Laos, the Post run an article entitled “Peking Silent About ‘Volunteers’”71 These articles fostered
the impression that Beijing and Washington would not fight over the Laos incursion.
In the middle of the Laos incursion, Nixon sent another signal by addressing China with
its official name in his State of the World Message to Congress on February 25, 1971. The most
notable line was, “I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People’s
Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations.” On its front-page article
entitled “Highlights of the Message,” the Times called attention to Nixon’s “subtle compliment”
of China “the first of its kind by an American President.” Even though the Post still used
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“Communist China” in commenting on Nixon’s desire to “establish a dialogue” with Beijing, it
reprinted the section where he talked about the problems of Indochina and China.72
The Post’s negligence of Nixon’s nuance might have to do with its preoccupation with
the Vietnam War. As Kissinger stated, no matter how hard Nixon tried to make his annual State
of the World Message a statement of the basic philosophy of American foreign policy, each year
the press would focus on the section on Indochina. Instead of a debate over U.S. purpose in the
world, it “invariably generated a discussion in Vietnam.”73 In reporting Nixon’s State of the
World message, the Times headline was “Nixon Sees Risk of Isolationism if Disengagement is
too Swift,” and the Post used “President Sees no Early End to War in Asia.” The networks also
gave prominence to Indochina and the China policy in their coverage of Nixon’s report.74
The Reference News was quick to catch Nixon’s signal. It carried an article that called
attention to the fact that Nixon had used the PRC “seven times” in his foreign-policy report and
that it was the first time an American president had done so in an official document. The next
day, it reprinted on its front page the section of Nixon’s message about China and its source was
not any foreign press agency, but “this newspaper.”75 This arrangement seemed to tell readers
that Nixon’s message was not selected at random, but by the order from the central government.
In contrast to the Reference News’ undistorted presentation of Nixon’s message, the
People’s Daily attacked his administration for its determination to “occupy” Taiwan” and its
“criminal trick” of creating “two Chinas.”76 By displaying China’s “firm” position on Taiwan,
the article helped Beijing retain its public image as a revolutionary power. Nevertheless, the
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secondary placement of the comments showed a reduced level of hostility to Washington.
Sophisticated readers who read both newspapers could see the change in Beijing’s attitude
toward the United States.
Ping-Pong Diplomacy
In late March 1971, the operation in Laos ended in a fiasco, eliminating an irritant
between China and the United States. In April, Beijing made a bold initiative that greatly
accelerated Sino-American rapprochement, a move that amazed the whole world. Between 28
March and 7 April 1971, the thirty-first World Table Tennis Championships was held in Nagoya,
Japan. From the beginning, Beijing regarded whether to send a team as a “political” issue
because it would have been the first time for a Chinese sports team to appear in a major
international event since the Cultural Revolution. According to Chen Jian, the Foreign Ministry
and the National Commission on Sports were opposed to the idea at first because they were
worried that Chinese players might have to deal with players from “puppet regimes” in South
Vietnam and Cambodia. However, Mao and Zhou, who were well aware of the public relations
value of the Chinese players in displaying the “new outlook” of the Chinese people to the world,
decided to send their team.77
During the championships, the People’s Daily devoted considerable space to the Chinese
team’s activities besides reporting the game results. It repeatedly mentioned the theme of
“friendship” in covering the interactions between Chinese players and those from other
countries. In reporting the opening ceremony, it featured an article entitled “Transmitting
Friendship through the Silver Ball--Chinese Ping-Pong Team in Nagoya.” In an article called
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“Friendship first, Competition second,” the People’s Daily called on the Chinese players to “use
politics to guide skills and friendship to direct matches.”78
The Chinese players performed excellently in fulfilling their “political” task and showed
extraordinary courtesy when they encountered American players on several occasions. On 27
March, they talked with a few American players at the game’s opening reception. On 4 April,
Glenn Cowan, a nineteen-year-old American player from Santa Monica College in California,
boarded a bus carrying Chinese players “by accident,” as Chen Jian states. In the bus, three-time
world champion Zhuang Zedong approached him and offered an embroidered scarf as a gift.
When Cowan and the Chinese players got off the bus, they ran into a crowd of waiting
journalists. The next day, Cowen returned the favor by giving Zhuang a Beatles T-shirt. Their
exchange was again caught by journalists and cameras.79
In reality, Cowan got into the bus not by accident, but by the invitation of Chinese
players. According to Xiong Xianghui, the story that Reference Materials reprinted from Kyodo
News Service went as follows: Cowan was hurriedly walking to the gym wearing a U.S. team
jacket. When he passed by the bus for the Chinese players, they waved to him and said, “Are you
going to the gym? Hop in.” Cowan was surprised, but he got in. 80 Without any prior
encouragement from the government, Chinese players probably would not have been so
forthcoming in dealing with U.S. players.
What happened between Zhuang and Cowan might have encouraged the Chinese leaders
to make bolder moves. According to Mao’s head nurse Wu Xujun, Mao, who was intrigued upon
learning of the story between Zhuang and Cowan from the Reference Materials, praised Zhuang
for his “diplomatic adroitness” and “political smartness.” During the tournament, leaders of the
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American delegation had inquired repeatedly whether they could visit China when they met their
Chinese counterparts. They became especially eager upon learning that Beijing had invited teams
from England and Canada. When the American request was reported to Beijing, Zhou Enlai’s
opinion was positive. Mao was undecided at the beginning. On 6 April, when the tournament
was about to end, he suddenly made the decision to invite the American team.81
On April 11, Beijing allowed three U.S. newsmen, John Roderick from the Associated
Press along with John Rich and Jack Reynolds from NBC, to go with the American team.
Roderick and Rich had reported from the mainland during the Chinese Civil War. In addition to
them, there were two Japanese technicians working for NBC and two non-U.S. reporters working
for Life magazine. On April 16, Tillman Durdin, head of the Times’ Hong Kong bureau and a
prominent China watcher, was given a one-month visa, the first of this kind issued to an
American journalist for regular news coverage since 1949.82 The selection of the New York
Times was not an accident. Chinese leaders must have noticed its efforts in promoting better
Sino-American relations and that it was the most influential U.S. newspaper.
During the week in China, the American ping-pong team toured universities, factories as
well as farms, watched a revolutionary ballet, and played exhibition matches with the Chinese
players in front of a large audience. Besides Beijing, they toured Shanghai and Guangzhou
(Canton). The People’s Daily devoted much space to their activities, even their departure from
China. The matches between Chinese and American players received live coverage on Chinese
television and radio. The Chinese television anchor’s comments that “for a long time, friendship
has existed between the Chinese and American peoples” and that “the visit by the American
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table-tennis team will enhance such friendship” had been examined and revised by Zhou Enlai
carefully.83
The high moment of the visit came on April 14, when Zhou Enlai met with the American
team in the Hall of the People, where he said, “Your visit has opened a new page for more
friendly relations between the two peoples.” The People’s Daily placed Zhou’s pictures with
them in prominent places. The quotation of Mao for that day was, “People all over the world
support each other in their just fight. Our friends are all over the world.”84
Ping-Pong Diplomacy displayed Beijing’s use of “people-to-people” diplomacy before
the establishment of the official relationship with Washington. Zhou Enlai’s welcoming speech
as well as the Chinese media carefully separated the “aggressive and imperialistic” American
government from the “heroic” American people.85 When the game in Japan was over, the
People’s Daily featured an article entitled “Our Friends are all over the World.” It claimed that
Chinese player Zhuang Zedong had reportedly told an American couple, “Even though the U.S.
government is hostile to China, Chinese people and American people are friends. We
differentiate the American government from the American people.” After the American team’s
visit to China, the People’s Daily ran an editorial entitled “Salute to the Courageously Fighting
American People.”86
In order to prepare the Chinese people for a change in relations, Beijing started
promoting the friendship between the two peoples in the media. The People’s Daily could not
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directly comment on what the U.S. team’s visit meant to the official relations because Beijing
had to worry about its “revolutionary” image. However, because of the media’s intensive
coverage of the Americans’ activities in China, ordinary Chinese people could feel that
something new was happening between the two countries.
U.S. media were much more excited than their Chinese counterparts. When the Nixon
administration completely lifted travel restrictions to China three weeks before the Chinese
invitation, the Times and the Post did not attach too much meaning to the move.87 Beijing’s
invitation to the first sizable group of Americans and its granting of visas to U.S. reporters
thrilled American newspeople indeed. Walter Cronkite of CBS called the invitation a
“consolation prize” for the U.S. team and “unexpected good news.” The Post headline was,
“Surprise Served at Table Tennis Match: U.S. Team Invited to Peking.”88 Harrison Salisbury, in
his Times column, claimed that the invitation was “not only a gesture of friendship, but also one
of national honor” considering the importance of ping-pong as China’s “paramount international
sport.” With a phrase “Major Policy Change” in its headline, the Times interpreted Beijing’s
granting of visas to American newsmen as “more significant” than the invitation to the pingpong team in showing its discarding of the policy of “self-isolation.” It called the two moves as
Beijing’s “first positive response” to American overtures.89
For two weeks, John Roderick’s dispatches from Beijing made several front pages of the
Times and the Post, and Ping-Pong Diplomacy occupied the prime time of the three networks.
Frequently using Zhou Enlai’s remark about a “new page” in Sino-American relations, U.S.
media presented overwhelmingly positive stories about China. The Post pictured that “the smile
on the face of the dragon was dazzling” as the American team received “first class treatment,
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warm welcomes and speeches of friendship.” The Times reported Zhou’s meeting with the
American team with a headline “Chou, 73, and ‘Team Hippie’ Hit It Off.”90
The cover of Newsweek was a big cartoon depicting Mao and Nixon playing ping-pong
with a caption “A New Game Begins.” It noticed that the Chinese ping-pong players appeared in
Japan with “no small little red book, no chanting of quotations, no speech making and no
singing.” Instead, they were “profusely” polite when socializing with their ping-pong rivals and
the local people. Also, it put the “cleanness” of Guangzhou (Canton) in sharp contrast to the
“litter-strewn shanty towns of Hong Kong” and claimed that everything, including the Chinese
guards and officials, had been “freshly scrubbed.”91
Time published several large pictures of the American team’s activities in China. In an
article based on witness accounts of Life’s two reporters, it described China as “a nation that was
unified and organized--with a level of poverty, but absolutely no misery” and the people as
“healthy and self-confident. Moreover, it described Zhou Enlai as “smooth, very handsome, and
quite witty.” In 1954 when Zhou Enlai led the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Convention,
Life had called him “a political thug,” “a ruthless intriguer, a conscienceless liar and a sabertoothed political assassin.”92 In the brand new atmosphere, newspapers and magazines also ran
articles tracing the development of Sino-American relations. Some of them dated the “traditional
friendship” between the two countries back to the American Revolution.93
Television had obvious advantages in covering Ping-Pong Diplomacy. For the first time
the networks had the chance to show films provided by the Chinese official news agency. As the
only network with reporters in China, NBC sent over 10,000 feet of color film and 30-odd
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voicecasts back to the United States through telephone relay without being censored by the
Chinese.94 In the NBC video, there were smiling Chinese children holding Mao’s red books and
a large crowd waving to the Americans when they toured the Summer Palace. During the
exhibition matches between the Chinese and the American teams, 18,000 audience members
were shown clapping for the American team. The most impressive scene of the game came at the
closing ceremony when players of the two countries marched into the gym in pairs holding
hands. In the end, the reporter stated, “In sports at least, the Chinese and the Americans have
found a common meeting ground.”95
ABC had its own way of illustrating the new relationship. While the anchor was talking
in the studio, the background changed from the Communist “hammer and sickle” into two
crossing ping-pong bats, each bearing the Chinese and American flags.96 Through the Canadian
Broadcast Company, CBS ran a video of American players visiting the elite Qinghua University,
where Chinese students produced tractors. Under the influence of the Cultural Revolution, it
claimed, students would not be trained as an intellectual class, but workers with their own
hands.97
Ping-Pong Diplomacy excited Nixon so much that a few hours after Zhou Enlai’s
meeting with the American team, he announced the plan to remove the trade embargo with China
over non-strategic goods. White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler deliberately linked it with
Ping-Pong Diplomacy by telling the media that Nixon had made the decision two weeks earlier,
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but the timing was greatly “influenced” by the Chinese decision to invite the American pingpong team and Zhou Enlai’s remarks about a “new page” in U.S.-China relations.98
The Reference News well documented the positive response to Ping-Pong Diplomacy. It
reprinted stories about how the American team was warmly received at the White House upon its
return home, and Nixon’s hope to receive the Chinese ping-pong team as Zhou Enlai had the
American team. It even reported that Nixon had started practicing ping-pong to prepare for the
meeting with Chinese players. As always, it also reported the worries of Brezhnev and the
Nationalists on Taiwan, and their concern about the possibility that Japan might follow the
example of the United States.99
Most observers knew that the venues visited by American players and journalists in
China had been carefully screened and stage-managed. What matters, nonetheless, was that the
overwhelmingly positive report on China by American journalists helped create an image of
stability and rationality, which stood in sharp contrast to the chaos during the Cultural
Revolution. They displayed to the world that the Chinese government felt confident enough to
receive journalists from other countries, especially the United States. The film of Chinese and
American players holding hands must have had a strong impact on American audiences. The
Chinese government was well aware of the media’s role when it invited the American the pingpong team along with journalists. It is fair to say that the Chinese government successfully used
American media to improve the chances for rapprochement.
One of the few to express dissent about Ping-Pong Diplomacy in the Nixon
administration was Vice President Spiro Agnew. While attending the spring Republican
governor’s conference on April 19, Agnew told journalists that he had misgivings about Nixon’s
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policy of easing relations with Beijing because it might undermine Taiwan’s position. He
especially disliked the media’s overwhelming positive coverage of China, for example, their
stories about the “contented and productive” lives of workers who lived in tiny apartments in
Beijing. He argued that it helped the Chinese government achieve a “propaganda triumph” over
the United States. Agnew’s remarks were so shocking that it made the headlines in newspapers
and the networks. In order to clear up a possible policy rift within the Nixon administration,
Ziegler summoned the media the next day and declared that there was “no disagreement”
between the President and the Vice President and that Mr. Agnew “fully” supported Nixon’s
initiatives to improve relations with China.100 While most media accepted Zielgler’s assertion,
CBS speculated that Nixon might have “orchestrated” Agnew’s statement to appease
conservatives.101 Agnew’s concern was directed at U.S. media because of their promotion of an
overwhelmingly favorable image of China.
U.S. media’s coverage of Ping-Pong Diplomacy most likely played an important role in
changing public opinion about China. In its wake, a May Gallup Poll found that for the first time,
people supporting the admission of China into the U.N. exceeded those who were against by a
ratio of 45 percent to 37 percent. The poll also indicated that for the first time, Republican
respondents who favored China’s U.N. membership exceeded those of their Democratic
counterparts.102 It should be noted that this change happened before Washington announced in
July Kissinger’s secret trip to China and Nixon’s coming visit to China. In reporting the poll
results, while the Times used an article entitled “Gallup Poll Reports a Plurality Favors Entry of
Peking in U.N,” which suggested favorable public opinion, the Post used a title “Peking U.N.
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Seat Favored by 45%.”103 Whether the Post editor was deliberate in choosing such a headline or
not, readers with no knowledge about past poll results could hardly read from it any significant
progress or any sign of promising change in public opinion because it was below 50 percent.
Kissinger’s Secret Trip to Beijing
Ping-Pong Diplomacy, which turned out to be a great success, greatly encouraged leaders
of the two governments to move toward a common ground. Soon after the U.S. ping-pong team
left China, Zhou Enlai sent a message through Yahya to Nixon explaining that it had not been
possible to reply earlier to his message “owing to the situation of the time.” Zhou changed the
wording carefully, “As the relations between China and the U.S.A. are to be restored
fundamentally, a solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions
between high-level responsible persons of the two countries.” Changing the negotiation focus
from solving the Taiwan issue to restoring Sino-American relations, Zhou again included Nixon
on the list of people invited to visit China.104
Beijing’s concession cleared the last obstacle for the American president to accept the
invitation. In his reply to Zhou Enlai on May 10, Nixon said that Kissinger was to visit Beijing in
advance to discuss arrangements for a presidential visit and that he hoped the first meeting
between Kissinger and Chinese officials be kept “strictly secret.” At first, Zhou was not too
pleased with the suggestion about secrecy. After Yahya explained that Nixon wanted to handle
these negotiations entirely by himself to prevent any politicians from disrupting his efforts until a
“government-to-government channel” was established, Zhou Enlai accepted the American
suggestion. When Washington and Moscow were about to reach an agreement on arms
limitation, Nixon sent a special message to Zhou Enlai on May 20, reassuring him that the
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agreement was not “directed against the People’s Republic of China.” Finally on June 4, Nixon
informed Zhou Enlai that in order to make arrangements for the presidential visit to China,
Kissinger was to visit Beijing between July 9 and 11, 1971.105
On June 10, the Nixon administration announced the relaxation of China trade, which
went much further from the previous step announced during Ping-Pong Diplomacy. He
authorized the export of a wide range of “nonstrategic items” and lifted all controls on imports
from China. Though trade with China was still limited to “nonstrategic items,” the Times and the
Post both regarded the policy as a move to “end the 21-year trade embargo against trade with
China.” The Times regarded this announcement as “the most important milestone” in a two-year
series of diplomatic efforts by Nixon to improve relations with China--the White House turned
into a “major political occasion” when it issued the list of items that could be exported to China
without special licensing. The Post viewed the Nixon measure as a “prelude” to an ending of
U.S. opposition to China’s U.N. seat later in the year.106 Among the three networks, ABC
commented that the biggest reaction to the U.S.-China trade announcement might occur in the
Soviet Union. NBC interpreted it as a “resumption of direct trade” with China without
considering the response of the Chinese government.107 Considering the insubstantial volume of
trade between China and the United States at the time, the resumption of “direct trade” had more
symbolic meaning than substance. While the Chinese media were not impressed by this gesture,
U.S. media treated it with great prominence. Therefore, it had a larger impact on American
audiences.
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Three days before Kissinger set out on his disguised trip to Asia, the Times worried him

by speculating that he might go to China in a story about possible new ambassadorial
assignments in the Far East. As the article stated, the White House had “refused to confirm--and
pointedly declined to deny--repeated reports” that Nixon had asked some months earlier that he
or his representative Henry Kissinger be invited to China in early 1972. While William Rogers
thought it was “funny,” Kissinger regarded it as a possible State Department leak to get him
away from Washington.108 The context of that article was its claim that there was “a race to be
the first prominent American official” to visit Beijing between Nixon and his Democratic
competitors Senators George McGovern (D-SD) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA).109 Ping-Pong
Diplomacy had brought about a favorable change in American opinions. After that celebrated
event, Beijing invited several non-official U.S. delegations to visit China, which made American
officials jealous. Politicians of both parties were anxious to gain benefits by visiting China,
especially those interested in their party’s presidential nomination.
On July 1, Kissinger started his visit to South Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. At
the beginning of the trip, he made it look as “boring” as possible to reduce media interest. Upon
his arrival in Pakistan, the last leg of his tour, Kissinger started complaining about an upset
stomach. As a result, all his appointments were cancelled and word was put out that he would
recuperate at Pakistani President Yahya Khan’s rest house in Murree, a hill station not far from
Islamabad. At 3:30 in the morning of July 9, Kissinger boarded a Pakistan International Boeing
707, a civil flight with regular service to Beijing, and set on his adventure into China.110
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The talks between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai went well. Before the trip, Nixon had told

Kissinger to secure reassurances from Beijing that no other American political figure would be
invited before his visit. Zhou said that he had a great pile of letters from American politicians
asking for invitations, but he had not answered them. Zhou also told Kissinger that he had placed
James Reston, vice president of the Times, on a slow train so that he would not arrive in Beijing
until Kissinger had left.111
Before the meeting was over, one last thing they could not agree upon was how to
announce Kissinger’s secret trip and Nixon’s forthcoming visit to China. The Chinese wanted to
make it appear that the U.S. president asked for the invitation. Kissinger, who did not want to
give the impression that the United States was playing the role of supplicant, reminded Beijing
that it was the Chinese who had proposed such a visit. Finally, under Mao’s instructions, the
Chinese side agreed to the wording that suggested the initiative came from both sides. The final
version was, “Knowing of President Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the People’s Republic of
China, Premier Zhou Enlai on behalf of the People’s Republic of China has extended an
invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate time before May 1972. President
Nixon had accepted the invitation with pleasure”112 With their final agreement on the agenda of
Nixon’s trip, the next step for Beijing and Washington was to make the announcement that
shocked the world.
While Beijing and Washington were reaching agreements on Nixon’s visit to China, he
dropped hints in this direction on several public occasions. Unfortunately, these hints impressed
the Chinese more than U.S. media. Besides his interview with Time published in October 1970,
Nixon explicitly talked about his intention to visit China on at least two occasions in April 1971.
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The first was on April 16, when he spoke to the convention of the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, two days after Zhou Enlai’s meeting with the American ping-pong team.
Nixon said he had suggested his two daughters consider visiting China for their honeymoon. He
also said, “I hope they do, as a matter of fact, I hope sometime I do. I am not sure that it is going
to happen while I am in office.” Neither the Times nor the Post was impressed by his remark in
their front-page stories the next day. The second occasion occurred at the end of a news
conference on April 29, the day before Life published Snow’s article containing Mao’s signal to
him. Nixon said, “I would finally suggest--I know this question may come up if I don’t answer it
now--I hope, and as a matter of fact, I expect to visit mainland China sometime in some
capacity--I don’t know what capacity. But that indicates what I hope for the long run.” Nixon
gloated in his memoir that “even the most rigorous monitors and analysts of Nixon rhetoric”
could not pick up his hints.113 In both cases, “tricky Dick” deliberately left the date of the China
trip open, which made him look not so serious about it. However, the Reference News faithfully
reprinted his remarks at prominent places.114 The Chinese newspaper understood well his signals.
On another occasion, when addressing a large group of Midwestern media executives in
Kansas City on July 6, 1971, Nixon spent considerable time talking about the potential of China
and the importance of improving relations with it. Again it attracted more attention in Beijing
than in the United States.115 Actually, when Zhou Enlai mentioned Nixon’s speech in Kansas
City to Kissinger during their talk in Beijing, Kissinger was embarrassed that he knew nothing
about it. Later, he had to borrow a copy of the speech from Zhou Enlai.116 Having known about
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the secret from the top, the official Chinese media were probably more alert to Nixon’s signals
than independent U.S. papers.
Another reason for the failure of American newspeople to take seriously Nixon’s remarks
about visiting China was because they had seen such comments before. As early as 1960 when
he campaigned against John F. Kennedy, the Post carried articles that speculated on the
possibility of Nixon’s use of a China trip as a “gimmick” to promote his own reputation. They
thought he might want to repeat the personal triumph he had achieved while confronting Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the famous “Kitchen Debate” a year earlier.117 None of those
stories turned into reality eventually.
Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger had been very successful keeping their communications
with Beijing secret. Even Secretary of State Rogers did not learn of Kissinger’s secret trip to
Beijing until July 8, when Nixon told him that it was a “last-minute decision” in response to an
invitation received while Kissinger was in Pakistan.118 Before the two countries established
diplomatic relations, no one could image Nixon meeting Mao, regardless of what he said.119 By
comparing U.S. media with the Reference News, it seemed that more Chinese picked Nixon’s
hints about visiting China than Americans before Kissinger’s secret trip to China was announced.
Conclusion
The period between the renewal of the Warsaw contact in December 1969 and
Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 witnessed the most important breakthrough in
Sino-American reconciliation. During this period, Beijing became a much more active
participant in the “intricate minuet” in which leaders of the two governments communicated their
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desire to improve relations through sophisticated means. When there was no direct contact
between them, the media in both countries functioned as the message carriers.
As U.S. media correctly pointed out, Beijing’s entrance into talks with Washington
marked the beginning of the triangular politics with the Soviet Union as the third player. The
Chinese eagerness to publicize the meetings with the Americans was mainly used to increase the
Soviet concern. Besides displaying to the world Beijing’s support for the Indochinese people, the
anti-U.S. campaign in the Chinese media was also aimed to embarrass Moscow. Though Beijing
broke off the Warsaw talks in response to the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, it was tough on words
but flexible in deeds, leaving the door open for further contacts with Washington.
A key feature of the “intricate minuet” was that many of the signals emanating from the
two capitals were unilateral steps that did not require reciprocity and several of these signals did
not reach the intended audience. While Beijing’s release of the bishop was well received in U.S.
media, Mao’s signals through Edgar Snow were too nuanced for U.S. media and the government
to comprehend. Similarly, Nixon’s signals by addressing China with its proper name at the
reception for Ceausescu and his remarks about visiting China did not attract enough attention in
U.S. media. The Chinese media were more impressed with these signals because they showed
that the U.S. government had accorded China its “rightful” place in the world.
Another difference was that U.S. media seemed to be more interested than their Chinese
counterparts in Nixon’s initiatives of releasing trade and travel restrictions. Between 1969 and
1971, the Nixon administration shrewdly coordinated the timing of these announcements with
important political events, such as Nixon’s Asia trip in July 1969, the renewal of Warsaw
contacts in December 1969, and Ping-Pong Diplomacy in April 1971.The prominent coverage
and positive response from U.S. media helped reinforce the effect of these initiatives. Though
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U.S. media were free from government control, they acted as the unwitting “cooperative partner”
of the government in promoting Sino-American rapprochement.120
By inviting American ping-pong players to China and allowing U.S. reporters to cover
their activities, Beijing achieved a great public-relations success. As a landmark in SinoAmerican relations, Ping-Pong Diplomacy made great contributions to preparing the two peoples
for a change in relations. For the audiences in both countries, it was the first time to see friendly
exchanges between the two peoples since the establishment of the PRC. The headlines, pictures,
and videos had a profound impact on their perception of the relations. More importantly, U.S.
media’s overwhelmingly positive coverage of China changed its image from a militant, irrational
revolutionary power into a more stable country that was rational and possible to deal with. In this
sense, the media functioned as not only observers, but also as crucial participants in U.S.-China
rapprochement.
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Chapter 6: Preparing for the Show in Beijing: 1971-1972
After the announcement of Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, both

Washington and Beijing faced problems at home. Nixon needed to deal with the formidable
challenges from conservatives who stood up for Taiwan. He could counter their opposition with
a well-calculated public-relations project to maximize media coverage of his China trip,
especially through television. In an election year, this would appeal to the majority of
Americans, who could understand the benefits to be gained through the dramatic diplomatic
breakthrough.
On the other hand, Beijing used different channels, especially its media, to accustom its
people to the fact that their government had forged a new relationship with the United States,
formerly its archenemy. Nixon’s trip turned out to be a great success for both his own
administration and China. Massive media coverage contributed to and became part of this
success story. This chapter studies how the two governments prepared for the Beijing summit
through their respective media and then how the media covered the visit itself.
Impact of the Announcement
At 7:30 on the evening of July 15, 1971, in the NBC studio in Burbank, California,
President Nixon announced that Henry Kissinger had paid a secret visit to Beijing and met with
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during his recent Asian tour, and that he had accepted Zhou’s
invitation to visit China sometime before May 1972.1 Eager to be part of the “historic moment,”
Nixon had requested airtime so that his “major policy statement” would receive live broadcasting
on national radio and television.
As Nixon hoped, his photo as well as the “surprising” news became the main headlines in
the two elite newspapers as well as the cover story of the newsmagazines. The Times described
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his acceptance of the visit as “simply astounding” and a “dizzying performance.” The Post
compared the China trip to a “moon landing” and called the news “mind-blowing.” It went as far
as predicting a “possible end of the Cold War.” Time was amazed by the “extraordinary NixonKissinger diplomatic adventure.” Calling Nixon’s move a “political masterstroke,” Newsweek
argued that his “awesome power” in conducting foreign affairs had “shattered two decades of
hallowed American policy” in just three and half minutes.2 In the case of Kissinger’s secret trip,
the media seemed to support Nixon’s use of the executive power for the sake of good ends.
In response to the Nixon announcement, congressional leaders including Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT), House Republican Leader Gerald Ford (R-MI), and Senate
Republican Leader Hugh Scott (R-PA), in addition to Senator George McGovern (D-SD), who
was the only announced Democratic Presidential candidate, responded favorably. Two
conservative Republicans, Senators James Buckley (R-NY) and John Tower (R-TX), expressed
their opposition. In evaluating the overall response, the Times claimed that Nixon had won
“bipartisan support” and the conservative Republicans constituted only “a handful.” The Post
described it as “universally favorable.” Time mentioned conservatives who compared Nixon’s
move to going to Berlin to “wine and dine with Adolf Hitler.” Noting the irony that Nixon’s
announcement came during the “Free China Week” designed by supporters of Taiwan, it
admitted that Nixon’s anti-Communist credentials made him far less vulnerable than a liberal
Democratic President. In an article “A Setback for the Democrats,” Newsweek similarly noted
how Nixon could easily get away with such a bold move when the conservative outcry was
“surprisingly slight.”3
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Though Nixon said in the announcement that his decision was not made “at the expense

of old friends,” journalists noted its ramifications for Taiwan. The front pages of the Times and
the Post not only published photos of Nixon, Zhou Enlai, and Kissinger, but also those of
Nationalist Ambassador to the United States James Shen and Premier C.K. Yen. They predicted
that Nixon’s visit to China would increase the chance of China’s entrance into the U.N. and
Taiwan’s expulsion.4 A cartoon in Time featured Uncle Sam leading Mao to the door of the UN
with a subtitle “Tell’em Sam sent you.” Newsweek ran a picture of the Nationalist leader Jiang
Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) looking afar with a telescope. The subtitle was “Chiang: A Bleak
Prospect.”5 Though journalists offered generally favorable reviews of the Nixon visit, their
expressed worry about Taiwan served as a restraint on Nixon’s approach to Taiwan.
In contrast to Nixon’s dramatic announcement of his trip, the Chinese media handled the
news with a much lower profile. The People’s Daily placed the joint announcement on the front
page, but in the lower right corner. While other articles were arranged horizontally and easier to
read, the font of the announcement was smaller and the text was arranged vertically, which made
it harder to read.6 This arrangement shows the complex mentality of the Chinese leadership. On
one hand, they knew that the visit to China by the head of a former enemy was important news.
On the other, its secondary position on the front-page displayed the detachment of the Chinese
government, which did not want to appear too excited about Nixon’s visit.
After the announcement, the People’s Daily refrained from making any commentaries on
the Nixon trip. The only one it published was an editorial entitled “The Tide of History is
Irresistible” reprinted from North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun (Newspaper of the Workers). Buried
on the last page, this editorial claimed that Nixon’s planned visit to China signified the failure of
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the United States in “isolating and containing China” and that it was “a great victory of the
Chinese people as well as the revolutionary people of the world.”7 Beijing apparently suggested
that the North Korean article represented the position of all “revolutionary” people of the world.
While the People’s Daily refrained from making comments on Nixon’s visit, the
Reference News devoted considerable space to the shock and positive response of the
international community. For example, it reprinted Agence France Presse (AFP)’s claim that
Nixon had exploded the “most shocking bomb of diplomacy” and Reuters’s comments that the
“warming between Washington and Beijing will have incalculable impact on the world situation,
especially the Vietnam War and the general election the next year.” It even included a story
about how Nixon had spent “the happiest night” by having a dinner of “crab leg and wine”
before making the historic announcement. For a diplomatic payoff, it reported how the Greek
government declared that Nixon’s move would accelerate its negotiations with China over
normalization of relations.8 The positive world response in the Reference News vindicated to the
Chinese people the correctness of the government decision to host Nixon.
The articles selected by the Reference News also highlighted a theme that the Chinese
government had been consistent in its position on Sino-American relations while the United
States had changed its policy. It reprinted a comment from an Egyptian newspaper that claimed,
“The American Giant had been beaten by the Asian Giant” and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s
Newsweek article that argued Nixon’s action symbolized a “kowtow” to Beijing.9 In an article
“Why did Mao agreed to let Nixon Come to Beijing,” Zhou Enlai told several foreign visitors
that it was the United States, not China, that had taken the initiative, and that he did not think of
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the new contact between the two governments as something of a “miracle.” By comparing a
growing China with a declining United States plagued with all kinds of problems, Beijing
wanted to show the world it was the United States that was anxious to seek reconciliation. These
commentaries also reduced the threat of the United States before the Chinese audience and made
their own country appear superior.
Nixon’s Media Campaign
In order to guarantee the success of his trip, Nixon started his own media campaign. First,
he had to deal with unrealistic illusions about it. In briefing Congressional leaders on July 19, he
cautioned against tying it to the solution in Vietnam. Press Secretary Ron Ziegler made similar
comments in his news briefing afterward.10
Moreover, Nixon asked Kissinger to explain the rationale of the new development in
communicating with the media. After his return from Asia, Kissinger held several news briefings
hosted by the White House or in the presidential jet from California to Washington. In those
briefings, he made very positive comments about his China experience and Zhou Enlai in
particular.11 In a memo, Nixon asked Kissinger to tell the press how he himself was “uniquely
prepared” for the meeting and how “ironically” he was similar to Zhou Enlai in terms of
personality and background in coming up through “adversity.”12
Nixon also changed his discourse on China. In a press conference on August 4, 1971, he
claimed that China could potentially become the “most powerful nation in the world” and that
there could be no world peace without communication between the “two great superpowers, the
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People’s Republic of China and the United States.”13 By elevating China to the status of a “super
power,” Nixon wanted to magnify the impact of his trip. Granting China such an equal status
could also unsettle the Soviet Union in the triangular relationship.
Nixon’s dramatic announcement of his China trip encouraged other countries to seek
diplomatic relations with Beijing, which directly affected the balance in the UN vote on China’s
membership. In fact, since the UN vote a year earlier when China’s entry won a simple majority
for the first time, the Nixon administration had envisioned that it would not be able to stop the
inevitable. The State Department proposed “dual representation,” which meant a shift from
stopping the entry of Beijing to fighting against Taiwan’s expulsion. Due to his concern for the
conservatives, Nixon still felt leery about announcing the policy shift. According to Kissinger,
Nixon prevented Rogers from announcing the policy in January, April, and June 1971.When
Kissinger met with Zhou Enlai in July, he got the impression that the UN seat was not Beijing’s
utmost concern and that it could continue to wait if conditions to enter was not favorable. Seeing
the positive response to his announcement of the China trip, Nixon became convinced that “the
price was manageable.” He then authorized Rogers to declare on August 2 that in the coming fall
at the General Assembly the United States would support the seating of China, but it would
oppose the expulsion of Taiwan. 14 In a conversation on September 30, 1971, Nixon and
Kissinger told U.S. Ambassador George Bush to “fight hard” to keep Taiwan in the UN. At the
same time, Nixon told Rogers that he did not want any “personal involvement” in the UN issue,
particularly when Washington was “working on” Beijing.15 Besides his consideration of the
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ongoing Sino-American reconciliation, Nixon was taking steps to disassociate himself from a
possible defeat.
The most important part of Nixon’s preparatory work was with the media. Washington
Post’s White House correspondent Carroll Kilpatrick said that Nixon “understood the press
better than Johnson did and he knew how to make news.”16 Early in his political career, Nixon
had learned about the power of the media in the Alger Hiss case, which not only brought him
national prominence but also made him the enemy of eastern liberals and particularly the eastern
media.17 Though Nixon despised most journalists and he believed that they hated him in return,
as a shrewd politician, he was well aware of the importance of their favorable coverage of his
trip, which he knew would place him in a unique position in history and would help him in his
re-election.18 Among different forms of the media, Nixon was particularly suspicious of the print
press. Living in an era when television had become widely available to ordinary Americans, he
knew well that television could help him reach a large number of people with far less physical
effort.19 In his “farewell” to the journalists in 1962, he declared, “Thank God for television and
radio for keeping the newspapers a little more honest.”20 After he became president, Nixon chose
to deliver his key messages through television speeches. As he told the press, “I think the
American people are entitled to see the President and to hear his views directly and not to see

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16

David Broder, Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News Is Made (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1987), 164-5.
17
Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 11.
18
Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: the Week that Changed the World (New York: Random House,
2007), 150-2.
19
Richard Nixon, In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1990), 123.
20
Joseph C. Spear, Presidents and the Press: The Nixon Legacy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 85.

!

!

190!

him through the press.”21 Kissinger said, “Television in front of the President is like alcohol in
front of an alcoholic.”22
John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs, described him as “usually
capable of a passionless and penetrating analysis of his press opportunities” and that he thought
“like an editor.”23 With his China trip, Nixon believed that “people” contact was more important
than meetings in terms of public relations. Before Kissinger’s interim trip in October, Nixon
asked him to raise the question of Pat Nixon’s going since he wanted her to act as a “prop” for
“good people pictures.” He also thought it was a good opportunity to convey to the American
audience the “human side of the Chinese.” He told his chief of staff Robert Haldeman, “On TV
the American President received by a million Chinese is worth a hundred times the effect of a
communiqué.”24
As a successful advertising man in Los Angeles and a tireless worker, Haldeman was not
only Nixon’s chief of staff, but also his chief “stage manager.” He shared Nixon’s suspicions of
the media and his consciousness of their role in public relations. Knowing well how to sell an
image, Haldeman wanted to make sure that Nixon “shone” as a great leader and statesman in
China.25 According to Kissinger, in the cabinet meeting upon his return from the secret trip to
China, what concerned Haldeman most was the “size of the press contingent.” He was
“disdainful” upon learning that Kissinger had not settled the issue with Zhou Enlai, especially
when Kissinger said that forty was enough, which was even less than the number of secret
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service people. As he said, “Haldeman saw no sense in making history if television was not there
to broadcast.”26
In order to guarantee the success of TV coverage, the White House worked, in the words
of the Post columnist Don Oberdorfer, “hand-in-glove” for several months to bring it about.
According to him, four days after Nixon’s announcement of his China trip on TV, the
Washington bureau chiefs of the three networks met with Press Secretary Ron Ziegler to talk
about coverage. The networks put forward three plans: film cameras only with footage to be
flown out of China and transmitted to the American audience via satellite from Tokyo, Seoul or
Hong Kong; film cameras only with footage transmitted directly from China via satellite through
a ground station in China; and live coverage with electronic cameras transmitting images directly
from a Chinese ground station. They pushed hard without hopes of success for the third choice-live coverage.27
During Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in October, he secured from Zhou Enlai the permission
to build ground stations in China. Zhou said he understood the equipment would be used to
“manage the whole show.”28 In early January when Kissinger’s deputy General Alexander Haig
and Ziegler led the advance team of eighteen into China, seven network executives and engineers
went along. Their job was to install the ground stations to be used for communication and live
transmission through satellites. During his talks with the Chinese, Haig emphasized the
importance of making Nixon’s trip a “visible success.” Travelling to Beijing, Shanghai, and
Hangzhou, the advance group literally traced every place Nixon planned to visit, paced every
step he might take, and worked on every camera angle.29
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The White House also gave extraordinary privileges to networks in allocating the seats of

correspondents who would travel to China. In the list of eighty-seven newsmen Ziegler
announced on February 7, 1972, only fifteen independent newspapers were invited and six went
to the two wire services. Three went to columnists Richard Wilson, William Buckley whom
Ziegler described as a “conservative,” and Joseph Kraft whom he depicted as a
“nonconservative.”30 Six slots went to magazines including Reader’s Digest, which did not
normally cover the White House but was friendly to Nixon.31 Each of the three networks could
send four correspondents. In addition to the eight seats for cameramen and seventeen for
television technicians, they received thirty-seven in total. This did not include the sixty television
technicians who had arrived in China earlier in the month. In the end, the networks each had
twenty-one seats while newspapers, magazines, and non-network broadcast organizations had
only one seat each--if they were lucky. In order to attend the festivities, many TV executives and
producers disguised themselves as “television technicians” bumping real engineers.32
Max Frankel, the only Times correspondent lucky to be on the press plane, talked about
the “massive competition” he faced when he arrived in China. As he wrote, “From the moment
we landed, I saw myself outgunned by cameras, so I labored to paint verbal pictures into
interpretive commentaries in ways that television could not match.”33 Frankel won a Pulitzer
Prize in 1973 for his reporting of Nixon’s epochal trip. The three networks also “scooped” the
print media when TV Guide reported a week in advance many details of Nixon’s plans, which the
newspapers were jealous of but had to employ in their own reports.34
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To deal with conservative fears of the betrayal of Taiwan, on February 9, a week before

his departure for China, Nixon reiterated in his State of the World message that the United States
would maintain its “friendship, diplomatic ties, and defense commitment” with Taiwan.35 Three
days before his departure, he ordered a further ease in Chinese trade restrictions whose effect, as
Ziegler told the media, would place China on an equal footing with the Soviet Union and East
European countries. Though Ziegler denied that the timing of the new trade action was
connected to Nixon’s forthcoming trip, his words that “we would hope that the People’s
Republic of China will be receptive to this step” was interpreted by both the Times and the Post
on their front pages as a move to “improve the political atmosphere” for the visit. In the press
briefing, Ziegler also referred to Nixon’s recent meeting with André Malraux, the celebrated
French author who had known Mao and Zhou since the 1930s 3%7! -37! E.8,! 6%,.126,,.%,!
;0%,3;,! B6,-! ,-.2! ,-10'<-! ,-.! ).314. Nixon had recommended his book “Anti-Memoirs” to
the journalists in his press conference on February 10, 1972. When he honored Malraux with a
small working dinner with many officials, Nixon invited ABC commentator Howard Smith to be
present.36 By showing the media how “diligently” he was preparing for the China trip, Nixon
was building the crescendo of his “show.”
Preparing the Chinese People for the New Relations
When Beijing made the decision to reconcile with its former number-one enemy, it took
great efforts to educate the Chinese people, who had been taught to hate the American
“imperialists,” about a new relationship. Beijing’s education was done at three different levels:
the internal channel of the Party institution, the semi-internal channel through the Reference
News, and its main propaganda machine--the People’s Daily.
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In order to reduce the shock to the Chinese people before the announcement of

Kissinger’s secret trip and Nixon’s visit, Beijing first informed the top leadership in the Party,
the government, and the military. On May 26, 1971, under Mao’s instructions, Zhou Enlai
explained to the CCP Politburo the rationale of Sino-American rapprochement. Stressing that the
decline of the United States and its desire to leave Vietnam had caused it to seek reconciliation
with China and that an improvement in Sino-American relations would be beneficial to the
struggle against “imperialist expansion and hegemonism,” to peace in Asia as well as in the
world, and to China’s security and the solution to its “unification problem” in a peaceful way,
Zhou pointed out that a successful opening might accelerate the “competition between the two
superpowers” and benefit China.37
Between May 27 and 31, the central government convened a national conference on
foreign affairs, where Zhou Enlai suggested that the attendees should adapt to the new situation
when China would renew its contact with the world and receive people from “the left, the center,
and the right.” 38 On May 31, the Central Committee, with Mao’s approval, ordered the
distribution of the minutes of Mao’s interview with Edgar Snow to the party’s bottom branches
and that it be “verbally related to every party member.” It also ordered, “the study of the
interview should be carefully organized so that the spirit of the chairman’s words will be
correctly comprehended.”39 On June 4, Zhou Enlai read the “Report of the CCP’s Politburo on
Sino-American Talks” at a working conference attended by two hundred and twenty–five
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officials from different levels.40 After the joint announcement of Nixon’s visit, the CCP on July
21 issued a confidential document to local party branches, explaining that the chairman himself
had invited Nixon and that it was “another tactic in the struggle against imperialism.”41 These
measures aimed to make sure that rank-and-file party members understood Mao’s decision.
On August 17, 1971, the People’s Daily published a front-page article entitled “A
Powerful Weapon to Unite the People and Defeat the Enemy--On Policy.” The article called for
a study of Mao’s 1940 article “On Policy,” which argued for cooperating with the Nationalists in
fighting the Japanese. By referring to this “united-front” policy, the editorial implied that
reconciliation with the United States was a tactic to deal with the more threatening Soviet Union.
The second level of education was through the internal newspaper--the Reference News,
which was the only source for most Chinese cadres and intellectuals to learn about foreign
affairs, especially the status of the Sino-American reconciliation. In July 1970, before Snow
started visiting China, Mao had ordered the most dramatic expansion in the circulation of the
Reference News so that it could be read by all local party branches in factory workshops, village
production teams, PLA companies, and among college students. He even suggested putting the
Reference News on public bulletin boards so that everyone could read it. As a result, its
circulation increased from 400,000 in 1964 to around five million in 1970.42 At the working
conference on foreign affairs in May 1971, Zhou Enlai said, “After his meeting with Chairman
Mao, Snow published articles, which had been read all over the world. We should reprint their
excepts in the Reference News. If the current circulation of four to five million is not enough, we
can add a million more copies.” His point was that every local party branch should have
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Reference News, from which the cadres could learn about the chairman’s assessment of the
international situation.43 The arrangement greatly enlarged the impact of the Reference News. By
educating more people about the international situation, Beijing made it easier for them to
understand its ongoing rapprochement with the United States.
Between May and June 1971, the Reference News published on its front pages six articles
written by Snow. On June 19, it ran a special notice that read, “From June 17, this newspaper
publishes American friend Edgar Snow’s articles about his China trip one piece every other day.
Readers, please pay attention.” It also reprinted an article from Life magazine carrying Nixon’s
remark to Time that he would like to visit China.44 The publication of these inside stories in the
Reference News attracted so much attention in China that the readers’ demand could still not be
met even though many of its local offices printed copies far above the quota. As it turned out,
instead of one million more copies required by Zhou, two and a half million more copies were
printed.45 Before Kissinger’s secret visit in July 1971, millions of Chinese had learned that Nixon
wanted to visit China and that Mao was willing to meet with him.
To educate the largest number of Chinese about the new relations with the United States,
Beijing conducted “people-to-people” diplomacy, which was based on a separation of the
“heroic” or “revolutionary” American people from the “imperialistic” or “oppressive” American
government.46 By displaying American visitors to the Chinese people through public ceremonies,
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banquets, and the intensive coverage of the Chinese media, especially the People’s Daily, the
Chinese government promoted the friendship between the two peoples.
Beijing’s “people-to-people” diplomacy started with Edgar Snow. During his stay in
China, Snow felt like a “symbol to be paraded” by the Chinese who arranged him to attend so
many banquets and ceremonies that he had no real chance to talk to people long enough to learn
anything.47 During his interview with Snow on December 18, 1970, Mao questioned the policy
of not allowing Americans to visit China and said that the Foreign Ministry should study the
issue of inviting Americans from the “left, middle, and right.” On 17 February 1971, when the
Foreign Ministry’s report reached his desk, Mao approved it.48
After the celebrated Ping-Pong Diplomacy, Beijing invited several American delegations
to China. Though the People’s Daily claimed that the Chinese People’s Association for
Friendship with Foreign Countries, a non-governmental organization, made these invitations, its
official nature was not hard to discern. Its head Wang Guoquan was the former Chinese
Ambassador to Poland, who had been involved in talking with the Americans in Warsaw during
the Johnson Administration.49
The People’s Daily provided no information on the identity or occupation of these
visitors and simply addressed them as “American friends” or “American visitors of goodwill.” A
closer look, however, reveals that many of these people were either leftists who had been victims
during the McCarthy era or activists of the Civil Rights movement. For example, there was John
Service and Koji Ariyoshi, both of whom were members of the Dixon Mission, a group of State
Department officials who had worked with the Communists at their headquarter in Yan’an in the
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1940s. William Hinton, a Marxist journalist and vocal China sympathizer who lost his job during
the McCarthy Era, stayed in China for seven months with his wife. During their stay, Zhou
Enalai met with them five times and all meetings were placed on the front pages of the People’s
Daily. There were also members of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars and radical
students who supported the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Beijing invited as well African
American delegations whose “revolutionary struggle” had been applauded in the Chinese media.
They included the Black Worker’s Congress, the Black Panthers, and prominent communist
activists like Bill Epton. The Hintons and the three leaders of the Black Panthers were treated as
state leaders when they were invited to attend the National Day reception hosted by Zhou Enlai
in 1971.50 Admitting Americans that had been “friendly” to China was good for Beijing because
these people were more likely to write positively about China when they returned home.
The People’s Daily’s coverage of these delegations had a common pattern. Neither
revealing the contents of the meetings nor elaborating on their significance, it focused on
apolitical news such as their tour itineraries. For every American delegation, there were separate
news entries covering its arrival or departure when the visitor(s) were received or seen off at the
airport or train station by Chinese officials. Though these delegations were non-governmental in
nature, Zhou Enlai actually met with almost every one of them irrespective of their numbers.
Stories of Zhou’s meeting with the American visitors, usually with photos taken, were placed on
prominent places in the People’s Daily. The frequency of coverage was also increased by the fact
that Zhou Enlai met with several Americans together after receiving them individually. As a
result of this intensive coverage, there was news about American visitors in China in the
People’s Daily every few days, especially during the second half of 1971. At one time during
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September and October, there were three or four such stories on a single day. The intensive
coverage of so many American visitors in the official newspaper cultivated among the Chinese a
friendly atmosphere between the two peoples.
Beijing’s people-to-people diplomacy also included its working on U.S. media when it
allowed U.S. journalists into China after Ping-Pong Diplomacy. According to Seymour Topping,
managing editor of the Times, when he, along with William Attwood of Newsday and Robert
Keatley of the Wall Street Journal, attended a dinner hosted by Zhou Enlai in June 1971, the
Chinese Premier expressed his belief that American journalists could help to “mobilize their
fellow countrymen to bring about the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan and
Indochina.” Topping perceived Beijing’s effort to “court” American public opinion to realize its
foreign-policy aims.51
After Beijing opened the door to American journalists in April 1971, it treated the New
York Times with special privileges. As stated in the last chapter, chief of the Hong Kong Bureau
Tillman Durbin had been the first American newsman to receive a visa to report in China. Both
Durdin and Topping were old China hands who had reported extensively from the country before
the Communist victory in 1949.52 Max Frankel claimed that the reputation of the Times had been
established because Topping had married Audrey Ronning, whose father Chester Ronning had
been the chargé d'affaires of the Canadian embassy in China between 1949 and 1951 and an “old
friend” of Zhou Enlai.53 When talking about foreign-news coverage of China, the Reference
News especially noted that the number of China stories in the Times increased to five times since
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Ping-Pong Diplomacy.54 Beijing must have been impressed by the influence of the Times and
especially its generally favorable coverage of China.
In May 1971, James Reston became the third Times journalist to receive a visa to enter
China. Upon his entrance from Hong Kong, the Reference News ran a special entry introducing
him as “an influential figure in the American journalistic as well as the political circles” with
“close connections” to the U.S. government.55 When he got in Beijing, Reston developed an
acute appendicitis and underwent surgery in the Anti-Imperialist Hospital. As soon as he
recovered, Reston published on the front page of the Times an article elaborating on how well he
was treated as Zhou Enlai had sent eleven leading medical experts to work on his case, which
was not a major surgery. Reston also catered to the imagination of Americans by writing in
length about how the Chinese doctor treated his pain with acupuncture, a traditional Chinese
therapy that many Americans considered mysterious.56
Reston also received the honor of an official interview with Zhou Enlai on August 9,
1971. In the interview, Zhou expressed his admiration for the Times because it criticized Nixon’s
invasion of Cambodia a year earlier. Reston was proud of the position of his newspaper. When
Zhou Enlai praised Nixon’s courage to visit China, Reston did not give him much
acknowledgement. While admitting that Nixon’s trend of thought on Vietnam and China was
“bold and even right,” Reston criticized his lack of “clarity and definition and boldness” to cut
the killing in Indochina and to normalize relations with China. When Zhou expressed his desire
to see the solution of the Indochina conflict before the Taiwan issue, Reston’s position was, “We
cannot resolve the problems in the world without China… but we can resolve the problems of the
world without Taiwan.” Reston also commented on Nixon’s personality as a Californian and his
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ambition to get reelected so that he could “preside over the 200th anniversary of the Declaration
of Independence.” He described the “Nixon turnaround” as simply a “personal redemption” by
which he attempted to repair the damage he had done to Sino-American relations as the alleged
chief “red-baiter.” After publishing the interview transcripts, the Times optimistically ran an
article entitled “Chou’s Views Encouraged U.S. Aides.”57 Haldeman, however, claimed in his
diaries that Nixon viewed the interview as evidence that the Times was attempting to “sabotage”
his trip. According to him, Nixon became so furious that he wanted every White House official
to enforce his rule that no one should talk to the Times people and even threatened not to take
them on his China trip.58 Reston’s case demonstrated the uneasy relationship between Nixon and
the influential Times. It also revealed that despite its approval of the president’s tactics, the Times
did not completely support his foreign policy.
During his three-week stay in China, Reston wrote several columns and commentaries
that presented favorable impressions of China. In one of his “Letters from China” series, Reston
vividly described the atmosphere after Ping-Pong Diplomacy. As he wrote, “The routine of life
for an American visitor in China these days is full of paradox. For example, you live in an
atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda, but are treated with unfailing
personal courtesy and are free to cable your impressions without censorship from the lobby of
your hotel.”59 Reston’s stories of China were so positive that the Reference News reprinted many
of them.60 Zhou Enlai’s effort in winning over prominent U.S. opinion shapers like James Reston
and his newspaper seemed to have paid off.
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The Lin Biao Incident and Kissinger’s Interim Trip
While the two countries were preparing for Nixon’s China trip, a political drama--the Lin
Biao Incident--occurred and at one time it seemed to call into question the Beijing summit. What
happened on the night of September 13,1971, whether Lin Biao had plotted Mao’s assassination
and fled or he was ignorant of the plot and had been forced away by his wife and son, remains a
mystery. One certain thing was that after their plane took off, it crashed in Mongolia with no
survivors. The death of Lin Biao caused an earthquake in Chinese politics. That very night, Zhou
Enlai ordered the grounding of all planes in China for three days. Lin Biao’s closest four
generals Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo--who occupied the most
important posts in the Chinese military and were members of the Politburo--were all arrested. Ye
Jiangying, one of the four respected marshals who had studied the international situation during
the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, became the new head of the Chinese military. Lin Biao’s
death also dealt a severe psychological and physical blow to Mao, who was bedridden for a long
time thereafter. As a result, Beijing decided to cancel the National Day parade at Tiananmen
Square for that year.61
The unusual military movements, the disappearance of so many top members of the
Politburo from public view, and particularly Beijing’s unprecedented cancellation of the National
Day parade caused wide speculation around the world that a major political crisis might be
occurring in China.62 As the closest ally of Mongolia, Moscow knew more about the incident. On
the eve of the Chinese National Day, Tass embarrassed Beijing by publishing the story of nine
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people killed in a Chinese jet crash well inside Mongolia on the night of September 12-13
without releasing their identities.63 The Soviet story added further to the mystery.
Without knowing exactly what happened, U.S. media offered all sorts of speculation.
There were rumors that Mao might have been dead or dying and that a power struggle over his
succession was going on in Beijing. There was also the possibility that China and Moscow were
on the verge of war and even the story that State Chairman Liu Shaoqi might have escaped.64
The upheavals in China raised the concern about the stability of China and Nixon’s China
trip thus came under question. The Post argued that the “mysterious events” had shattered
China’s image of stability displayed in Ping-Pong Diplomacy. Its concern for Nixon’s visit could
be shown in Joseph Kraft’s column “Portents from China,” and headlines like “China
Uncertainty Clouds Nixon Visit Plans” and “China Events Raise U.S. Concern.”65 A Times
editorial speculated that the political crisis in Beijing could have been precipitated by the
invitation to Nixon and it worried whether the moderate forces led by Zhou Enlai could prevail
over the radical forces if there was indeed a power struggle.66 On October 2, Secretary of State
Rogers told the media that he hoped what occurred in China did not “signal any change in the
possibility of the President’s visit.” His use of the word “possibility” raised further uncertainties.
Both the Times and the Post regarded his statement as Washington’s first official expression of
concern. The Times interpreted it as an indication that “political changes in Peking could make it
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impossible for President Nixon to carry out his planned visit.” U.S. officials later explained that
Rogers’ use of the word “possibility” had no special significance.67
Despite the concern of American newspeople, communications between Beijing and
Washington on Nixon’s visit continued. Kissinger also thought that the political crisis might
have been caused by the sharp turn in China’s policy toward the United States, but he pointed out
that Chinese officials never mentioned Lin Biao and U.S. officials never asked.68
During Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing, the two sides had agreed to set up direct
communications in Paris through U.S. military attaché Lieutenant-General Vernon Walters and
Ambassador Huang Chen. On important matters, he would personally go to Paris to meet with
Huang under the cover of negotiating with representatives from Hanoi. Kissinger met with
Huang three times between July and September. In their meeting on September 13, Kissinger
said he preferred to announce the date of his interim trip on September 21 because it was before
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s planned visit to Washington, during which they
would probably decide on a date for Nixon’s visit to Moscow. He did not want the
announcement of his trip to China to look like a reaction to Gromyko’s visit.69
On September 23, Huang informed Walters that his government could not agree on the
date because of Bush’s submission of a “two-China” proposal to the UN one day earlier.
However, Huang agreed to announce the trip on October 5. What was remarkable, as Walters
pointed out, was that Huang put his arm around his shoulder when saying goodbye.70 The rapport
between officials of the two governments in Paris showed that the Lin Biao Incident did not
change Beijing’s decision for rapprochement. To some extent, the incident intensified Beijing’s
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feeling of vulnerability. It did not want other powers, particularly the Soviet Union, to take
advantage of it. Therefore, the continuation of the Sino-American accommodation served
Beijing’s interests.
On October 5, Kissinger personally showed up with Press Secretary Ron Ziegler when
the latter announced his interim trip. His appearance not only added weight to the announcement,
but also reassured worried newspeople. Both the Times and the Post ran headlines and editorials
to elaborate on the steady relationship between Beijing and Washington. The Times was so
relieved that “the party line now is that there was never any uncertainty.” Stanley Karnow, the
Post’s chief China watcher, wrote a column entitled “Kissinger Trip Reflects Accord.71
When Kissinger went to Beijing in late October, he was deeply impressed by Beijing’s
commitment to improving relations. On his arrival, he noticed several anti-American slogans on
the city walls. When he asked Zhou Enlai about those slogans, Zhou said that was just “firing
empty cannon.” On the day when he left Beijing, Kissinger noticed that many of the antiAmerican slogans had gone or had been freshly painted over.72
The other thing that impressed Kissinger was Beijing’s effort to get its people
“accustomed to” the idea that their government was dealing with a senior U.S. official in a
friendly manner. He noticed that about 500 officials were present when his party watched a
“revolutionary” performance of the Beijing Opera and that crowds of Chinese spectators looked
on when he toured the historical sites in Beijing. His impression was that Marshall Ye and acting
Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei “saw to it” that they could be “properly displayed together” before
the Chinese people. One of the most remarkable scenarios happened when they were having tea
together aboard a boat in the lake of the Summer Palace “in plain view of literally hundreds of
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Chinese spectators.” As Kissinger wrote, “The fact that a strong, cold wind was blowing (on an
otherwise perfect day) did not deter our hosts; they clearly wanted this boatride to take place and
only a hurricane could have prevented it. When I waved to the crowds of people on the shore,
they clapped loudly.”73
Kissinger’s second trip to Beijing was indeed given much publicity in the Chinese media.
Besides prominent coverage of his arrival and departure, the People’s Daily also published large
photos of his meetings with Chinese officials. In reporting Kissinger’s departure, it even
mentioned that he had visited tourist sites and watched theatrical shows amid the negotiations.
Upon his departure, the two governments issued a joint communiqué, which especially
emphasized that preparations for Nixon’s trip have been “proceeding exceedingly well.” 74
Beijing wanted to show the world how its normal diplomatic activities, especially the SinoAmerican rapprochement, had not been disrupted despite worldwide speculation about its
internal politics.
Another thing worth noting was how Marshal Ye Jiangying figured prominently in the
People’s Daily’s coverage of Kissinger’s trip. Ye not only led the party that received and saw off
Kissinger at the airport, but also attended all meetings between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. In the
published group photo, Ye stood on one side of Kissinger while Zhou Enlai stood on the other.75
As Snow pointed out, “Nothing the Chinese leaders publicly do is without purpose.”76 John
Holdridge, Kissinger’s aide who accompanied him on both his China trips in 1971, argued that
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the public appearance of Marshal Ye with Kissinger informed the Chinese audience that the PLA
supported Sino-American rapprochement.77
The publication of Kissinger’s photos with Chinese officials in the People’s Daily
attracted the attention of U.S. media. Both NBC and the Times displayed the photos in their news
stories. As the Post claimed, even though the Chinese audience had grown “accustomed in recent
months seeing their leaders pose with groups of visiting Americans,” it was the first time the
Chinese official press published photos of American officials with the Chinese. The Times
pointed out that their publication in the People’s Daily meant they would also appear in
newspapers all over China, which showed that Beijing wanted its people to know about the
positive developments in Sino-American relations.78
China’s Admission into the UN
Before Kissinger’s return from China, the United States had suffered what the Times
called a “crushing defeat” in the United Nations on October 25. After the American proposal to
make Taiwan’s expulsion an “important matter” was defeated by 59 to 55, an Albanian
resolution that called for China’s admission and Taiwan’s expulsion won by the large margin of
76 to 35. All NATO members except Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg, voted against the
United States.79
U.S. media sympathized with Taiwan. In the ABC story, Nationalist representatives
received applause of sympathy when they walked out of the General Assembly before the vote
on their expulsion. NBC played the last speech of the Nationalist ambassador to the UN. All
three networks featured the wild reception from representatives from countries that supported
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China. In a nice touch, they also showed pictures of vacant seats and the flag post waiting for
Chinese representatives.80 On the front page of the Times, a picture of China supporters clapping
hands over their victory was contrasted with a picture of Nationalist representatives walking out
of the General Assembly. The Post had a picture of Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai
listening to the debate with a stern face. Both newspapers also reported that Senator James L.
Buckley (R-NY), who reacted sharply, proposed in Congress for “a major reduction” in the
American financial contribution to the UN. Both of them deplored the “injustice” to Taiwan and
the dangerous precedent of expelling a “member state” in their editorials. The two newsweeklies
featured Zhou Enlai on their covers with “The Chinese are Coming” as the headlines of their
accounts.81
Though the Nixon administration felt obliged to address the domestic sentiment over
Taiwan’s expulsion, it did not want to create an anti-China impression. In their public
statements, administration officials reiterated how the government had tried hard to keep Taiwan
in the UN, but their condemnation mainly focused on the expulsion and the behavior of small
states, instead of the vote. In an official response, William Rogers appearing on TV, accepted
“the will of majority” and welcomed the admission of China, but he emphasized that Washington
and its co-sponsors had made “an all-out effort” to keep Taiwan in the UN. In order to appeal to
conservatives, he said that the administration was not opposed to a reduction in UN allocations
because it might be spending too much and “living beyond its sources.”82 In a press briefings two
days after the UN vote, Ron Ziegler told reporters that the President condemned the joyful
response of the delegates after the UN vote as a “shocking demonstration” and “undisguised
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glee” and “personal animosity” toward American policy. Calling it “offensive and undignified,”
he said the President felt that it “could very seriously impair support for the United Nations in
the country and in Congress.” Nixon’s condemnation of the “glee” successfully made headlines
in the Times and the Post.83
In their editorials, both the Times and the Post criticized the Nixon administration for
playing to the irrationality of conservatives and called on the country to move ahead with the
Beijing dialogues. The Post called retaliation against the U.N. “petty and vindictive” and
criticized Rogers for “hardly discouraging” those in Congress who were bent on reducing the
U.S. contribution. It argued that the consensus should be “that it was past time to begin pursuing
a policy of realistic accommodation with Peking--a policy whose most intense advocate these
days is the U.S.” Similarly, the Times argued that since the issue had been finally settled, it was a
“height of folly” to retaliate against the U.N. and that the solution of China’s UN membership
problem might “not be unhealthy in the long run” because it might give Washington a chance to
improve its relations with its friends and allies. James Reston claimed that Nixon had “more
flexibility” on the world stage than he had before.84
The two newspapers also understood Nixon’s approach. The Post pointed out that the
White House had left Rogers to make explanations “in an apparent effort to keep the President’s
personal prestige separated from the voting setback.” In an article entitled “Crushing Defeat …
or a Blessing in Disguise,” the Times maintained that Nixon had “put on a calculated display of
anger--however genuine his anger may have been--with the primary object of deflecting from
himself the sense of outrage in Congress and on the right.” It also pointed out that after all Nixon
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still had his major “political assets intact” on his road to Beijing and the 1972 election.85 When
U.S. publications condemned the U.N. for expelling Taiwan, they never mentioned the fact that
the Nationalists did not accept the two-China idea either, which meant the admission of
Mainland China might have caused the departure of Taiwan, even had the UN wanted it to stay.
Another measure the Nixon administration took to deflate criticism was to coordinate
Kissinger’s second trip. In order to avoid the impression that his success in Beijing had caused
the American defeat in the UN, Kissinger not only asked Bush to deliver his UN speech after his
departure for Beijing, but also delayed his return at the request of Nixon so that he could arrive
home after the UN vote.86 In the press briefing upon his return, Kissinger described the timing of
the UN vote during his stay in China as a “painful experience.” Emphasizing that the visit had
been planned during his last trip, he especially reiterated that it “did not affect the outcome of the
U.N. decision.”87
Nixon’s tactic of delaying Kissinger’s return from China seemed to pay off. On the same
front page where Nixon’s denunciation of the delegates’ “glee” was reported, large photos of
Kissinger with Zhou Enlai appeared in the two newspapers, which were thrilled because that was
the first time when officials of the United States and China posed together for a photo shoot. In
an article entitled “China: a Stinging Victory,” Time placed a picture of the Nationalist
Ambassador walking out from the UN together with the one with Zhou Enlai and Kissinger.88
The agenda quickly shifted from the UN to the Sino-American dialogue.
After Kissinger’s October trip to Beijing, the two governments worked on a communiqué
announcing the exact date of Nixon’s visit. On November 18, Ambassador Huang Chen told
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Walters that his government wanted to change the announcement date from November 23 to 30
because it was not “opportune” to make such an announcement when “the chief of government
from a neighboring state” was visiting China. When Walters offered to guess that it was North
Vietnam, Huang slapped him on the back and said, “You guessed right for the first time.” In his
memo, Walters wrote, “all of the foregoing was washed down with jasmine tea and accompanied
by the now usual friendly pats on the arm and back.”89 The rapport between officials in Paris
suggested that the Chinese leadership no longer regarded the United States as its archenemy.
When North Vietnamese premier Pham Von Dong visited China between November 20
and 27, 1971, Beijing launched an enormous propaganda campaign to highlight the “solidarity”
between the two communist “comrades and brothers.” The People’s Daily devoted extensive and
prominent coverage to Vietnam with front-page stories, pictures, and editorials and published an
unusually long communiqué between the two governments at the end of Pham’s visit. Three days
after Pham left, the People’s Daily announced Nixon’s visit with only one sentence placed on the
very bottom of the front page, “The governments of the People’s Republic and China and the
United States of America have agreed that President Nixon’s visit to China would start on
February 21, 1972.”90 Beijing’s public enthusiasm for the visit of the North Vietnamese and the
“low profile” it gave to the communiqué showed its effort to hold together its ideological friends
who were hostile to the United States.
On February 15, 1972, a week before Nixon started his China tour, Edgar Snow died of
cancer in Switzerland. The People’s Daily made a big deal of the death of “a friend of the
Chinese people” by publishing on its front page official condolences from Mao and his wife
Jiang Qing, Zhou Enlai and his wife Deng Yingchao, and Madam Sun Yat-sun who was the vice
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state chairman. In addition to the story that Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing had attended a memorial
service in Beijing, Snow received the tribute paid to the head of a state. In his published
cablegram of condolence to Mrs. Snow, Zhou called Snow a “witness” of good friendship
between the two peoples and expressed his strong belief that “the friendship that Snow had
dedicated his whole life to would definitely grow.”91
American newspapers and networks also gave Snow’s death prominent attention. All
three networks covered the story. Both the Times and the Post ran Snow’s photos with Mao on
their front pages and called attention to the “unique tribute” Chinese leaders paid to him in their
official media. The Times pointed out that Zhou Enlai had sent a medical team of three doctors
and a nurse to attend to Snow when he failed to “rally from” his surgery on his spleen. Moreover,
it posted a special editorial that praised Snow as a “first class journalist” who had played an
important role in maintaining the “tenuous link” between the Chinese leaders and the United
States.92 By extending special privileges to Edgar Snow, Beijing again highlighted the friendship
between the two peoples through the media.
The Show in Beijing
After several months of preparation, Nixon set out for China on February 17, 1972. All
three networks stopped their regular programming to cover live his farewell ceremony on the
South Lawn of the White House. The front pages of the Times and the Post both featured
pictures of Nixon and his wife waving good-bye in front of their helicopter.93 After stopping in
Haiwai and Guam for two days, Nixon’s party set off for Shanghai, where they made a brief
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stop, picking up Chinese navigators and flew to Beijing. On February 20, Nixon’s plane, the
“Spirit of 76,” landed at the Beijing airport. In the middle of cameras and spotlights, Nixon
walked down from the plane and stepped forward to shake Zhou Enlai’s waiting hand. This
moment became the main story in the media around the world the next day. According to
Kissinger, Nixon and Haldeman wanted to make sure the president would be alone for the
television cameras in his first encounter with Zhou Enlai. He and Rogers had been instructed
several times that they were to stay on the plane until the historic handshake between Nixon and
Zhou had been accomplished. Notwithstanding the instructions, Haldeman did not want to leave
anything to chance. A burly aide blocked the aisle of the presidential plane when the moment
came.94
To the dismay of U.S. reporters, only a few dozen Chinese officials and five hundred
honor guards showed up at the airport. When CBS’s Charles Collingwood in New York asked
Walter Cronkite whether there was an air of excitement in Beijing, Cronkite did not think so.
NBC’s Barbara Walters found an “air of disappointment.” NBC’s Edwin Newman commented
that Zhou Enlai’s handshake with Nixon “did seem to be a cordial” one.95 James Thomson Jr., a
China hand in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and a Harvard professor who worked as
ABC’s commentator on the Nixon trip, said the receiving ceremony was “low key, but very, very
serious.” Harry Reasoner, the ABC anchor in Beijing, did not think Beijing tried to downplay its
importance considering the presence of a number of high-level Chinese officials and the
involvement of the PLA at the reception. The Times reported that Nixon received a “quiet
greeting,” which was “studiously correct but minimally official.” It speculated that it was
probably because the two governments had no diplomatic relations yet. The Post pointed out the
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“lack of fanfare” which was in sharp contrast to receptions accorded to other foreign visitors,
such as Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who was greeted by 300,000 Chinese citizens when
he arrived a year earlier.96
Despite the low profile of the reception, the images at the airport were still powerful. For
example, when the People’s Liberation Army band played the Star-Spangled Banner, James
Thomson noted that it had been a while since it was last played in China. Reasoner echoed
Thomson and said that it was a “startling moment.” Talking about the Zhou-Nixon handshake,
Thomson referred to the Geneva Conference in 1954 when John Foster Dulles refused to shake
hands with Zhou. Interestingly, when Howard K. Smith criticized China because of its troop
maneuvers in the capital, the rumor that China shipped luxurious cars from Hong Kong to
prepare for Nixon’s visit, and the three Americans still imprisoned in China, Thomson brushed
aside those negative comments and expressed high hopes for the coming summit. Thomson also
keenly noted that the appearance of Marshal Ye Jianying behind Zhou Enlai in receiving Nixon
showed that the military and the civilian branches were still “holding together.”97 Thomson
shared an “Emmy” award with the ABC news team for his ten-day service as a television
commentator during Nixon’s visit.98
The Chinese government did not set up the exact date when Nixon would meet with Mao.
As soon as Nixon arrived at his residence, Mao became so excited that he told Zhou that he
wanted to meet with the president right away. Winston Lord, Kissinger’s aide who attended the
meeting, thought the arrangement was a “typical Chinese example” where the Emperor kept
visitors on edge. Nevertheless, Nixon was so thrilled that he rushed to the meeting with
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Kissinger and Lord without bringing William Rogers who, as the Secretary of State, should have
been present at the summit but in whom the president had little confidence. The one-hour
meeting happened behind closed doors. Only Xinhua News Agency was allowed in briefly for
photo shooting. Before the Chinese media released photos of the meeting, Kissinger asked them
to cut off the much lower ranking Lord in order not to embarrass Rogers.99 Nixon later told
Haldeman how he was impressed during the meeting when “at one point Mao reached over,
talking, and grabbed my hand and held it for more than a minute while he made his point.”
Feeling that scene was significant, Nixon was especially happy that the Chinese film crew
covered it.100 After the Nixon-Mao meeting, Ron Ziegler announced it to the journalists. Though
he simply said that the conversation was “frank and serious” when asked for details, the photos
and black-and-white film of Nixon with Mao became major stories in the United States. Under a
big picture of the Mao-Nixon meeting on its front-page, the Post described it as “Mao’s apparent
endorsement of an eventual improvement in Sino-American ties.”101 This statement would have
pleased Nixon because it would silence conservatives who were worried that Nixon might be
slighted in China.
On the night of Nixon’s arrival, Zhou Enlai hosted a state banquet. On television,
American audiences could see how Nixon clinked cups with Zhou Enlai and other Chinese
officials with the national flags of the two countries on display together and the PLA band
playing “Home on the Range “and” America the Beautiful” in the background. As Nixon was
delivering his toast, the CBS camera offered a long close-up of the Chinese premier so that the
American audience could have a better look at him.102 Nixon’s remarking “Let us start a long
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march together” was widely quoted in the media.103 When he reviewed the news summaries with
Haldeman before they went to bed that night, Nixon was extremely pleased with the coverage
and especially happy because they got all the images he wanted, such as his use of chopsticks,
his toast as well as Zhou Enlai’s, and their glass-clinking. Nixon also told Haldeman that when
he clinked Zhou’s glass, the Chinese Premier said he had the band play “America the Beautiful”
because it was played at Nixon’s first inaugural. Assuming that was one of his favorite songs,
Zhou offered it to Nixon as a toast to his next inaugural.104
As Ron Ziegler told a UPI correspondent, Nixon’s trip was indeed a “picture story.”
There were no regular news briefings and the correspondents had no important news to cover
except when the Nixons went sightseeing or Pat Nixon visited Chinese citizens and their families
at a model farm, in a kitchen, kindergarten, or factory. While Nixon’s closed-door conversations
with Zhou Enlai were totally kept from the media, the Chinese arranged image-makers and photo
opportunities so that they would be transmitted home via satellite and played at “prime-time
viewing hours.”105 For an entire week from February 18, the front pages of newspapers ran
photos following Nixon’s itinerary until his return to Washington. The magazines, though
published after his return, both used the trip as their cover stories and similarly offered many
photographs.106 Nixon’s trip commanded live broadcasting, often in prime time, and the lion’s
share of the evening news during the week.
The Chinese media expressed qualified enthusiasm for Nixon’s visit. The day after
Nixon’s arrival, the People’s Daily on its front page featured several large photos of Nixon’s
meeting with Mao and Zhou Enlai. Several U.S. news agencies, newspapers and networks
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included, picked this front page as a highlight in their stories. As they reported, the People’s
Daily had caused a “sensation” in Beijing and was sold out within a few hours when throngs of
people crowded the newsstands.107 They were deeply impressed by Beijing’s effort to publicize
Nixon’s visit.
Beijing might have felt that the “unusual” coverage of Nixon’s first day in China had
caused too much world excitement. In the days that followed, readers of the People’s Daily
witnessed a subtle change. Photos of Nixon’s activities remained on the front pages, but they
became smaller and were placed in less prominent places below stories of domestic matters.
Interestingly, while U.S. media ran pictures showing the warm interpersonal relations between
the leaders, such as the Nixon-Zhou toast, Nixon’s handshake with ordinary Chinese in
Hangzhou, and especially his offer to help the Chinese premier with his coat,108 the People’s
Daily coverage was more of an official and ceremonial nature, ignoring the “personal”
dimensions in the exchanges. As Kissinger said, Beijing faced “a philosophical crisis, torn
between the imperatives of Realpolitik and the dictates of ideology.”109
The Reference News provided more political insights than the People’s Daily. It covered
the world response to Nixon’s planned trip to China and the China craze it caused in the United
States, U.S. preparatory work including advance-team activities in China and media allocation,
how Americans watched Nixon’s tour on TV, and their response to the Shanghai Communiqué.
It also reprinted many stories about how Nixon was “diligently” studying the history and culture
of China. More importantly, it reprinted the full text of many of Nixon’s TV and radio
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announcements and his interviews with the media. While the People’s Daily covered Nixon’s
tour with pictures and brief introductions to the itinerary, the Reference News printed in detail his
talks with the press when he visited tourist sites. It also mentioned the picture that showed Nixon
helping Zhou with his coat.110 Beijing wanted its cadres to know more about Nixon and his
China policy. These details in the Reference News revealed how Beijing valued the trip.
In covering the opponents to Nixon’s visit, the Reference News seemed to be more
objective or comprehensive than the two U.S. newspapers in some respects. In January and
February of 1972, for example, it reported twice on Carl McIntire, a minister in the Bible
Presbyterian Church sympathetic to the Nationalists, who announced his plan to organize
demonstrations in eighteen American cities to protest Nixon’s toast with “murders and slave
owners.”111 Interestingly, neither the Times nor the Post covered the activities of the reverend
during that period, perhaps because he was an obscure critic on the right fringe. Another
interesting thing was that when Henry Winston and Gus Hall, the Secretary and Chairman of the
Communist Party of the United States attacked Nixon’s China trip as a “cover” for his Vietnam
War, the Reference News branded them as “revisionists.”112 Obviously, Beijing did not regard
the American communists’ attack on the Nixon trip as friendly actions considering that the party
was a Soviet appendage. The newspaper seemed to be trying to find opposition to show how
difficult the demarche was for Nixon.
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The Shanghai Communiqué
Nixon’s visit to China concluded with a joint communiqué announced in Shanghai on
February 27. During Kissinger’s visit in October 1971, the two sides had decided that the
communiqué would state their agreements to move toward normalization of relations, to reduce
the danger of military conflict, and their commitment not to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific
regions and to oppose other countries who might try to establish such “hegemony,” which had
become the new code word for “Soviet expansionism.” With regard to issues with ideological
differences such as Indochina, Korea, Japan, and the Indian-Pakistan conflict, they agreed that
each side would state their own positions. While Beijing would express its commitment to
support for “revolutions and national liberation movements” around the world, Washington
would reiterate its support for people around the world in their “pursuit of personal freedom and
social progress free from outside interference.” However, Taiwan remained a “thorny” problem
because it involved principles on both sides. While Washington had to deal with a strong
domestic sentiment for the island and a commitment in the form of the mutual security treaty of
1955, Beijing regarded Taiwan and its unification with the mainland as issues of sovereignty.
When Nixon arrived in Beijing, the two sides still differed on the wording about Taiwan. The
Chinese side wanted the U.S. acknowledgment that Taiwan was a “province” of China and its
commitment to withdraw all forces from the island unconditionally. Washington could go no
further than to describe the withdrawal as an “objective” and needed conditions attached to it.113
When the Nixons went sightseeing, Kissinger was still bargaining with Chinese Deputy
Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. At one time the negotiations reached a deadlock and even Zhou
Enlai joined in temporarily. Kissinger explained to him that Washington could not made
“unconditional commitments” and that the communiqué had to be “explicable” or “defensible” to
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the American public. His proposal was to link the “final withdrawal from Taiwan” to the
“premise of peaceful settlement,” and to tie the “progressive reduction of forces” to the “gradual
diminution of tension in the area,” because the United States had an interest in the peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue, and the conflicts in Indochina would end in time. The Chinese
side promised to consider his proposal but they preferred the “prospect” of a peaceful settlement
rather than “premise,” arguing that it had a “more active and more bilateral connotation.” Finally
on February 25, less than forty-eight hours before Nixon’s scheduled departure from China, the
Chinese accepted the American formulations. Kissinger claims that he even managed to secure
the Chinese consent to stating that Taiwan was a “part” rather than a “province” of China, thus
avoiding a suggestion of subordination. Though the real American security role on Taiwan was
defined by the mutual defense treaty, neither side mentioned it in the communiqué.114
In the final version of the communiqué, the U.S. position on Taiwan was stated as
follows:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States
government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement
of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the
ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from
Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on
Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.115
As the communiqué came out, U.S. media ignored all others issues and jumped on the
U.S. pledge to “withdraw gradually from Taiwan,” terming it a “major concession.” The Post
headline was “Nixon Pledges Pullout of Forces on Taiwan.” Under a picture where Nixon and
Zhou Enlai stood below a giant statute of Mao, there was an article titled “China Trip: Limited
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Results.” The Times ran a headline, “Taipei is Bitter: Paper Reflecting View of Regime Assails
U.S. ‘Cowardice’”116
Responses from the networks were more favorable. They presented Senators Mike
Mansfield (D-MT), Hugh Scott (R-PA), Edward Kennedy (D-MA), George McGovern (D-SD),
and Representative Paul McCloskey Jr. (R-CA), who praised the communiqué as a forwardlooking document, in front of Senators James Buckley (R-NY) and John Tower (R-TX), and
Representatives John Ashbrook (R-OH) and Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), who expressed either
concern or shock at the American position on Taiwan. The overall response, as described by
Howard K. Smith of ABC, was “cautiously favorable for most part, although there were
dissenters.”117
During the flight from Shanghai to Alaska, Haldeman noted that their press reports did
not include the networks. Even though he tried hard to convince Nixon that the general press was
not that negative, the president was still worried about “dealing with a bad story.” He then
instructed his aides to work in haste on the plane adding points that could clarify his position in
the return message.118 After a long layover in Anchorage scheduled by White House television
specialist Mark Goode, Nixon’s plane arrived in Washington during prime TV time. 119
Surrounded by a large welcoming crowd, Nixon delivered to the cameras his triumphant return
address in which he highlighted what he considered the “heart of the communiqué”--the
agreement of both governments to renounce the use of force in dispute settlement and their
commitment to prevent the domination of Asia by any power. In terms of Taiwan, he
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emphasized that the gradual withdrawal of forces was based on the easing of tensions and that
the United States would not relinquish its commitment to its allies.120
The Post changed its tone after Nixon’s speech. Its headline the next day was “Nixon
back from China Trip, 15,000 Welcome President.” Under it was an article entitled “U.S.
Communiqué is praised by both Parties on Hill.” In its editorial “Sellout’ of Taiwan?” it argued
that the charge of Nixon’s abandonment of Taiwan was “insupportable.” Calling the
communiqué an “agreement to disagree,” the Times argued that it offered “no dramatic
surprises,” but contained “no major disappointments.” It praised the “renunciation of force in
favor of diplomacy” and highlighted the agreement on exchanges in trade, science, technology,
culture, sports and news reporting as a “concrete achievement.”121 The communiqué did not
change the status of Taiwan. People may ask what, if anything, Nixon had brought back from
Beijing. The answer from Time was “the event itself, the fact that it took place.” As far as the
gains of the Nixon’s administration, Newsweek pointed out its success in securing from the
Chinese not to include in the communiqué its usual propaganda tirade that the American defense
treaty with Taiwan was “null and void” and the Chinese agreement to resolve the Taiwan issue
by “peaceful means.” Similar to Time, it argued that the China trip was not a “great leap
forward,” but it was at least an “important first step,” which brought a much better chance of
peace in Asia.122 Overall, the elite media supported the Shanghai Communiqué and reviewed the
significance of Nixon’s China trip favorably.
In China, one noticeable development was that when Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing from
Shanghai where he saw Nixon off, he received an extraordinary warm welcome at the airport.
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The People’s Daily headlined “Resolutely Support and Execute the Revolutionary Diplomatic
Line of Chairman Mao: Premier Zhou was Warmly Received by Five Thousand People at the
Airport upon his Return to Beijing from Shanghai” with three big pictures showing the
welcoming party. Among the party, the article listed several key members of the Politburo
including Mao’s wife, who was the head of the radicals, key leaders of the PLA and the
government.123 As the crowd was much bigger than Zhou normally received when he returned
from somewhere within China, the Times argued that the “triumphant welcome” Zhou received
marked Beijing’s “satisfaction with the outcome of Nixon’s visit as contained in the joint
communiqué.”124 Publicizing the ceremony at the Beijing airport not only showed the consensus
among the Chinese leadership in supporting the outcome of the Nixon visit. It also sent a positive
signal to the United States.
The “TV Spectacle” as Part of the Story
David Broder, a prominent columnist for the Washington Post, wrote that television, with
its strength in images, creates a “communication loop” that makes the TV coverage “part of the
story it is covering.”125 In covering Nixon’s China trip, television, or the “TV spectacle,” did
become a hot topic. Largely feeling at a disadvantage in the competition or due to their envy, the
print media pointed out many problems with their electronic rivals to critique Nixon’s overdoing
of the TV drama.
In its editorial entitled “Spectacle and Substance,” the Times described Nixon’s departure
ceremony as a “genuine drama” with an “elaborately staged fanfare.” It warned of the danger
that the spectacle Nixon had “assiduously” created might obscure the differences between the
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two governments and foster “illusions” about Sino-American relations.126 The Post similarly
maintained that the audience had to tell “show business” from “diplomatic business.” Stanley
Karnow, the Post’s correspondent in Beijing, called Nixon’s visit an exercise of “TV
Diplomacy,” arguing that TV not only helped him maximize public attention, but also helped the
Chinese irritate Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union. He also surmised that the Chinese
leadership might use TV as a “lever” to build up the American expectations that Nixon might
return home with some kind of “arrangement” by inflating his image.127
Time described Nixon’s trip as an excellent opportunity for “a presidential candidate
seeking re-election to make a television appearance.”128 It maintained that all was “elaborate
scrollwork, hiding content.” In its cartoon, Nixon and Mao stood in the middle of TV cameras
and spotlights with a row of saluting guns firing in the background. The caption read, “Just think,
all this will have gone to waste if you’re not re-elected!”129 In an article “TV: An Eyeful of
China, A Thimbleful of Insight,” Newsweek showed CBS journalists “huddled together” in the
Beijing press room, “bemoaning” their isolation and the lack of “hard” news. As it indicated,
CBS president Richard S. Salant decided to cancel live broadcasts on Thursday, saying “we’d
had enough picture postcards” from the Great Wall one day earlier. It also mocked the lack of indepth reporting in television coverage because the networks all sent their most experienced
anchors who “made up standard news teams to cover a spectacular in standard American terms,”
while their sinologists better equipped with digging information from sources in China were
sitting in New York studios “7000 miles from the scene.”130
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As pointed out in a Post editorial, Nixon in his “Man of the Year” interview with Time

had confidently said, “Where you need a lot of rhetoric, a lot of jazz, a lot of flamboyance, is
where you don’t have much to sell.” Using Nixon’s own words, it argued that his effort to
“embellish” his trip with “rhetoric and flamboyance and jazz” was to encourage the suspicion
that he did not have all that much to sell.”131 When television coverage was used to this frothy
extreme, the media themselves began to question what Nixon could bring back from Beijing.
Conclusion
Ever since Beijing made the decision to reconcile with Washington, it faced great tasks in
accustoming the Chinese people to the change in relations. Beijing gradually transmitted Mao
and Zhou’s decision from the central leadership at the top to the ordinary Chinese citizen.
Through the internal channel of the party infrastructure on the first level, it informed leaders at
higher levels to mobilize their support for the departure in China’s foreign policies. On the
second level, the insightful news stories and analyses in the Reference News kept the communist
cadres as well as ordinary party members updated about international developments. It was also
through this internal newspaper that the Chinese audience learned about Nixon’s wish to visit
China, Mao’s desire to meet with him, and the favorable international response to the visit. On
another level, Beijing promoted the friendship between the two peoples through the People’s
Daily in the form of people-to-people diplomacy. By displaying Americans, such as Edgar Snow,
the ping-pong team, the “friendly” visitors, and Henry Kissinger, before Chinese crowds as well
as in the official media, Beijing prepared its people for the new relationship with the United
States.
Though the U.S. government did not have too much work getting its people used to the
change in relations since debates about this topic had been going on in the media increasingly
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frequently since the early 1960s, it faced a challenge from conservatives, especially when it came
to the Taiwan issue. On UN membership, Washington slowly changed its position from banning
China’s entry to preventing Taiwan’s expulsion. Besides disassociating himself from a possible
failure, Nixon asked his aides to tell the media that his administration was fighting hard to keep
the Nationalists in the UN.
Nixon also launched a media campaign to maximize the influence of his trip. In order to
guarantee the success of the “show” in Beijing, the White House granted the TV networks
extraordinary privileges. They not only received more seats in the media plane, but also joined
the advance team in tracking every spot Nixon planned to visit so that they got the best camera
angles. As Nixon hoped, his one-week trip turned out to be a “TV spectacle,” which not only
helped him write history by scoring a success of public relations, but also aroused criticisms
about the lack of “substance” under the fanfare.
As a Post editorial pointed out, although “Nixon overdid the TV bit badly,” television
“helped educate the American people,” showing them that China was not a monster, but a nation
“to be dealt with as best one can.”132 Zhou Enlai must have known what it meant when he agreed
to allow an American press corps of one hundred fifty into China, especially when he agreed to
the proposal of live television coverage. He knew they would be volunteer promoters of China’s
image to the world. Although Nixon’s visit did not formally normalize relations between the two
countries, as journalists and Nixon said during several occasions during that historic week, his
presence in China signified a new relationship between the two countries that had been separated
for more than two decades. The start of exchanges in trade, education, culture, and news
reporting seemed not as significant as the summit. However, the reopening of dialogue through
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these channels provided means by which the peoples of the two countries could engage and learn
about each other before the formal normalization of relations in 1979.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This dissertation does not ask why the Sino-American rapprochement could happen.

Instead, it evaluates “how” it played out in the media in both countries between 1963 and 1972
and what role they played in the evolution of relations. In the Sino-American rapprochement,
media in the United States and China made different contributions because of their relationships
with their governments. Nevertheless, as means of communication, they were similar in their
roles in message sending and preparing the people for the change in relations.
U.S. Media
This study addresses the issue of the relationship between American media and the
government in terms of foreign policy. Scholars of communications have developed several
theories on this topic. One school of thought, widely known as the “hegemony” school, claims
that government manipulates the media when officials “stage events, leak selective information,
cover up facts behind a wall of secrecy, overwhelm the media with barrages of press releases,”
and of course, lie occasionally to the point that the media become “putty in the hands of the
president and his legion of media managers.” A fundamental argument of the “hegemony” theory
is that the media have “no independent contribution” to the foreign-policy debate. A contrary
school portrays the media as participants in the foreign-policy process. For members of this
school, the media play the role of the “fourth estate” of the government with unique influence on
policy. The problem with the hegemony theory is that it perceives the media as too “subservient”
to the government.1 The “fourth estate” school, on the other hand, tends to exaggerate the role of
the media in the policy-making of the government.
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In my study of the elite U.S. media’s coverage of Sino-American relations, I find that

they did make an “independent contribution” to the reconciliation between the two countries.
They played important roles as transmitters of diplomatic signals and active participants. They
also educated the American people about the progress and significance of Sino-American
reconciliation.
As transmitters of political information, U.S. media functioned as a “diplomatic signaling
system” between the two governments, especially when direct communications did not exist.2
When Nixon and other U.S. officials addressed China by its proper name, or emphasized its
importance in world affairs, they expected the media to deliver these gestures of friendliness to
the American public as well as the leadership in Beijing. However, there were times when the
messages did not get across. For example, Beijing’s signals through Edgar Snow were not
delivered to Nixon at an earlier time because of the media’s suspicion of communist
sympathizers. Moreover, when Nixon “casually” talked about his intention to visit China, his
remarks attracted more media attention in China than in the United States. In both cases, the
media’s intentional or unintentional underestimation of the signals’ importance caused the failure
of their transmission. To some extent, they reflect the independence of the media in transmitting
the political information.
By participants, Robert M. Batscha means that the media acted as an “advocate” of policy
and “representative of the people” in foreign relations.3 U.S. media’s advocacy of foreign-policy
options caused them to endorse or to criticize government policies. During the Johnson
administration, newspapers and newsmagazines acted as powerful critics of the government’s
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inflexible China policy, especially after the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Chinese
nuclear test in 1964. Besides calling on the government to make initiatives to reduce tension with
China and incorporate it into the international community, they criticized officials who evoked
the “China threat” as an excuse for the American involvement in Vietnam. In both the Johnson
and Nixon administrations, journalists urged Washington to be more creative on the issue of
China’s UN membership and to move toward a “two-China” solution sooner to prevent the
expulsion of Taiwan before it was too late. In these cases, media ran ahead of public opinion and
the government in pushing for policy reform.
As the relations between the two countries began to unfreeze, especially after Ping-Pong
Diplomacy in April 1971, Beijing admitted members of the U.S. media into China, treating them
with extraordinary privileges and displaying them to the Chinese people. By winning over
prominent opinion influencers such as James Reston and the New York Times, Beijing promoted
the image of China among the American people. These journalists not only wrote generally
favorable stories about China, but also acted as “cultural diplomats” between the two peoples
when official contacts were scarce.
Sometimes the media played the role of participants when they became part of the stories
they covered. During Ping-Pong Diplomacy, Vice-President Spiro Agnew accused U.S. media of
helping the Chinese government win a “propaganda triumph” over the United States. The use of
live television to cover Nixon’s visit was unprecedented in history. While it helped him achieve a
public-relations success, the media criticized Nixon for arousing unrealistic expectations because
of his overuse of television. By talking about the distinction between “content” and “form,” they
questioned how much the President could bring home.
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The media educated the American people about China policy by providing forums for

public deliberation. The best example was the Fulbright Hearings in 1966 when their prominent
and intensive coverage magnified critical voices in the academic community and Congress. It
contributed to the relaxation of public hostility toward China. Moreover, when Washington
announced new initiatives to China, the media illuminated their significance with phrases such as
“the most significant,” or “a major step.” These positive responses helped the government win
public support. If the readiness of American people was an important cause for Nixon to make
bolder moves toward China upon taking office, the media made a great contribution.
Because the media did not have to worry about political restrictions as the U.S.
government did, they had more freedom elaborating on issues that Washington could not openly
talk about. The concept of “containment without isolation” had existed in the U.S. media long
before the Johnson administration acknowledged it. During the Cultural Revolution, the Johnson
team refrained from making comments on the Chinese domestic politics to avoid provoking
China or undermining the moderate forces in China. In contrast, U.S. media reported widely the
violence in China. Some even reported the U.S. interests in the victory of Mao’s faction. After
the eruption of Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969, while the Nixon Administration
assumed a posture of impartiality in order to avoid provoking the Soviet Union (even though in
private it tilted toward China), U.S. media was not worried about upsetting Moscow when they
openly wrote and spoke about the benefits of closer ties with Beijing. Similarly, while they made
a variety of sensational speculations in response to the Lin Biao affair, Washington neither
inquired about it with Beijing nor made comments to avoid sabotaging Nixon’s China trip. In
these cases, the media did have independent voices when they provided policy options for the
government to consider.
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Despite my argument that U.S. media made independent contributions to Sino-American

rapprochement, they were far from being completely “independent” players. They relied heavily
on the government as the main source in reporting foreign affairs. Kissinger’s secret trip to China
is a good example where the government totally denied the media access to the political process.
Moreover, there were ample examples where the U.S. government turned a deaf ear to prominent
news agencies’ call to admit China into the UN. On the other hand, even though the government
initiated policies, media’s abilities to set the agenda of political debates and to influence public
opinion make them a restraining force that the government could not manipulate at will or
simply ignore. For example, whereas Nixon wanted to illustrate his comprehensive approach to
the world situation in his annual foreign policy report, both the Times and the Post focused on
Vietnam in their headlines. In another example, while Nixon wanted to demonstrate the historic
significance of his China trip, several journalists focused on his “betrayal” of Taiwan in the
Shanghai Communiqué.
Though media comparison is not the focus of this dissertation, I would like to point out
some observations based on comparisons among different media agencies. Between the two elite
newspapers under study, the New York Times appeared much more forthcoming than the
Washington Post in promoting an improvement in Sino-American relations. During the Cultural
Revolution, the Post was more graphic in describing the chaos in China and Red Guard
brutalities. On Sino-Soviet conflicts in 1969, while the Times editorials promoted closer ties with
Beijing, the Post editorials appeared more detached. When Warsaw talks were renewed in 1970,
the Times was more optimistic about the prospect of better relations than the Post, which showed
more suspicion of Beijing’s intention. Between the two magazines, while Time was more hostile

!

!

233!

to China before the death of Henry Luce, Newsweek was more balanced in presenting views from
different perspectives.
In comparison to the print media, the three networks devoted less space to news analysis
and were generally more neutral in their brief “headline” reporting. As a visual medium with a
much larger audience, television had a larger impact, especially when it provided live coverage
of the events. They made a great contribution to the success of Ping-Pong Diplomacy in 1971
and Nixon’s visit in 1972. The large amount of videos they provided about China and the
friendly exchanges between the two peoples were truly refreshing to the American audience after
two decades of alienation between the two countries.
Chinese Media
Different from the independent U.S. media, Chinese media are controlled by the
Communist Party to serve its own political interests. The People’s Daily and the Reference News
represented the two levels of information transmission in China: public and internal. During the
period under study, the People’s Daily mainly worked to propagate China’s image as a fighter
against “imperialists” and “revisionists.” The anti-American and anti-Soviet articles aimed not
only to mobilize Mao’s domestic struggle against his political enemies, but also to display
Beijing’s support for the revolutionary struggles around the world, especially those in Indochina.
By attacking the Soviet Union as the “number-one accomplice” of the American “imperialists,”
Beijing assumed a moral high ground in its ideological conflict with Moscow.
The propaganda in the People’s Daily had nuances. On the conflicts in Indochina, Beijing
was radical in words but cautious in deeds. Even though it repeatedly warned against the
American “war provocations” and expressed the Chinese determination to support peoples in
these areas with all means, readers could see its lack of commitment as it did not specify when
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and how it would intervene. When Hanoi decided to negotiate with Washington in 1968, Beijing
displayed its unhappiness by remaining silent and lowering the place of Hanoi on its list of
“friends” in the media. During the Cultural Revolution, despite Beijing’s fierce attacks on the
Soviet Union, the People’s Daily was silent on their conflicts on the border. The contrast showed
that Beijing did not want to start a real war with the Soviet Union. When it started to report the
border clashes after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Moscow had changed from an
ideological opponent to a threat to Beijing. When Beijing had made major progress with
Washington in improving their relations, its low key in announcing it and its continued attacks
on the United States reflected its effort to hold together its ideological friends, particularly those
opposed to the United States.
Besides its propaganda function, the People’s Daily was an important channel through
which Beijing sent diplomatic signals to Washington. It publicized Beijing’s “four points” when
the Vietnam conflicts were dramatically escalated. When Beijing decided to move closer to
Washington, it publicized the release of American prisoners and the photos carrying Chinese
leaders and the “friendly American” Edgar Snow as signals of a new posture. By 1970, even its
anti-American tirades in response to incursions into Cambodia and Laos became relatively
toothless.
The People’s Daily also played an important role when Beijing felt the need to reorient
the public’s opinion toward the United States. By keeping the distinction between the American
“government” and the American “people,” it promoted the friendship between the two peoples.
Moreover, by giving prominent and intensive coverage to the activities of American visitors,
Beijing tried to get its people used to the fact that their government was dealing with Americans.
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As an internal newspaper, the Reference News targeted only a limited number of Chinese

Communist cadres as well as intellectuals and constituted the only legal way for them to learn
about the outside world. Being less propagandistic, it reprinted foreign news agencies’ objective
reports about China’s diplomatic problems with North Korea, Cambodia, and even North
Vietnam during the Cultural Revolution. More importantly, it transmitted friendly signals from
Washington in their original forms, usually with comments about their significance for SinoAmerican relations. When Beijing decided to reconcile with Washington, it reported Chinese
signals to the United States, also with comments on their significance.
With the dramatic expansion of its circulation in August 1970, the Reference News
played a particularly important role in preparing Party members and intellectuals for a change in
Sino-American relations. Its reproduction of foreign news agencies’ insightful analyses of the
benefits of Sino-American rapprochement, especially by considering the impact on the Soviet
Union, Japan and Taiwan, and the favorable world response, provided useful perspectives for the
Chinese audience to consider. A comparison between the People’s Daily and the Reference News
shows that, under its cover of anti-American invective, Beijing had started preparing its cadres
for the reconciliation with its former number-one enemy long before it became evident.
For all the differences between the U.S. and Chinese media in terms of their freedom of
action and mechanisms of news reporting, they were similar in their roles as deliverers of
diplomatic signals and educators of their respective publics for the change in Sino-American
relations. The media in both countries were also interrelated because they used each other as the
source of information. By reading the People’s Daily closely, the U.S. media tried to find clues
about the domestic and foreign policies of China. Similarly, many news stories in the Reference
News actually came from the U.S. media. The most important feature they share is their ability to
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influence public opinion, although it is admitted that there were few dissenting opinions in
China.
Sino-American rapprochement remains a fascinating topic for scholars. The study of the
media’s role offers interesting but not definitive evaluation of this historic process. Nevertheless,
it demonstrates the importance of the media for both governments in presenting their foreign
policies to their respective publics. In a broader sense, it provides food for thought in the
continuing debate about the government-media relationship in the United States. By showing the
unique way by which Beijing handled policy legitimacy within the Party and the general public
in particular, moreover, it presents a more nuanced picture of the “propaganda state” of China
and challenges the idea that the media in Communist countries were only used for political
indoctrination.4
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READING THE TEA LEAVES:
THE MEDIA AND SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT, 1963-1972
by
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
This dissertation aims to find out what role(s) the media in the United States and China
played in their historic rapprochement from 1963 to 1972. In order to examine how they covered
the major events that affected Sino-American relations, I select seven elite U.S. media and two
Chinese official newspapers to study. These media include: the New York Times, Washington
Post, Time, Newsweek, CBS, ABC, NBC, People’s Daily, and Reference News,
The study is based on the assumption that media, instead of reporting the information
“objectively,” have the ability to affect the content they deliver and set the agenda for public
discussions. Therefore, I examine how the media in both countries dealt with the events in terms
of selectivity, placement, images, and opinions.
The dissertation argues that the U.S. media did make independent contributions to the
thaw in relations and that the Chinese media were much more sophisticated than most people
think. As important participants in Sino-American relations, U.S. media criticized Washington’s
rigid China policy in the 1960s. In the early 1970s, American journalists functioned as
representatives of the people whom Beijing tried to befriend. The Chinese media were not
merely propaganda tools for political indoctrination. Through them, Beijing took calculated steps
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to prepare the Chinese people at different levels of the political hierarchy for the reconciliation
with its former “number-one enemy.” Media in both countries, despite their differences in
freedom of action and operation mechanisms, played important roles as a “diplomatic signaling
system” and in educating their respective publics for the change in relations.
This study is important because it enriches the study of Sino-American rapprochement
through the lenses of the media, an understudied but vital institution that reflected and influenced
the two publics’ perception of the relations. It not only readdresses the issue of governmentmedia relationship in the United States, but also maps out the development of Beijing’s approach
to the United States without relying on its highly classified state documents. Essentially, it
reveals the “agency” of the U.S. media and the nuances in the “propaganda state” of China.
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